Abstract
It is well established that majority rule is transitive on some restricted domain and that majority rule is the unique social welfare function satisfying some standard axioms on the universal domain. We prove that majority rule is the unique social welfare function satisfying these axioms on a standard restricted domain over which majority rule is transitive. That is, the only profiles which are used to derive majority rule belong to the restricted domain.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arrow, K. J., 1963,Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Black, Duncan, 1948, ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision Making’,Journal of Political Economy 56, 23–34.
Bordes, Georges, 1976, ‘Consistency, Rationality, and Collective Choice’,Review of Economic Studies 42, 451–457.
Campbell, D. E., 1976, ‘Democratic Preference Functions’,Journal of Economic Theory 12, 259–272.
Campbell, D. E., 1980, ‘Algorithms for Social Choice Functions’,Review of Economic Studies 47.
May, K. O., 1952, ‘A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision’,Econometrica 20, 680–684.
Sen, A. K., 1970, ‘Collective Choice and Social Welfare’, Holden Day, San Francisco.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
This paper was prepared while the author was visiting at the Ontario Economic Council, Toronto. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the hospitality of the OEC and the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Ottawa. Neither Council bears responsibility for the views expressed herein.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Campbell, D.E. On the derivation of majority rule. Theor Decis 14, 133–140 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133973
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133973