Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

“Bringing Home the Bacon”: Distributive Politics in China’s National People’s Congress

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Journal of Chinese Political Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

While many researchers have extensively studied the distributive politics of legislatures in liberal democracies, only a few have examined the role of those legislatures outside of liberal democracies in the geographical distribution of public resources, and their findings have been inconsistent. Based on an original dataset of 75,797 deputy proposals of China’s National People’s Congress from 2008 to 2017, this article first reveals that when deputies from a particular province submitted more proposals about constituency interests, it usually resulted in more central fiscal transfer payments to that province. However, a province whose relevant proposals were signed by more deputies usually received fewer fiscal resources. Deputy proposals can influence governmental policymaking to a certain extent, but deputies are discouraged from mobilizing bottom-up collective action. This study further indicates whether and how legislatures outside liberal democracies influence public resource distribution and sheds light on the limitation of such influence.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and the People’s Liberation Army are excluded from the analysis because these regions and organizations are not related to central fiscal transfer payments.

  2. Tax returns include returns from the central government of the value added tax, consumption tax, income tax and refined oil product tax to compensate for the loss of local governments after the tax reform.

  3. General transfer payments refer to relatively rule- and formula-based transfer payments that are allocated mainly to fiscally starved regions; examples of these payments are the subsidy received for fiscal equalization, the subsidy received by minority regions, the subsidy for rural tax reform, and the wage-increase subsidy.

  4. Special transfer payments are the earmarked subsidies supporting clearly specified projects, such as education, health care, social security, and agriculture.

  5. NPC deputies of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and the People’s Liberation Army are elected by special electoral units instead of by PPCs.

  6. A small number of NPC deputies change the delegations to which they belong during their terms because they change their jobs and work in another province.

  7. For example, in the 2012 NPC session, deputies put forth 489 motions and 477 of them were about law making, while 8189 deputy proposals were submitted. The data come from http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/huiyi/ztbg/11j5cdhyasyjgjybl/2012-03/14/content_1794310.htm and http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/huiyi/ztbg/11j5cdhyasyjgjybl/2012-04/07/content_1751631.htm which are collected on July 13 2021.

  8. The dataset completely covers the terms of the 11th and 12th NPCs. It is a pity that the information of a small number of deputy proposals is missing for unknown reasons. However, the dataset is still among the best ones till now for studying China’s NPC.

  9. In this article, for those NPC deputies who are elected by PPCs, their constituencies refer to the corresponding provinces, except that for those NPC deputies who have changed the delegations to which they belong during their terms, their constituencies are regarded as also being changed accordingly in this research.

  10. The proposals concerning rural areas of the whole country are also not coded as CI proposals because rural areas are in almost every province and municipality.

  11. It is possible that some proposals mention constituency interests in their full texts instead of in titles and such proposals can hardly be coded as CI proposals because the full texts of proposals are not available. This limitation needs to be addressed in the future when the full texts of proposals are available.

  12. The number is the total number of the deputies submitting and seconding relevant proposals. The deputy who submits or seconds more than one proposal is repeatedly counted. The proposals raised by one or more NPC delegations are not counted.

  13. It refers to the proportion of the GDP of secondary industry.

  14. It refers to the proportion of the GDP of tertiary industry.

  15. It refers to the rate of total import–export volume in GDP.

  16. It refers to the rate of fiscal revenue in fiscal expenditure.

  17. It refers to the number of people who are permanent residents.

  18. It refers to the number of NPC deputies in each province at the beginning of the 11th or 12th NPCs’ terms.

  19. It refers to the number of proposals NOT about constituency interests submitted by deputies in a province.

  20. It refers to a province’s total number of proposals not about constituency interests and proposals about constituency interests but not addressed by the Ministry of Finance.

  21. CPC’s Political Bureau meetings were not held during the NPC sessions between 2007 and 2016.

  22. The main agenda of each CPC’s Political Bureau meeting is usually published in official media after the end of the meeting. The impoverished areas in agendas were regarded by this study as the provinces of which the GDP per capita is equal to or lower than the 25% quantiles each year. In addition, populous provinces in agendas were regarded as the provinces of which the numbers of populations are equal to or larger than 75% quantiles.

  23. Interview with NPC deputy 01, the director of a hospital, Jan 19, 2017.

  24. Interview with NPC deputy 01, the director of a hospital, Nov 29, 2017.

  25. ibid.

  26. Interview with NPC deputy 02, the owner of a farm, Nov 29, 2017.

  27. Interview with NPC deputy 03, a village cadre, June 11, 2017.

  28. It is a binary variable referring to whether a certain deputy is reelected into the next NPC.

  29. It refers to the total number of deputies signing the proposals submitted by a certain deputy. The deputy who signs more than one proposal is repeatedly counted. The natural logarithm of the variable is used in the analysis. 1 is added to all values of the variable before they are transformed to the natural logarithm because of the existence of “0” values.

  30. 0 refers to male and 1 refers to female.

  31. 0 refers to Han people and 1 refers to ethnic minority.

  32. Age refers to an NPC deputy’s age in 2008 (for the 11th NPC) or 2013 (for the 12th NPC).

  33. Education levels include primary school, junior high school, senior high school/technical secondary school, junior college, undergraduate, master and doctor.

  34. Party affiliations include CPC members, members of democratic parties, and nonparty personages.

  35. Twenty-five types of occupations are categorized, including central officials, provincial officials, municipal officials, county-level or township-level officials, leaders of political consultative conferences, community cadres, village cadres, leaders of nonprofit work units, leaders of people’s organizations, leaders of social organizations, leaders of democratic parties, leaders of state-owned enterprises, managers of private enterprises, leaders of private nonenterprise organizations, private entrepreneurs, urban individual business owners, professionals, workers in industries and service industries, junior staff in public organizations, agricultural labors, unemployed urban residents, soldiers, full-time NPC deputies, full-time local PC deputies, retired full-time PC deputies.

  36. Levels of organizations include central work units, provincial work units, municipal work units and below, and nonstate sectors.

  37. Standing committee is the permanent body of the NPC. This variable refers to whether a deputy is a member of the standing committee.

  38. Special committees are institutions under the leadership of the NPC and its standing committee. This variable refers to whether a deputy is a member of special committees.

  39. This variable refers to the number of proposals submitted by each NPC deputy during a five-year term. The natural logarithm of the variable is used in the analysis. 1 is added to all values of the variable before they are transformed to the natural logarithm because of the existence of “0” values.

  40. The link for the NPC website: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/index.shtml.

  41. Baidu Encyclopedia is an online Chinese encyclopedia, and the personal information of many Chinese prominent figures, including NPC deputies, can be found here.

References

  1. Aidt, Toke S., and Julia Shvets. 2012. Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (3): 1–29.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Albouy, David. 2013. Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds. The Review of Economics and Statistics 95 (1): 127–141.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Alexander, Dan, Christopher R. Berry, and William G. Howell. 2016. Distributive Politics and Legislator Ideology. The Journal of Politics 78 (1): 214–231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Alvarez, R. Michael., and Jason L. Saving. 1997. Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits: Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel in the 1980s. Political Research Quarterly 50 (4): 809–831.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Alvarez, R. Michael., and Jason L. Saving. 1997. Congressional Committees and the Political Economy of Federal Outlays. Public Choice 92 (1): 55–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Arnold, R. Douglas. 1979. Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Atlas, Cary M., Thomas W. Gilligan, Robert J. Hendershott, and Mark A. Zupan. 1995. Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. The American Economic Review 85 (3): 624–629.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Aytaç, S. Erdem. 2014. Distributive Politics in a Multiparty System: The Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Turkey. Comparative Political Studies 47 (9): 1211–1237.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Balla, Steven J., Eric D. Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, and Lee Sigelman. 2002. Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork. American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 515–525.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Banful, Afua Branoah. 2011. Do Formula-Based Intergovernmental Transfer Mechanisms Eliminate Politically Motivated Targeting? Evidence from Ghana. Journal of Development Economics 96 (2): 380–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending. The American Political Science Review 104 (4): 783–799.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Bickers, Kenneth N., and Robert M. Stein. 1996. The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel. American Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 1300–1326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Chen, Chuanmin. 2019. Getting Their Voices Heard: Strategies of China’s Provincial People’s Congress Deputies to Influence Policies. The China Journal 82: 46–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Cho, Young Nam. 2009. Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  16. Dynes, Adam M., and Gregory A. Huber. 2015. Partisanship and the Allocation of Federal Spending: Do Same-Party Legislators or Voters Benefit from Shared Party Affiliation with the President and House Majority? The American Political Science Review 109 (1): 172–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Ezrow, Natasha M., and Erica Frantz. 2011. STATE INSTITUTIONS AND THE SURVIVAL OF DICTATORSHIPS. Journal of International Affairs 65 (1): 1–13.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Fan, Bonai, and Ming Zhang. 2011. Jiyu Mianban Fenxi de Zhonguo Shengji Xingzheng Quyu Huoqu Zhongyang Caizheng Zhuanyi Zhifu de Shizheng Yanjiu (A Study on the Determinants of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in China: A Panel Data Approach). Zhejiang daxue xuebao (renwen shehui kexue ban) 41 (1): 34–44.

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  19. Ferejohn, John A. 1974. Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947–1968. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Frenkiel, Emilie. 2021. Participatory Budgeting and Political Representation in China. Journal of Chinese Governance 6 (1): 58–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  22. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. Comparative Political Studies 40 (11): 1279–1301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Golden, Miriam A., and Lucio Picci. 2008. Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–94. American Journal of Political Science 52 (2): 268–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Goss, Carol F. 1972. Military Committee Membership and Defense-Related Benefits in the House of Representatives. Western Political Quarterly 25 (2): 215–233.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Gu, Yanfeng, et al. 2021. Global Justice Index Report 2020. Chinese Political Science Review 6 (3): 322–486.

    Article  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  26. Gu, Yanfeng, et al. 2022. Global Justice Index Report 2021. Chinese Political Science Review 7 (3): 322–465.

    Article  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  27. Hammond, Ben, and Leah Rosenstiel. 2020. Measuring the Influence of Political Actors on the Federal Budget. American Political Science Review 114 (2): 603–608.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Han, Kangwook. 2020. Distributive Politics in Authoritarian Regimes. PhD Dissertation. Michigan State University.

  29. He, Junzhi. 2005. Zhidu Dengdai Liyi: Zhongguo Xianji Renda Zhidu Moshi Yanjiu (Institutions in Search of Roles: The Growth of China’s County People’s Congresses). Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Heurlin, Christopher. 2016. Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  31. Hird, John A. 1991. The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The American Political Science Review 85 (2): 429–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. Jiang, Junyan, and Muyang Zhang. 2020. Friends with Benefits: Patronage Networks and Distributive Politics in China. Journal of Public Economics 184: 104143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Kamo, Tomoki, and Hiroki Takeuchi. 2012. Representation and Local People’s Congresses in China: A Case Study of the Yangzhou Municipal People’s Congress. Journal of Chinese Political Science 18 (1): 41–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Kautz, Carolin. 2020. Power Struggle or Strengthening the Party: Perspectives on Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Campaign. Journal of Chinese Political Science 25: 501–511.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Kiewiet, D. Roderick., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Knight, Brian. 2005. Estimating the Value of Proposal Power. American Economic Review 95 (5): 1639–1652.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  37. Knight, Brian. 2008. Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress. The Economic Journal 118 (532): 1785–1803.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Kong, Weina. 2016. Gongneng Yu Guocheng Shiye Xia de Zhuanyi Zhifu Fengpei: Jiyu Shengji Mianban Shuju de Fenxi (The Allocation of the Fiscal Transfer from the Perspectives of Function and Process: An Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data). Difang caizheng yanjiu 6: 46–53.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Lancaster, Thomas D. 1986. Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics. International Political Science Review 7 (1): 67–81.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  41. Lazarus, Jeffrey. 2009. Party, Electoral Vulnerability, and Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives. The Journal of Politics 71 (3): 1050–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. Lee, Frances E. 2000. Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics. The American Political Science Review 94 (1): 59–72.

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  43. Leigh, Andrew. 2008. Bringing Home the Bacon: An Empirical Analysis of the Extent and Effects of Pork-Barreling in Australian Politics. Public Choice 137 (1–2): 279–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  44. Li, Xiangyu. 2015. Zhongguo Renda Daibiao Xingdong Zhong de “Fenpei” Zhengzhi: Dui 2009–2011 Nian G Sheng Shengji Renda Dahui Jianyi He Xunwen de Fenxi(“Distributive Politics” among People’s Representatives in China: An Analysis of the Proposals and Queries in the Provincial People’s Congress of G Province, 2009–2011). Kaifang shidai 4: 140–156.

    CAS  Google Scholar 

  45. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. 1988. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  46. Liu, Dawei. 2022. A Rational Policy Design or Contingent Historical Creation? Considering the Emergence of China’s Distributed Solar Power Generation Regime. Journal of Contemporary China 31 (136): 539–557.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  47. Lü, Xiaobo, Mingxing Liu, and Feiyue Li. 2020. Policy Coalition Building in an Authoritarian Legislature: Evidence From China’s National Assemblies (1983–2007). Comparative Political Studies 53 (9): 1380–1416.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  48. Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. Comparative Political Studies 41 (4): 715–741.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  49. Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament. American Political Science Review 104 (3): 482–502.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  50. Malik, Rabia. 2021. (A)Political Constituency Development Funds: Evidence from Pakistan. British Journal of Political Science 51 (3): 963–980.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  51. Manion, Melanie. 2014. Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in China. The China Quarterly 218: 311–338.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  52. Manion, Melanie. 2015. Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  53. Manion, Melanie. 2016. “Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections. Comparative Political Studies 50 (3): 362–394.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  54. Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Meinke, Scott R. 2018. Distributive Politics and Party Participation in the U.S. House. American Politics Research 46 (4): 671–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  56. Meng, Tianguang, Jennifer Pan, and Ping Yang. 2017. Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in China. Comparative Political Studies 50 (4): 399–433.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  57. Meserve, Stephen A. 2017. Deadly Politics: Elections, Medical Spending, and Mortality. Studies in Comparative International Development 52 (1): 115–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  58. O’Brien, Kevin J. 1989. Legislative Development and Chinese Political Change. Studies in Comparative Communism 22 (1): 57–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  59. O’Brien, Kevin J. 1990. Reform without Liberalization: China’s National People’s Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  60. Qiaoan, Runya, and Jessica C. Teets. 2020. Responsive Authoritarianism in China – a Review of Responsiveness in Xi and Hu Administrations. Journal of Chinese Political Science 25 (1): 139–153.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  61. Raiser, Martin. 1998. Subsidising Inequality: Economic Reforms, Fiscal Transfers and Convergence across Chinese Provinces. The Journal of Development Studies 34 (3): 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  62. Ray, Bruce A. 1981. Military Committee Membership in the House of Representatives and the Allocation of Defense Department Outlays. Western Political Quarterly 34 (2): 222–234.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  63. Rundquist, Barry S. 1978. On Testing a Military Industrial Complex Theory. American Politics Quarterly 6 (1): 29–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  64. Rundquist, Barry, Jeong-Hwa. Lee, and Jungho Rhee. 1996. The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending: Some State Level Evidence. Legislative Studies Quarterly 21 (2): 265–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  65. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization. American Journal of Political Science 25 (1): 96–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  66. Shepsle, Kenneth A., Robert P. Van Houweling, Samuel J. Abrams, and Peter C. Hanson. 2009. The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics. American Journal of Political Science 53 (2): 343–359.

    Article  PubMed  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  67. Stein, Robert M., and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1994. Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel. The Journal of Politics 56 (2): 377–399.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  68. Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  69. Tanner, Murray Scot. 1994. The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China. The China Quarterly 138: 381–403.

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  70. Tian, Youfei. 2021. The Anti-corruption Discourse of China: Cracking down on “Tigers.” Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences. 14: 587–610.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  71. Timmons, Jeffrey F., and Daniel Broid. 2013. The Political Economy of Municipal Transfers: Evidence from Mexico. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 43(4): 551–79.

  72. Truex, Rory. 2016. Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  73. Wang, Shaoguang. 2002. Zhongguo Caizheng Zhuanyi Zhifu de Zhengzhi Luoji (The Political Logic of the Fiscal Transfer in China). Zhanlve yu guanli 3: 47–54.

    Google Scholar 

  74. Wang, Zhongyuan. 2020. Engineering Representation in A Single-Party Regime: A Mobilizational Model of Political Representation in China’s Local Congresses. Journal of Chinese Political Science 25 (3): 371–393.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  75. Wang, Chenxi. 2021. Legal and Political Practices in China’s Central-Local Dynamics. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 14 (4): 523–547.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  76. Wang, Kai. 2022. Does Poverty Relief Breed Corruption? An Evaluation of China’s Poverty Alleviation Program. Journal of Chinese Political Science 27 (2): 341–374.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  77. Wang, Zhongyuan, and Su Yun Woo. 2021. Deliberative Representation: How Chinese Authorities Enhance Political Representation by Public Deliberation. Journal of Chinese Governance 7(4): 583–615.

  78. Wang, Jiayuan, Yang Zou, and Qingbin Wang. 2014. Fiscal Transfers From the Central Government to Provinces in China: Potential Influence of the Native-Place Connections of Politburo Members. Journal of Chinese Economics 2 (3): 14.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Washida, Hidekuni. 2019. Distributive Politics in Malaysia: Maintaining Authoritarian Party Dominance. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

    Google Scholar 

  80. Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. 1988. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. Journal of Political Economy 96 (1): 132–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  81. Wong, Mathew Y. H. 2022. Performance, Factions, and Promotion in China: The Role of Provincial Transfers. Journal of Chinese Political Science 27 (1): 41–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  82. Xia, Ming. 2007. The People’s Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network Mode of Governance. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  83. Yang, Xuedong, and Jian Yan. 2021. Governance Edging out Representation? Explaining the Imbalanced Functions of China’s People’s Congress System. Journal of Chinese Governance 6 (1): 110–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  84. Young, Andrew T., and Russell S. Sobel. 2013. Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spending at the State Level: Keynesian Stimulus or Distributive Politics? Public Choice 155 (3–4): 449–468.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  85. Zhan, Jing. 2011. Zhongyang Dui Sheng Caizheng Zhuanyi Zhifu de Jueding Yinsu: Gongping, Yijia, Haishi Xiaoyi? (The Determinants of Central Fiscal Transfer: Fairness, Bargaining, or Efficiency). Jingji shehui tizhi bijiao 158 (6): 73–84.

    Google Scholar 

  86. Zheng, Bingdao, Gu. Yanfeng, and Xu. Duo. 2020. No Taxation Without Representation? An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Democratization and Tax Compliance. Chinese Political Science Review 5 (2): 200–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  87. Zhu, Demi, and Shuai Cao. 2020. Decision-Making and Risk Sources: Key to Source Governance for Social Stability. Chinese Political Science Review 5 (1): 95–110.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  88. Zuo, Cai. 2022. Political Selection Institutions and Policy Performance: Evidence from China. Chinese Political Science Review. 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-022-00225-5(November12.

  89. Zuo, Cai (Vera). 2022. Legislator Attributes and Advocacy Focus: Non-Electoral Sources of Parochialism in an Indirectly-Elected Legislature. Studies in Comparative International Development. 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-022-09373-w(October2.

  90. Zuo, Cai, Linchuan Zhang, and Liting Pan. 2020. Difang Renda Zhong de Diyu Daibiao Xianxiang Tanxi: Jiyu Wu Shengshi Renda Daibiao Jianyi de Neirong Fenxi (Geographic Representation in Local Congresses in China: An Analysis Based on Deputy Suggestive Bills in Five Provincial Congresses). Kaifang shidai 2: 145–158.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for valuable comments and suggestions by Junzhi He, Xinhui Jiang, Xiangyu Li, Lingling Qi, Qing Wang, Xingjian Yan, Qingjie Zeng, Pei Zhong, the anonymous reviewers, and editors. All remaining errors are the author’s own.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Government, East China University of Political Science and Law, No. 555, Longyuan Road, Shanghai, 201620, People’s Republic of China

    Chuanmin Chen

Authors
  1. Chuanmin Chen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Chuanmin Chen.

Ethics declarations

Conflicts of Interests/Competing interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplementary Information

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary file1 (DOCX 122 KB)

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Chen, C. “Bringing Home the Bacon”: Distributive Politics in China’s National People’s Congress. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 29, 133–157 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-022-09842-y

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-022-09842-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation