Abstract
We assessed the impact of teaching methodological aspects of physics on students’ scientistic beliefs and subject interest in physics in a repeated-measurement design with a total of 142 students of upper secondary physics classes. Students gained knowledge of methodological aspects from the pre-test to the post-test and reported reduced scientistic beliefs, both from their own views and from their presumed prototypical physicists’ views. We found no direct impact of teaching on students’ subject interest in physics. As path analysis indicates, this result can be traced back to opposing paths: Lower scientistic beliefs of students attenuate subject interest while lower presumed scientistic beliefs that they hold of physicists foster subject interest. This finding is in accordance with the self-to-prototype matching theory that predicts an impact of the overlap between students’ self-image and their prototypical image on subject interest in physics.
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Notes
In addition to ontological and epistemological presuppositions, a scientistic worldview may include additional components, e.g., expressing the superiority of science over other different approaches to describe reality (in-depth discussions of different scientistic positions can be found in Stenmark (1997) and Mutschler (2002); see also Appendix 3). Considered a philosophical position, scientism is closely related to materialism, physicalism (see Section 4.2), and ontological naturalism (Papineau 2007).
Intersubjective testability is what is generally meant by objectivity. We will use the term intersubjective that stresses the social nature of the scientific enterprise (Feigl 1981, p. 369).
This seems especially to be the case for the field of physics. In recent years—with the advent of rather speculative theories in high-energy physics and cosmology—empirical testability has been defended as an important criterion for science by a number of physicists (e.g., Ellis and Silk 2014).
We talk about “laws of nature” instead of physical theories in the teaching unit. In our opinion, this is a justifiable simplification for a first approach to this topic. Especially as differentiating between laws and theories seems to be difficult for many students (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell and Schwartz 2002). Nevertheless, this is an important goal for NOS education and should be dealt with in subsequent teaching units.
This property is exactly what defines “metaphysical” for Popper (2005). Historically, there has been some debate, and still is, whether science relies on certain indispensable metaphysical assumptions, e.g., that there is regularity and causality in nature. A detailed account of this debate is provided by Gauch (2003; see also Margenau 1977). For recent summaries on this topic, see Hansson and Lindahl (2010) and Hansson (2014).
In a saturated model, there are as many estimated parameters as data points. Per definition, this leads to a perfect fit.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Three sample problems for subsequent classroom discussions of the aspect “intersubjective empirical testability of physical theories”:
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(1)
In court, a single testimony is considered as important evidence. It can lead to a conviction, even if no other “traces” point to the perpetrator. Compare this with physics and discuss possible similarities and differences!
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(2)
What is your view: Could feelings like love or hate be subjects of physics research? Take the criterion of empirical testability into account and try to substantiate your position. Discuss it with your classmates!
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(3)
At the research center CERN in Genova exists the world’s largest accelerator for elementary particles (such particles are, e.g., electrons, protons, or neutrons of which atoms are composed). This machine—called LHC (Large Hadron Collider)—can accelerate particles to kinetic energies much higher than accessible with any other scientific device. It is unique in the world due to its gigantic dimensions and enormous costs. Discuss to which extent this could be a problem with respect to the empirical testability criterion.
Appendix 2: Example of a jigsaw NOS teaching text
1.1 Expert group 3: “All-statements” are not provable.
Many people believe that physics can provide answers to all of life’s questions. To decide which questions can be answered by physics and which cannot, one has to address the characteristics of physics methodology.
First, in the expert group, you will learn about one characteristic of physics methodology. Subsequently, in “jigsaw groups,” you will teach the other group members this characteristic. Hence, a lot depends on your expertise of the following information.
1.1.1 Information for characteristic 3: “All-statements” are not provable.
Many statements in physics are all-encompassing, e.g., “All galaxies at all times depart from each other.” We qualify these statements as “all-statements” because they are all-encompassing generalizations. The example statement encompasses all galaxies at all times.
However, “all-statements” are not provable. Why is this? We can explain it with the following example. First, we are not able to investigate the vast number of galaxies for practical reasons. Second, investigating galaxies for all times even in the remote past or future is impossible as a matter of principle.
Laws of nature are “all-statements,” e.g., the law of gravitation states that all released objects are accelerated to Earth by the force of gravity. Hence, the law of gravitation provides statements about the past and the future. For us, however, a test can only be conducted in the present. Hence, laws of nature are not provable. But, although laws of nature are not provable, one assumes that they are true because they are confirmed many times.
However, they can be rejected by a single counterexample. If one day in the distant future a stone is launched from the Earth’s surface, the law of gravitation would be shown to be false or, at least, must be limited.
Please note that the word “all” is not necessarily for “all-statements,” e.g., “Warm food cools in a cold surrounding.” This assertion applies to all warm food. Probably, one will never have warm food that becomes warmer in a cold surrounding. Yet, the statement is not provable because one cannot be absolutely sure. It is not completely impossible that someday a temperature of warm meal increases by absorption of energy from a colder surrounding.
Therefore, we conclude with the following summary: Physics cannot prove “All-statements.”
Appendix 3
Appendix 4: Performance test on methodological aspects of physics
(sample solutions are in italics)
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Are the following statements provable? Please justify your answer.
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a.
There are substances that have higher temperatures in a liquid state than in a solid state.
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b.
All substances have higher temperatures in a liquid state than in a solid state.
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a.
Statement b is not provable because one does not have access to all substances. Statement a is provable; e.g., the temperature of liquid water is higher than that of ice from the refrigerator. [1 point]
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(2)
Are the following statements testable by physics? Please justify your answer.
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a.
Today, the temperature in Hamburg is lower than in Munich.
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b.
Today, the temperature in Hamburg is more comfortable than in Munich.
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a.
Statement a is testable but not statement b because all persons would agree only in the first case. [1 point]
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(3)
Do the following questions ask for physical causation? Please justify your answer.
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a.
What is the purpose of a thermometer?
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b.
What is the reason for the expansion of the liquid in a thermometer?
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a.
The expansion of a liquid (question b) can be traced back to a physical reason. By contrast, the purpose of the thermometer cannot be deduced from physical theory. [1 point]
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Korte, S., Berger, R. & Hänze, M. The Impact of Explicit Teaching of Methodological Aspects of Physics on Scientistic Beliefs and Interest. Sci & Educ 26, 377–396 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-017-9899-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-017-9899-x