Summary.
A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let \({\cal L}_{C}\) (resp., \(\wp_{C})\) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain \({\cal L}_{C}\), and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain \(\wp_{C}\).
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Received: August 29, 2000; revised version: November 13, 2002
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ID="*"We are grateful to Wulf Gaertner and our two referees for insightful comments on a previous draft.
Correspondence to: D. E. Campbell
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Campbell, D., Kelly, J. A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule. Econ Theory 22, 557–568 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1