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Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules

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Abstract

A typology of electoral environments in which strategic manipulation of voting rules can occur is proposed. From this typology, six different concepts of equilibria (or quasi-equilibria) are defined, including the usual ones. Then, focusing on three alternative elections, we derive some analytical representations for the vulnerability of a large number of voting rules to strategic manipulation by considering successively each type of equilibrium. Our results show that the hierarchy of the rules changes when the voting framework is modified. However, some rules are clearly dominated and some others (among which the Borda and the Nanson rules) appear to be uniquely the best in some specific contexts.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. GEMMA, UMR CNRS 6154, University of Caen, Caen Cedex, France

    Pierre Favardin

  2. CERESUR, University of La Reunion, Saint-Denis de la Reunion, France

    Dominique Lepelley

  3. UFR d’économie, Université de Caen, 14032, Caen Cedex, France

    Pierre Favardin

Authors
  1. Pierre Favardin
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  2. Dominique Lepelley
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Correspondence to Pierre Favardin.

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Favardin, P., Lepelley, D. Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules. Soc Choice Welfare 26, 485–509 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0106-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0106-2

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