Abstract
In this paper, I deal with the theories of cognition presented by three Jesuit authors from the sixteenth century: Juan Maldonado (1533–1583), Francisco de Toledo (1532–1596) and Girolamo Dandini (1554–1634). They belong to the first Jesuit generation and their work allows us to examine, for the period between 1564 and 1610, some of the first trends of the Jesuit philosophical production in two intellectual centres: Paris and Rome. The study of the main features of these accounts can help answer questions such as: is there anything like a Jesuit trend in theory of knowledge? What were the theories of cognition stemming from the Jesuit colleges, and what was the relation these authors had with the medieval sources? These three Jesuits, less studied today than the more famous Francisco Su´arez, provide us with three accounts of cognition. Maldonado was one of the first professors who taught—philosophy first, then theology—at the Jesuit College of Paris. Francisco de Toledo is a “best-seller” author, and was in his day far more popular than his colleague Su´arez. Girolamo Dandini taught philosophy for ten years in Paris; his commentary on De anima (Paris, 1610), with which this article ends, is a truly baroque commentary, with more than 2500 printed folios. I will first present each author, one at a time. In examining each account, I draw attention to the doctrine, to the way it deals with the Society’s main authorities, and to the role of the intellect. Finally, I compare these analyses.
Research for this article began during a 2-years stay in Berlin, thanks to a grant of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, and was later completed and supported by the European Regional Development Fund-Project ≪ Creativity and Adaptability as Conditions of the Success of Europe in an Interrelated World ≫ (No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000734). Special thanks to Ada Bronowski and Igor Agostini for discussing with me part of this work.
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Notes
- 1.
On the rise of the Society of Jesus, their system of education and teaching, see the most recent work by Casalini (2017, 159–188).
- 2.
Sortais (1929).
- 3.
See, e.g., the famous passage where Descartes criticises the species theory: Descartes (1982–1987, vol. VI, 85): “[…] il n’est pas besoin de supposer qu’il passe quelque chose de materiel depuis les obiects iusques a nos yeux, pour nous faire voir les couleurs & la lumiere, ny mesme qu’il y ait rien en ces obiects; qui soit semblable aux id´ees ou aux sentiments que nous en avons […] Et par ce moyen votre esprit sera d´elivr´e de toutes ces petites images voltigeantes dans l’air, qu’on appelle esp`eces intentionnelles, qui travaillent tant l’imagination des Philosophes.” On Descartes’ criticism of the species, see Perler (1997, 141–153) and Spruit (1995, 352–417).
- 4.
The presence of Aristotle in the early modern academic curricula has been extensively studied, from Charles B. Schmitt to the most recent works by Paul Richard Blum; see, e.g., Schmitt (1983) and Blum (2012). Nevertheless, concerning the teaching of philosophy, the case of the Jesuit Parisian College is still to determine. Even though its history has been documented by historians (Dupont-Ferrier (1921), Delattre (1953), Comp`ere (2002)), the philosophical culture of the College has been neglected by scholars, and is still in need of thorough documentation.
- 5.
The Aristotelian passages on which this theory is based are De anima III.8.431b26–432a1; De anima II.12.424a17–19.
- 6.
- 7.
See, e.g., Spruit (2011).
- 8.
- 9.
The simplest way to explain our usage of the label “Augustinian” is to refer to the appeal to Augustine made by later authors, like Su´arez, in their theory of cognition. See, e.g., Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.8: “Cruciantur enim theologi ut inveniant modum quo Deus de potentia absoluta possit, mediante re materiali, agere in spiritualem; quomodo ergo hic id potest naturaliter fieri. Unde D. Augustinus, 12 Super Genesim ad Litteram, cap. 16: ‘Non est putandum—inquit—aliquid agere corpus in spiritum, tamquam spiritus corpori facienti, materiae vice subdatur. Omni modo praestantior est qui facit, ea re qua aliquid facit’.”
- 10.
I agree with Spruit, who calls Aquinas’ account of the species “the canonical one”, because of its complexity and of the wide range of problems and questions that it will raise. See Spruit (1994, 156). For Aquinas on the species, see Spruit (1994, 156–174), Pasnau (2002, 267–324), and Baltuta (2013, 589–602).
- 11.
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q.3, a. 2; ST, Ia, q.85, a.2.
- 12.
Ignatius of Loyola (1938), 150–151: “Illi praelegentur libri, qui in quavis facultate solidioris ac securioris doctrinae habebuntur. Nec illi sunt attingendi, quorum doctrina vel auctores suspecti sint. […] In Theologia legetur vetus et novum Testamentum, et doctrina scholastica divi Thomae. […] In Logica, et Philosophia naturali, et morali, et Metaphysica, doctrina Aristotelis sequenda est.”
- 13.
de Borja (1974), Decretum de opinionibus in philosophia et theologia tenendis (novembri 1565), 382–385; see, particularly, points 3–5: “Nihil defendatur contra communissimam philosophorum aut theologorum sententiam […] Nulla opinio defendatur contra commune […] Nulla nova opinio in philosophia aut theologia introducatur”. Among the opiniones sustinendae, see also the lemma “secundum Aristotelem et veram philosophiam”: “Anima intellectiva non est assistens, sed vere forma informans secundum Aristotelem et veram philosophiam. Anima intellectiva non est una numero in omnibus hominibus, sed in singulis hominibus distincta et propria secundum Aristotelem et veram philosophiam. Anima intellectiva est immortalis secundum Aristotelem et veram philosophiam. Non sunt plures animae in homine: intellectiva, sensitiva et vegetativa, secundum Aristotelem et veram philosophiam. Anima in homine aut in bruto non est in pilis aut capillis.”
- 14.
Cf. the Regulae professoris philosophiae, 124: “n. 2. In rebus alicuius momenti ab Aristotele non recedat nisi quid incitat a doctrina, quam academiae ubique probant alienum; multo magis, si orthodoxae fidei repugnet; adversus quam, si quae sunt illius aliusve philosophi argumenta, strenue refellere studeat iuxta Lateranense Concilium. n. 3. Aristotelis interpretes, male de christiana religione meritos, non sine magno delectu aut legat aut in scholam proferat caveat que, ne erga illos afficiantur discipuli […] n. 6. Contra vero de sancto Thoma numquam non loquatur honorifice, libentibus illum animis, quoties oporteat, sequendo; aut reverenter et gravate quando minus placeat, deserendo.”
- 15.
On the meaning of philosophical orthodoxy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Schmutz (2010, 129–150).
- 16.
A good example of the impact of the Jesuit regulations on the professors’ intellectual life and production is that of Benet Perera (Valence 1536–Rome 1610), professor at the Roman College, and censured in the wake of his alleged Averroism; a synthesis of this most famous case is found in Sander (2014, 31–50).
- 17.
The originality of these scholastic commentaries lies more in their specific rearrangement of the received doctrine than in the introduction of new elements. The latter was not searched by these scholars; they were not aiming to be original, nor were they encouraged to be. The specific rearrangement characterises mostly Maldonado’s and Dandini’s accounts. The adjectives “original” and “traditional” should, then, be taken only in a loose sense. A further discussion on this topic is provided at the end of this paragraph.
- 18.
Cf. Regulae professoris philosophiae (1997, 125).
- 19.
Sommervogel (1960, 8 and 65).
- 20.
Cf. Müller (1968).
- 21.
Spruit (1995, 285).
- 22.
A case I like to mention is that provided by the Salamanca manuscript of Su´arez’s De anima (MS Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 583). Su´arez’s De anima corresponds to the course taught by the Jesuit in Segovia in 1572; the text was published posthumously in 1621: one of the copyists insists on comparing the two Jesuits’ works and he is partial to Toledo’s, whom he prefers to Su´arez’s more analytical treatise and less adherent to Aristotle. Cf. Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, disp. XLV. On Su´arez’s and Toledo’s different styles of commentary, see Aho (2005, 181–182).
- 23.
Toletus (1985), III, c.4, q.9, 131vb: “Quod cum in aliquo subiecto est actu aliqua forma, non potest in eo recipi alia similis, nec ipsius species intentionalis. Verbi gratia, ubi calor est, non potest recipi alius calor similis, nec ipsius species. […] Et hoc experientia constat: oculus enim colorem habens realem, impeditur a recipienda specie illius coloris similis: et auditus habens realem sonum, impeditur a percipienda specie alterius soni: similiter in alijs sensibus. Et hoc multum est notandum pro intelligentia huius doctrinae Aristotelicae.”
- 24.
Cf. Aristotle, De anima III.8.432a1–7.
- 25.
Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.4, q.9, 131vb: “Potentia cognoscens non debet absolute denudari ab actu, nisi ab eo solum a quo patitur, et cuius speciem in se recipit. Unde oculus ab illis coloribus est denudandus, a quibus movetur, et quorum species habet et recipit: non autem ab alijs accidentibus. […] Intellectus enim non patitur nec speciem recipit, nisi a phantasmate, et naturis sensibilibus: solum enim hae sunt quae in ipsum agunt; erit ergo Intellectus denudatus ab omni natura sensibili, nullaque erit sensibilis natura.”
- 26.
Cf. Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.7, q.22, 166ra: “Species autem est dispositio modificans et excitans intellectum ad operandum.”
- 27.
Cf. Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.7, q.21, 166ra: “Non enim est necessarium, quod posita specie in potentia, ponatur actio: nam aliquando species est in oculo et non videtur, quia deest advertentia: ita posset dici de intellectu.” Toledo mentions in passing the necessity of the cognitive power’s “advertentia”, attention, for the cognitive act to take place. In his account, there are nevertheless no more occurrences of this term, nor is the theme of selective attention further elaborated.
- 28.
Cf. Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.7, q.21, 165ra: “[Aristoteles] dixit, quod phantasma se habet ad intellectum, sicut sensibile ad sensum: ergo imprimit speciem. Probatur, text. 38 manifeste dicit, quod lapis non est intellectu, sed species lapidis: et intellectus sit intelligibilia, sicut sensus sensibilia.” Cf. also De anima, III, c.5, q.14, 142va.
- 29.
Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.7, q.21, 164vb–165ra: “Species intelligibiles sunt in intellectu necessario ad intelligendum. Haec probatur primo authoritate Arist. 3 de anima dicit, intellectum esse impassibilem, susceptivum tamen formarum, et specierum […].”
- 30.
See, e.g.,Thomas Aquinas, ST, Ia, q.79, a. 3; q.85, a.1.
- 31.
Fransico de Toledo, De anima, III, c.4, q.12, 142va: “Lumen intellectus agentis illustrat quidem species intelligibiles productas non solum extrinsece, sed interne, phantasmata vero extrinsece. Pro ipsius probatione notandum, lumen quidem illuminare colorem extrinsece per solum contactum superficiei, aerem vero et oculum, et diaphana, ac species similiter in ipso aere ac in oculo existentes, intrinsece illuminare. Sunt enim in eodemmet subiecto, tam species, quam lumen, et ratione luminis ipsae species inhaerent, et recipiuntur in ipso. Iam ergo phantasmata sensitivae se habent ad intellectum, ut color extrinsecus ad visum: species intelligibiles in intellectu se habent, ut sensibiles productae in ipso sensu, vel aere. Quare lumen quidem intellectus agentis intrinsece illuminabit species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili simul existentes, ut in subiecto utrunque: phantasmata vero extrinsece, ut lumen illustrat colorem; ut dicebat Caietanus.”
- 32.
Cajetanus, In Ia, q.79, a.3; q.85, a.1. The text by Cajetan is published in the Editio Leonina of Thomas Aquinas’ Opera Omnia (see Thomas de Vio 1889). Cajetan speaks about illuminatio obiectiva and formalis, whereas Toledo about illuminatio extrinseca and intrinseca; see Thomas de Vio, IX, 266: “Effectus luminis duplex est: scilicet formalis, et obiectivus. Formalis quidem est esse luminativum, ut patet in diaphano: obiectivus vero est apparere, ut patet in colore, color enim non apparet nisi illustratus. […] unde in proposito imaginor quod, cum in phantasmate sit natura haec, adveniente lumine intellectus agentis, phantasma illustratur non formaliter, ut diaphanum, sed obiective, ut color; qua illustratione splendet atque relucet in phantasmate non totum quod est in eo, sed quidditas seu natura tantum, et non singularitas illius ei coniuncta; ita quod ista illuminatio est abstractiva, quia facit apparere unum, sic licet quod quid est, non apparendo aliud, scilicet principium individuans. Etc.”
- 33.
Su´arez lectured on De anima in Segovia in 1572, but the text was published after his death by the Jesuit Baltasar Alvarez (Lyon, 1621).
- 34.
See Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.5–7.
- 35.
Cf. Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.4, q.12, 139ra: “Intellectus per se cognoscit singulare determinatum, ipsiusque intellectionem format, et non tantum per sensum. Haec est contra primam sententiam, et contra Caietanum.” The strategy of discussing directly Caietanus’, rather than Aquinas’ position, is also typical of the works of other Jesuits; see, for example, on the specific topic of the agent intellect’s illumination, Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.5–6; on the direct intellection of the singulars, see In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.3, n.4.
- 36.
Cf. Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.4, q.12, 139ra: “Ultima sententia est, quod intellectus cognoscit singulare per propriam speciem sicut sensus cognoscit. Haec opinio est Caiet. Thien. et Burlei, I. Phys. est etiam Theologorum fere communis, Duran. 2 Senten. d. 3 q. 7 et Scot. 4. Sent. d. 45 q. 3 et Gregor. I Sent. d. 3 q. 1 art. 2.” On the dissemination of the doctrine of the direct intellection of the singulars in the early modern period, there are no specific studies other than the classic work by Camille B´erub´e (mostly focusing on the Middle Ages, but with some reference to seventeenth-century authors, like Mastrius); see B´erub´e (1964). With a focus on Su´arez, see Picard (1923, 63–80), Alejandro (1947, 403–425; 1948, 131–152; 1948), de Vries (1949, 321–344), Peccorini (1974, 605–655), Nore˜na (1981, 159–174), South (2002, 785–823), and Aho (2005, 179–203). I have worked myself on the Scotist roots of Su´arez’s account of the singulars; see Tropia (2012, 95–116).
- 37.
See n. 35; on Toledo’s account of the singulars, see also Spruit (1995, 285–287).
- 38.
The bibliography on Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (1270–1332/34?) is extensive; see, e.g., the bibliography collected in the context of the Durandus’ project directed by Andreas Speer at the University of Köln: Durandus. Bibliographie. 2016. http://durandus.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/12818.html. Accessed 11 June 2017. For a general but precise synthesis of his life and works, see Iribarren (2011, I, 279–282). Despite some recent studies considering the impact of Durandus on the early modern authors, see, e.g., Uscatescu Barr´on (2014, 153–181). A work exclusively on Durandus’ impact on the early modern scholastics’ theory of cognition is still missing.
- 39.
Su´arez is of the same opinion; see Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.8, n.16–18: “Principium enim agendi et patiendi sunt realiter distincta; sed intellectus agens est principium agendi; possibilis, patiendi. Probabilis quidem est haec sententia, quam innuit D. Thomas, dicta q. 79, a. 7; in 2, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1. Et tenant omnes discipuli eius. […] Opposita nihilominus sententia est (etiam) valde probabilis, quam tenet Niphus, lib. De intellectu, cap. 4, quoniam sine tali distinctio potest facile intelligi munus intellectus agentis, nam eadem potentia potest esse activa specierum, et ut sic dicitur intellectus agens, et operativa per illas, et sic dicitur intellectus possibilis. Neque de his actibus spiritualibus est necessarium principium agendi et recipiendi esse res distinctas.”
- 40.
Cf. Francisco de Toledo, De anima, III, c.5, q.13, 142vb: “Puto esse sententiam Durandi probabilem, et eorum qui negant intellectum agentem, aut saltem sola ponunt ratione distinctum. Neque enim duos habemus intellectus, ut videtur, sed unum, sicut nec duas voluntates, nec duas memorias, nec duos appetitus, nec duas imaginationes, sed unam. Et secundo, quia ille unus satis esse videtur ad producendum lumen, et postea eliciendum species, et producendum in se notitia. Nil enim vetat in seipsum agere actione perfectiva. Et tertio, quia nulla est ratio contra hoc conveniens. Tamen, quia nec in contrarium rationes habentur convincentes, sequimur communem sententiam.”
- 41.
The same expression has been used by Leen Spruit in his synthesis of Toledo; see Spruit (1995, 286).
- 42.
See Sect. 6.6.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
Cf. Richeome (1621, Avant-propos).
- 47.
- 48.
MS Paris, BnF 6454 A (notes taken by an anonym student), and MS St. Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 1119 (notes taken by the Benedictine monk Mauritius Enk). Both manuscripts have been described by Charles Lohr; see Lohr (1988, 241–242; 1994, 263). Schmitt (1985, 241–245) is wrong in stating that a third copy of Maldonado’s course on the soul is preserved at the M´ediath`eque Jacques Lanzmann of Loches (France). The MS Loches 32b preserves only the incomplete transcription of Maldonado’s Compendium metaphysicae, while the MSS Loches, BM 31, 32a and 32b preserve the notes of the complete philosophical courses taught by another Jesuit teaching at the Parisian Jesuit College between 1568 and 1570, Jacobus Valentinus. All the notes in the Loches manuscripts have been taken by the noble Gaillard de Cornac (1552–1626).
- 49.
The text of the De origine, natura et immortalitate animae, which I recently edited, will be soon available. See Tropia (forthcoming, publication expected in 2020). In order to facilitate the reading, I use here the division of Maldonado’s text into paragraphs that I used in the edition—a division which is already present in the notes of both students. Henceforth, I will refer to this text in this way: Juan Maldonado, De origine, §x.
- 50.
An evidence of this is Richeome’s text, L’immortalitˊe de l’âme, where he reproduces the style and the arguments of his former teacher almost in the same words of the De origine.
- 51.
The usage of Galen for justifying the refusal of the species has a specific tradition extending from Gregory of Nysse (= Nemesius of Emesa); see Nyssenus (1537). For a list of the early modern authors referring to Gregory/Nemesius on the species, see Spruit (1994, 65–76).
- 52.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §28: “Omnes philosophi fere putant easdem formas que per sensus acceptae sunt, recipi intellectu patiente, factas spirituales beneficio intellectus agentis. Sed ut probatum est, species que semel fuerunt corporeae, numquam fieri possunt spirituales, quare cum Intellectus sit natura sua spiritualis, recipi non possunt in illo. Nullum vero accidens corporeum potest esse in subiecto spirituali. Si queras quomodo ergo intelligimus, considera gravissimos philosophos non existimasse necessarias esse species nec ad intelligendum nec ad sentiendum. Inter quos fuit Plato et Galenus lib 7 de placitis Hypocratis et Platonis et Porphirius, lib. de sensu, ut refert Gregorius Nicenus, liber de viribus animae c. 2.”
- 53.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §28: “Si obiicias quod Aristoteles c. 8 lib. 3 de animo vocat intellectum sedem formarum omnium et c. 4 (c. 4) dicit intellectum aliquem recipere, advertet hoc interesse inter sensum et intellectum, quod sensus ut sentiat duobus modis patitur, altero recipiendo formam obiecti materialem que proprie passio dicitur, altero recipiendo propriam actionem, visio in ipsis oculis recipitur. Intellectus vero priori modo pati non potest, quia non agit cum materia; secundo modo patitur, quia recipit suas actiones idest notiones seu intellectiones. Notio autem ab Aristotele similitudo et forma dicitur, ideo vocat Aristoteles intellectum formarum sedem. Quod hoc sit ita hinc constat quod Aristoteles laudat Platonem eo quod dixerat mentem esse sedem formarum. Platonem autem numquam intellectum recipere species, sed habere incitas a natura cogitationes rerum putavit.”
- 54.
Nevertheless, in §26–27 Maldonado states that the nature of the senses is only passive; see n. 64. In his treatise, which focuses mostly on the immortality of the soul, he does not provide any account of the sensible species and of sense-perception.
- 55.
See the aforementioned text.
- 56.
See text quoted below.
- 57.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §29: “Omnes fere putant solo beneficio intellectus agentis fieri res universas que fuerant prius singulares […] Sed fortasse errant qui putant ab intellectu agente abstraxi universales. Abstrahere vero nihil est aliud, quam e multis rebus qui coniunctae sunt unam cognoscere aliis omissis reliquis. […] Sic intelligit, qui simul agens et patiens est, qui proprie abstraxit unum ab aliis intelligendo unum sine aliis, ut in Socrate qui est et Socrates et homo et animal. Aliquando intelligit mens quod sit animal non quod sit homo, et hoc est abstrahere genus. Aliquando inteligit quod sit homo, non quod sit Socrates, et hoc est abstrahere speciem.”
- 58.
See the text quoted in the next note. This “libere” might also introduce the theme of selective attention; still, there are no more elements in Maldonado’s account to expand it.
- 59.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §29: “Multis autem rebus differt sensus ab intellectu. Primo, intellectus, qui habet obiectum proprie infinitum ab alieno non potest abstrahere, sed a proprio. Secundo, sensus necessitate quadam abstrahit, quia nulla potentia percipit alienum obiectum; intellectus non necessitate, ut quando non potest multa simul comprehendere separat, aliquando libere, quia vult unum et non alterum contemplari. Preterea, sensus non abstrahit nisi formam a forma, ut colorem a sono, quam Metaphisici vocant formalem abstractionem. Intellectus enim non tantum unam formam ab alia, sed etiam universam a singulis. Postremo, sensus, quia vis materialis est, non potest abstrahere a formis et proprietatibus et individuis; non enim videmus nisi hunc vel illum colorem, et hoc et illo loco et hoc et illo tempore. Intellectus, quia est vis sine materia, abstrahit ab his omnibus, qua ratione facit ut vocant universale logicum.”
- 60.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §34: “Divus Thomas et omnes fere Latini putant intellectum primo quidem intelligere universa per proprias species, deinde per actum (ut dicunt) reflexum intelligere res singulas. Melius qui sentiunt etiam intelligere individua directe. Si quidem enim obstaret, illud esset maxime quia ut dicunt species individuorum sunt materiales et singulae; at etiam species hominis et animalis est materialis, quia homo et animal etiam in genere materiam habent, 7 Met. c. 10, et singularis est siquidem in aliquo subiecto est. Praeterea, intellectus intelligit notionem rerum universarum quam colligit ex rebus singulis, prius ergo res singulas cognovit.”
- 61.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §34: “Adde quod intellectus practicus non est alius a contemplativo et versatur circa res singulas; percipit ergo intellectus individua. Quod autem Aristoteles libro primo de nat. cap. 5, et 5 Met. c. 11 ait intellectum esse universorum sensum individuorum non ita intelligendum est, ut velit Aristoteles intellectum sola universalia cognoscere, sed voluit prescribere accomodatum obiectum intellectui; illud autem est universale, quia facilius cognoscitur. Hoc autem interest inter intellectum et sensum, quod sensus ita percipit individua, ut nullo modo universa quia vis est corporea; intellectus quia spiritualis percipit tanquam proprium obiectum universum, percipit etiam individuum. Hoc enim semper verum est, ut inferiores facultates non cognoscant obiecta superiorum, superiores vero cognoscant et sua et inferiores obiecta. Intellectus autem superior facultas quam sensus.”
- 62.
The Franciscan tradition is variegated and a thorough study concerning this topic would be necessary. For our scope, it suffices to mention as an example Duns Scotus’ text on the intellective memory of the separate soul. Scotus provides a list of arguments in favour of the direct intellection of the singulars, which is taken up by most early modern authors. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, IV, d.45, q.3, n.17: “Dico ergo quantum ad istum articulum, quod in intellectiva est memoria, et actus recordandi proprie dicte: supposito enim quod intellectus non tantum cognoscat universalia (quod quidem verum est de intellectione abstractiva, de qua loquitur philosophus, quia sola illa est scientifica) sed etiam intuitive cognoscat illa, quae sensus cognoscit, quia perfectior et superior cognoscitiva in eodem, cognoscit illud, quod inferior: et etiam cognoscit sensationes. Et utrumque probatur per hoc, quod cognoscit propositiones contingentes veras, et ex eis syllogizat: formare autem propositiones, et syllogizare, proprium est intellectui.”
- 63.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §26: “Sed haec duo argumenta neque sunt aristotelica neque philosophica.”
- 64.
Juan Maldonado, De origine, §27: “Aristoteles consuevit eodem vocabulo greco ‘noein’ comprehendere omnem vim cognoscendi tam sensum quam intellectum, cuius rei sunt apertissima testimonia haec lib. 3 c. 3 de animo de eo autem quod est intelligere, cuius altera pars dicitur phantasia, altera existimatio. Phantasia autem ad partem sentientem pertinet, quam tamen Aristoteles facit speciem ‘nous’, idest intellectus partem, et 4 eiusdem libro cum mensionem fecisset ‘nous’, idest intellectum, quia videbat vocabulum esse ambiguum addidit distinctionis causa. […] Aristoteles ergo in illo 5 c. voluit disputare de intellectu in actu et consideravit animum nostrum velut mundum quendam parvum, quia res omnes tam spirituales quam corporales potest comprehendere, ut dixerat 4 cap., cui ad consequendam perfectam cognitionem duae vires datae sunt a natura: altera que nihil cognoscit nisi patiendo, idest sensus, altera que dum cognoscat nihil patitur, idest mens. Primam vim vocat Aristoteles patientem intellectum, secundam agentem. Argumentum est quod paulo inferius dicit intellectum agentem immortalem, patientem mortalem.” A reading like the one offered by Maldonado is rather strong, and certainly deserves a thorough examination.
- 65.
- 66.
Lib. I: de animati corporis temperatione; II: de humoribus; III: de partibus homogeneis; IV: de partibus heterogeneis.
- 67.
Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, 1634: “Sensus ab obiectis non per intentionales formas, ut plerique inquiunt Latinorum: sed per reales qualitates moveri. Cum enim ipsimet illi earum formarum auctores ac patroni doceant, illas contrarietatem non habere, simulque contrariorum obiectorum formas absque contrarietate et pugna in sensu suscipi, nulla esset profecto philosophi haec dubitatio: quae plurima esse videtur dum a qualitatibus ipsis realibus, dulcedine et amaritudine, albedine et nigredine non ab earum intentionibus, afficiuntur sensus.”
- 68.
Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, 1892: “A quibus (Thomas et aliis) multis modis dissentio. Primum, intellectilem speciem nil aliud esse arbitror, quam ipsam intellectionem, quam actu promit intellectus, phantasmatibus inspectis.”
- 69.
Cf. Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, 1988–1989: “Intellectiles namque species eo modo, quo nunc plerique loquuntur, numquam illis in mentem venerunt: sed intellectilem speciem et intellectionem rem eandem esse voluerunt; intellectionemque appellari ut ab intellectu proficiscitur illiusque actionem significat; intellectilem autem speciem ut perfecta quaedam est intellectae rei similitudo, actu illam exprimens et repraesentans.”
- 70.
Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, 1989: “Quare ut intellectus est naturaliter coordinatus phantasiae, sit phantasma illius optime comparatum ad movendum intellectum; quique hoc neget, coordinationem facultatum harum negabit.”
- 71.
Cf. Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, 1897sq; see also 1902–1903: “Intellectum non naturas modo universas aut immateriales, sed singulas quoque et materiales cognoscere. […] Alterum autem, opinionem illam complurium Latinorum, intellectiles species ab intellectione diversas, tanquam ad intelligendum necessarias, asserentius, minus veram esse, vel ex hoc loco intelligi posse. Fatentur namque illi ipsi species eas universarum duntaxat naturarum esse; easque solas, non item res singulas repraesentare, quippe que ab illis omnibus conditionibus, quibus singulae res constabant, fuerint separatae. Addunt, nullas esse praeter has, rerum singularum speciem species. Iam igitur, dum res quoque singulas intelligit intellectus, aut phantasmata ipsa specierum, loco in intellectu suscipiuntur; quod vel ipsorum confessione fieri non potest; aut absque speciebus eas intelligit, sola propositorum phantasmatum inspectione. Non est igitur species ad intelligendum necessaria: eodemque modo in proposito phantasmate natura a determinatis conditionibus separans universam eam intelligit. Nam si tantopere, ut inquiunt illi, necessaria esset ad intelligendum species sine illa constaret nulla, ne rerum quidem singularum, intellectio. Quod si haec constet, non est igitur intellectioni, ut intellectio est, necessaria.”
- 72.
Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, 1990: “Et intellectus est eiusmodi formarum locus, dum omnes in eo suscipiuntur: et is intelligendo fit omnia, quia omnia in se transfert, idemque cum intellectis rebus evadit: et in anima non est lapis, sed lapidis forma, quae lapis est intellectus animoque comprehensus: ac demum in anima tum agens, tum patiens intellectus nominatur; non tamen re, sed ratione distincti; quatenus enim idem intellectus producit et suscipit intellectionem, et agens dicitur et patiens.”
- 73.
Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, 1989: “Non enim passivus est intellectus natura sua, inquit Alexander in 2 de anima cap. 19 ut ab alio fiat et patiatur, quemadmodum sensus: sed activus est. Nisi fortasse passivum dicere velis, quatenus formarum apprehensivus est. Pati namque videtur id, quod recipit atque apprehendit. Quapropter commune cum sensu habet, ut activus sit earum formarum, quas excipit. Atque hoc est illud in tex. 17 (necesse est has in anima differentias existere) cum enim non ab alio perfici queat intellectus, a seipso perficiatur necesse est; idemque ipse et agentis et patientis vim habeat.” As for Maldonado, cf. the text quoted in n. 53.
- 74.
- 75.
- 76.
Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.11: “Intellectus agens est indifferens ad efficiendas omnes species, et ideo, ut efficiat has vel illas indiget aliquo determinante; nihil est autem aliud a quo possit determinari nisi a phantasia cognitione. Haec determinatio non fit per efficientiam aliquam ipsius phantasmatis, sed per hoc solum quod materiam praebet et quasi exemplar intellectui agenti, idque propter unionem quam habet in eadem anima.”
- 77.
Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.12: “Est enim advertendum phantasiam et intellectum hominis radicari in una anima; et hinc est quod in suis operibus habent ordinem et consonantia; unde patebit, infra, quod eo ipso quod intellectus operatur, etiam imaginatio operatur.”
- 78.
Cf. Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.14–17.
- 79.
Su´arez compares Cajetan’s account of the illuminative act to Henry of Ghent’s. It also seems to me that his criticism echoes Duns Scotus’ against Henry in the Ordinatio; see Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d.3, q.6, n. 7. Cf. Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.5–6: “Caietanus, 1 p, q 79, a 330 3, et q 85, a 1, inquit quod intellectus agens habet actionem quamdam circa phantasma, quae est illuminare illud, non formaliter, sed obiective. Illuminare formaliter appellat quando illuminatur aliquid per lumen illi inhaerens, quomodo aer illuminatur; hoc autem non potuit dicere in phantasmate, quia est materiale; lumen autem intellectus agentis est spirituale, et ideo non poterat inhaerere phantasmati materiali. Illuminare vero obiective, inquit, est quando ex intrinseca assistentia aliquid in alio apparet. Et hoc modo ait Caietanus illuminari phantasma. […] Quod videtur sumpsisse ex Henrico, Quodl. 5, qq 7, 8 et 21; et Quodl. 5, q 14, ubi negans species intelligibiles, ait quod intellectus possibilis speculatur quidquid est in phantasmate relucens universaliter sub lumine intellectus agentis. […] Reicitur opinio Caietani. Sed est falsa quantum ad omnia. Ad primum: Actio illa illuminativa phantasmatis, quam Caietanus ponit ante productionem speciei intelligibilis, est inintelligibilis. Peto, an per illam actionem sit aliquid impressum phantasmati, et an sit ipsum phantasma realiter mutatum. Neutrum enim dici potest, nam tota actio intellectus agentis est spiritualis; ergo nihil potest imprimere phantasmati materiali; ergo non immutat illud realiter; ergo nullo modo illuminat. Quomodo enim potest intelligi quod ipsum phantasma, manens immutatum, alio modo repraesentet et sit illuminatum? Item, quae est assistentia illa intellectus agentis, vel in quo consistit applicatio sui luminis spiritualis ad phantasma? Praeterea, illa illuminatio phantasmatis est actio realis intellectus agentis; ergo per illam aliquid reale agit; ergo vel in phantasmate vel in intellectu possibili. Non primum, ut probatum est. Si autem secundum dicatur, ergo illa illuminatio est illa productio specierum, nam intellectus agens in possibilem nihil aliud agit, nisi speciem. Et hinc etiam ostenditur falsum dictum Caietani secundum, nam si phantasma nullo modo est immutatum, neque intellectus agens habet actionem realem circa illud, non potest eius repraesentatio variari. Item, repraesentatio phantasmatis semper manet materialis; ergo semper est rei singularis. Item, repraesentare universale abstractum est repraesentare rationem communem non repraesentando individuas conditiones; est autem impossibile quod phantasma non repraesentet conditiones individuas; ergo. Item, si phantasma ipsum repraesentaret universaliter, phantasia ipsa posset etiam universalia cognoscere.”
- 80.
Cf. Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.14: “Intellectus agens ut sic nullam aliam actionem habet nisi productionem speciei intelligibilis, quamvis haec actio diversis nominibus explicetur […] Sed nihilominus mihi est certum non fieri actu intelligibilem, nisi per eductionem speciei intelligibilis in qua res specialiter repraesentatur, ut patet ex dictis, nam in ipso phantasmate nullam actionem habet intellectus agens neque phantasma concurrit active ad productionem speciei.”
- 81.
Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.2, n.15: “Nam illuminatio phantasmatis non est actio circa phantasma, ut late supra contra Caietanum; ergo si aliqua actio est, illa est circa intellectum possibilem; at vero circa intellectum possibilem nullam aliam actionem habet intellectus agens praeter speciei productionem; ergo haec actio est quae dicitur illuminatio phantasmatis, quae idcirco sic appellatur, quia per illam apparet intellectui id quod in phantasmate repraesentatur. Et hoc modo intelligitur facile actio ista, et aliam fingendo, fit inintelligibilis.”
- 82.
Cf. South (2002, 785–823; see, more precisely, 804sq).
- 83.
Francisco Su´arez, In De anima, III, disp. IX, q.9, n.16–18: “Principium enim agendi et patiendi sunt realiter distincta; sed intellectus agens est principium agendi; possibilis, patiendi; ergo. Probabilis quidem est haec sententia, quam innuit D. Thomas, q. 79, a. 7; in 2, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1. […] Opposita nihilominus sententia est [etiam] valde probabilis, quam tenet Niphus, lib. De intellectu, cap. 4, quoniam sine tali distinctione potest facile intelligi munus intellectus agentis, nam eadem potentia potest esse activa specierum, et ut sic dicitur intellectus agens, et operativa per illas, et sic dicitur intellectus possibilis. Neque de his actibus spiritualibus est necessarium principium agendi et recipiendi esse distincta res.” It is remarquable that Su´arez, like Toledo, prudently introduces this opinion as “valde probabilis”, and only after exposing Aquinas’.
- 84.
See, e.g., the already quoted essays by James B. South in n. 75.
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Tropia, A. (2020). Three Jesuit Accounts of Cognition: Differences and Common Ground in the De Anima Commentaries by Maldonado, Toledo and Dandini (1564–1610). In: Decaix, V., Mora-Márquez, A. (eds) Active Cognition. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35304-9_6
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