Abstract
Simple majority is one of the most used decision rules in practice. However, under this decision rule, an alternative can defeat another one with very poor support. For this reason, other decision rules have been considered in the literature, such as qualified and special majorities as well as other majorities based on difference of votes. In this paper we generalize the latter mentioned voting systems by considering individual intensities of preference, and we provide some axiomatic characterizations.
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Garcí a-Lapresta, J.L., Llamazares, B. Preference Intensities and Majority Decisions Based on Difference of Support Between Alternatives. Group Decis Negot 19, 527–542 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9156-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9156-z