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Aquinas on Intellectual Cognition: The Case of Intelligible Species

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Abstract

The paper argues in favour of a direct realist reading of Aquinas’s theory of intelligible species, in opposition to the recent representationalist challenges. In order to secure the direct realist reading, the paper follows three steps: a short description of Aquinas’s process of cognition, a survey of the direct realist arguments and the analysis of the representationalist interpretation. The final step consists of investigating the representationalist reading as it is suggested by two scholars, Claude Panaccio in Aquinas on Intellectual Representation and Robert Pasnau in Theories of Cognition in the Latter Middle Ages. Thus, the paper can be construed as a reply to these two authors, due to the thorough attention paid to their argumentative trails. With regard to Panaccio’s reading the paper focuses on the identity between the intelligible species and the essence of the extra-mental object and argues that Panaccio understands identity in a very narrow sense. Concerning Pasnau’s line of reasoning the focus is on the primum cognitum status of the intelligible species, and the main argument is that intelligible species is understood by Aquinas as the quo and not the quod of cognition. As the paper shows, neither one, nor the other interpretation poses a threat to the direct realist reading of Aquinas’s intelligible species.

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Notes

  1. The sensible species are, as the realists would say, the first causal intermediary entities we come into contact with. They are numerically different in different cognizers, and are the quo of our cognition, the means by which we know; based on their similitude with the object, they work as causal mediators.

  2. See S.c.G. (II, 75, 7; II, 98) (Aquinas 1961); S.Th. (I, q.76, a.2, ad 4; I, q.85, a.2) (Aquinas 1952).

  3. The objects of sensation can be the proper objects, namely colour, smell, etc., the common objects, like movement, size, etc., and the accidental objects, like trees, people, etc., which exceed the power of a single sense.

  4. The internal senses are: the common sense, which acts like the root of all external senses, the cogitative power, which prepares the images and compares different individual intentions, the memory, which stores the images and recognizes past experiences, and imagination, which retains and combines the images.

  5. According to the realist interpretation, the intelligible species is a causal intermediary entity which, just like the sensible species, is assimilated by the cognizer. This stands for the interpretation of the intelligible species as the quo and not the quod of cognition.

  6. The quiddity of an object signifies what is common to all natures, through which the various beings are placed in various genera and species. In the case of human beings, humanity is the essence that can be signified by a definition, which includes both the common matter (body) and the substantial form (soul).

  7. See S.c.G. (III, 49, 2) (Aquinas 1961), Quod. (VIII, q. 2, a. 2, co.) (Aquinas 1996)

  8. See S.c.G. (I, 46) (Aquinas 1961); II Sent. (d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, co.) (Aquinas 1929); Perler (2000), 114; Spruit (1994), 169.

  9. Claude Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation”, in Chaiers d’epistémologie 002/2652 (2000). In his latest article, “Mental representation”, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1, eds. Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dyke, Cambridge, (2010), 346–56, Panaccio seems to leave room for a more moderated view, which takes into account the fact that Aquinas’s theory of intellectual cognition is build on two different levels, one of the intelligible species and one of the concept, which interwine. Apart from this, the line of argumentation does not go astray from the previous one.

  10. “(…) quodammodo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intelligibile, non secundum esse natural, prout est in rebus.” In this article I will make use of the following Latin editions and shortcuts: Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis (D.S.C.), in Opera Omnia, ed. J. COS, XXIV-2 (Roma & Paris: Commissio Leonina - Les Éditions du Cerf, 2000); Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia (D.P.), ed. P. M. Pession (Torino & Roma: Marietti 1965); Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate (Q.D.V.), in Opera Omnia, ed. H. F. Dondaine, XXII (Roma & Paris: Commissio Leonina & Cerf 1970–1976); Quaestiones quodlibetales (Quod), in Opera Omnia, ed. R. –A. Gauthier, XXV (Roma & Paris: Commisio Leonina & Les Éditions du Cerf, 1996); Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis (Super.Sent.), ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: 1929); Summa Theologiae (S. Th.), ed. P. Caramello (Torino & Roma: Marietti 1952); Summa contra Gentiles (S. c. G.), ed. C. Pera (Torino & Roma: Marietti 1961). I also make use of the following translations: for Summa Theologiae the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province; for I Sent. (d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, co.), II Sent. (d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4), D.S.C. (a. 9, ad 6) and Q.D.V. (q. 1, a. 11, co.) Pasnau’s translation from Theories of Cognition in the Latter Middle Ages; for II Sent. (d. 17, q. 2, a.1, ad 3) and Quod. (VIII, q.2, a.2, co.) my own translations.

  11. See for example S.Th. (I, q. 76, a. 8, ad 4) (Aquinas 1952); Comp. Th. (1, 85): “Quia si est alius intellectus in me, alius in te, oportebit quod sit alia species intelligibilis in me, et alia in te, et per consequens aliud intellectum quod ego intelligo, et aliud quod tu. Erit ergo intentio intellecta multiplicata secundum numerum individuorum, et ita non erit universalis, sed individualis” (Aquinas 1979).

  12. “Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum Avicennam species intellecta potest dupliciter considerari: aut secundum esse quod habet in intellectu, et sic habet esse singulare; aut secundum quod est similitudo talis rei intellectae, prout ducit in cognitionem ejus; et ex hac parte habet universalitatem: quia non est similitudo hujus rei secundum quod haec res est, sed secundum naturam in qua cum aliis suae speciei convenit” (Aquinas 1929).

  13. Besides this triple attempt to reject the realist interpretation at the level of the intelligible species, Panaccio also exploits the ambiguity of similitudo and stresses the fact that similarity is different from identity.

  14. Pasnau (1997) refutes the generally accepted thesis that formal identity secures direct realism, but I find his line of argumentation unconvincing. For an article which goes in the same direction as mine, see Klima (1996).

  15. “Sciendum tamen est, quod intellectum dupliciter dicitur, sicut visum etiam. Est enim primum visum quod est ipsa species rei visibilis in potentia existens, quae est etiam perfectio videntis, et principium visionis, et medium lumen respectu visibilis: et est visum secundum, quod est ipsa res extra oculum. Similiter intellectum primum est ipsa rei similitudo, quae est in intellectu; et est intellectum secundum quod est ipsa res, quae per similitudinem illam intelligitur” (Aquinas 1929). When discussing Pasnau’s interpretation I will use his own translations for a better understanding of his decisions.

  16. “Sed circa apprehensionem sensus sciendum est, quod est quaedam vis apprehensiva, quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem sensibili re praesente, sicut sensus proprius; quaedam vero quae apprehendit eam re absente, sicut imaginatio; et ideo semper sensus apprehendit rem ut est, nisi sit impedimentum in organo, vel in medio; sed imaginatio ut plurimum apprehendit rem ut non est, quia apprehendit eam ut praesentem, cum sit absens; et ideo dicit philosophus in IV Metaph., quod sensus non est dicens falsitatis, sed phantasia” (Aquinas 1970).

  17. “(…) quod virtutis cognoscitivae est una conversio in speciem rei et in rem ipsam; (…) non dicitur conferre” (Aquinas 1929).

  18. If sciences were to be about objects in our mind, they would all turn out to be psychology. See S. Th. (I, q. 85, a. 2) (Aquinas 1952).

  19. See S.c.G. (II, 75, 5) (Aquinas 1961); S.Th. (I, q. 5, a. 2, sc; I, q. 85, a. 2) (Aquinas 1952).

  20. For a similar reading of the passage see Perler (2002), 85.

  21. “Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod vires cognoscitivae quae sunt in nobis, nihil cognoscunt nisi proprias passiones; puta quod sensus non sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundum hoc, intellectus nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, idest speciem intelligibilem in se receptam. Et secundum hoc, species huiusmodi est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed haec opinio manifeste apparet falsa ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt scientiae. Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima; sicut secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt de ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu. Secundo, quia sequeretur error antiquorum dicentium quod omne quod videtur est verum; et sic quod contradictoriae essent simul verae. Si enim potentia non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem, de ea solum iudicat. Sic autem videtur aliquid, secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva afficitur. Semper ergo iudicium potentiae cognoscitivae erit de eo quod iudicat, scilicet de propria passione, secundum quod est; et ita omne iudicium erit verum. Puta si gustus non sentit nisi propriam passionem, cum aliquis habens sanum gustum iudicat mel esse dulce, vere iudicabit; et similiter si ille qui habet gustum infectum, iudicet mel esse amarum, vere iudicabit, uterque enim iudicat secundum quod gustus eius afficitur. Et sic sequitur quod omnis opinio aequaliter erit vera, et universaliter omnis acceptio. Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci. Ponebant enim quod anima per terram quae in ipsa erat, cognosceret terram quae extra ipsam erat; et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus speciem terrae loco terrae, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui dicit quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis; sequetur quod anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam” (Aquinas 1952).

  22. “Utrique autem harum operationum praeintelligitur species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus possibilis in actu; quia intellectus possibilis non operatur nisi secundum quod est in actu, sicut nec visus videt nisi per hoc quod est factus in actu per speciem visibilem. Unde species visibilis non se habet ut quod videtur, sed ut quo videtur” (Aquinas 2000).

  23. “Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima.” S.Th. (I, q. 85, a.2, co.) (Aquinas 1952).

  24. By saying that the intelligible species operate at a pre-cognitive level, I am in fact stating that they are a part of the process of thinking, which stands for the moving of the mind while it still deliberates. More clearly, it acts as a sort of preparatio for the actual act of understanding, by providing the matter for the possible intellect: acting at a pre-cognitive level means being a part of a process which unfolds before the actual act of understanding. See also Pasnau (1997), 139–40.

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  1. “Alexandru Dragomir” Institute for Philosophy, Romanian Society for Phenomenology, Bd. Mihail Kogalniceanu nr. 49, ap. 45, Bucharest, Romania, RO-050104

    Elena Baltuta

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Correspondence to Elena Baltuta.

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This paper was supported by the CNCS-UEFISCDI under the project PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0661.

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Baltuta, E. Aquinas on Intellectual Cognition: The Case of Intelligible Species. Philosophia 41, 589–602 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9481-y

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