Abstract
Explores, for several classes of social choice rules, the distribution of the number of profiles at which a rule can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we will do comparative social choice, looking for information about how social choice rules compare in their vulnerability to strategic misrepresentation of preferences.
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I am indebted to Universidad Internacional Menendez Pelayo for an invitation to present an early version of this paper at a June, 1989 conference at Valencia, Spain. Thanks for comments go to the participants of that conference, especially Salvador Barbera; also for comments at seminars at Syracuse University and the University of Rochester.
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Kelly, J.S. Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't. Soc Choice Welfare 10, 161–175 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183344
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183344