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Engineering Representation in A Single-Party Regime: A Mobilizational Model of Political Representation in China’s Local Congresses

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Abstract

Can authoritarian regimes provide meaningful representation to their citizens? Political representation has been primarily considered and discussed in liberal-democratic settings. However, why do authoritarian rulers care about representation? How can authoritarian rulers engender representation in their relationship with the ruled? China presents an ideal case to examine these questions in light of the party regime’s strong claims to represent its people and the recent reforms in utilizing mobilizational means to generate representation. Drawing on first-hand data collected from thirteen fieldwork sites across eastern, middle and western regions of China, this article outlines a mobilizational model of political representation under non-liberal environments by unpacking the dynamics, process, and logic of congressional representation in China. The findings of this article suggest that the Chinese party regime is strongly motivated to employ mobilizational means to engineer congress representation in the context of declining use of electoral accountability. Although it still meets with shortcomings and challenges, the mass-line mobilizational pattern of representation is instrumentalized by the ruling party for regime-sustaining purposes, therefore creating the potential for a form of representative authoritarianism to emerge in China.

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Notes

  1. See Suzanne Dovi (2006), “Political Representation,” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/ (accessed June 1, 2017).

  2. The scene is recalled based on LPC document archives, pictures and a related interview by the author.

  3. Deputies of Chinese congress at county and township levels are directly elected by voters. But the elections have been systematically controlled by the party regime through various tactics. See Wang [41].

  4. The Party’s leadership over local congresses mainly takes two forms: first, control key leaders and party groups in congresses; second, lead congressional election and representation by maintaining their correct political direction. In fact, the organization and operation of people’s congress are in many aspects similar to the CCP’s party congress.

  5. This doesn’t mean there is no variation in congress performance in different places. For discussions on how regional variation in political-economic conditions influences the performance of deputies, see Chen [5].

  6. This is part of the Party’s core doctrine of the “Three Represents”.

  7. See the Deputy Law 2010, Article 6.

  8. See the Deputy Law 2010, Article 45.

  9. See the Deputy Law 2010, Article 47.

  10. Representatives who are “delegates” are required and expected to follow the expressed preferences of their constituents.

  11. Interviews with congress officials in Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Chongqing, Guangxi, and Yunnan.

  12. See http://npc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1022/c14576-25886850.html (accessed December 07, 2015).

  13. For discussions on China’s representation crisis, see Thornton [37].

  14. This goes against Kevin O’Brien’s observation in 1990s that the dominant role of deputies was to transmit the “central spirit.” See O’Brien [23].

  15. Interview with LPC officials at S district, Shanghai; interview with LPC officials in H City, Zhejiang; interview with a party official at H district, Beijing.

  16. Relevant official documents were found at fieldwork sites in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guizhou, Chongqing, Yunnan, and Guangxi.

  17. Interviews with LPC officials at B district and P district, Shanghai; Interview with two LPC officials at N county, Anhui; interview with a congress vice-director, at B county, Guangxi.

  18. Unpublished congress reports at X district, Beijing. Similar statements were made by congress officials in my fieldwork interviews.

  19. Calculated by the author based on unpublished internal documents from the S district congress, H city. Relevant archives that document deputies’ voter reception services are found in all my fieldwork counties.

  20. In a very remote township in Guangxi (a least-likely case), we also found similar efforts.

  21. Interview with two LPC officials at B district and three LPC officials at S district, Shanghai; interview with two LPC deputies at N county, Anhui; interview with a deputy director at S district, H city, Zhejiang; interviews with two township deputies, B county, Shaanxi; interviews with two LPC chairpersons at N county, Yunnan.

  22. Interview with a LPC director at P district, Shanghai; interview with two LPC officials H City, Zhejiang; interview with two LPC chairpersons at N county, Yunnan.

  23. Congress archives of deputies’ representation activities, X sub-district, H city, Zhejiang.

  24. Congress archives of deputies’ representation activities, N sub-district, Shanghai.

  25. Similar practices are observed in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Guangxi and Yunnan.

  26. See the Deputy Law 2015, Articles 22, 23, 24.

  27. Interviews with LPC officials in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shaanxi, Guangxi, and Yunnan.

  28. See Article 42 of the Deputy Law 2010.

  29. Related cases are recorded in congress archives in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Guangxi.

  30. See Article 36 of the Deputy Law 2010.

  31. This is backed by Article 38 of the Deputy Law 2015.

  32. This is backed by Article 22 of the Deputy Law 2015. Seen also in congress archives in Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Guangxi.

  33. It is noteworthy that we also found several cases that some deputies have low motives to be re-elected or deputies were rejected at the nomination stage for other reasons even when they had served their representation roles very well.

  34. Interview with a senior party official in Shanghai. Similar statements were made by congress officials in my fieldwork interviews in other provinces.

  35. Related evaluation regulations and reports were found in these cases, albeit in varying details.

  36. Interview with LPC officials at S district, Shanghai; interview with LPC officials in H City, Zhejiang; interviews with LPC officials at S district, Chongqing; interview with a congress vice-director, at B county, Guangxi.

  37. See Article 45 of the 2010 Deputy Law. Related initiatives were observed in most of my fieldwork cases.

  38. Group interview with five deputies at S district, Shanghai; interview with two deputies at N county, Anhui; interview with a deputy at S district, H city, Zhejiang; interviews with two deputies at F county, Yunnan.

  39. The Deputy Law provides that funds for deputies’ activities shall be guaranteed in government budgets (Article 35). Taking X sub-district in Zhejiang for example, the congress branch received an annual budget of 298,800 RMB (45,985 USD) in 2013. 228,800 RMB (76.6%) of this was used for deputies’ daily representation activities.

  40. The “mass line” concept was originally created by Mao Zedong in the 1920s and inherited by then generations of Chinese communist leaders as a cornerstone of the CCP’s ruling mode. The mass line is promoted by the party “on the one hand as a theory for shaping and implementing policy and on the other as a theory of the interactions between political leaders (of the CCP) and the masses” [13]. The governing mode of the “mass line” has been rejuvenated under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

  41. Deputies’ services on behalf of parochial interests are allowed if they do not conflict with the party’s monopoly over the representation of the people [18].

  42. Related congress training material was found in Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Hubei, Guangxi, and Yunnan.

  43. This has been highlighted as “people-centered philosophy” since the 19th National Congress of the CCP.

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  1. Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

    Zhongyuan Wang

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Wang, Z. Engineering Representation in A Single-Party Regime: A Mobilizational Model of Political Representation in China’s Local Congresses. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 25, 371–393 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-020-09662-y

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