Abstract
A voting system is a rule which assigns to every possible combination of votes (by any number of individuals) an alternative. We define the notion of asymptotic nonmanipulability for voting systems, and prove that every representable positionalist voting system is asymptotically nonmanipulable. Various aspects of manipulation of large voting schemes and several examples are also discussed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Breiman, L., Probability, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1968.
DeMeyer, F. and Plott, C. R., ‘The Probability of a Cyclical Majority’, Econometrica 38 (1970), 345–354.
Dutta, B. and Pattanaik, P. K., ‘On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems’, Econometrica 46 (1978), 163–170.
Gärdenfors, P., ‘Positionalist Voting Functions’, Theory and Decision 4 (1973), 1–24.
Garmen, M. B. and Kamien, M., ‘The Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations’, Behavioral Science 13 (1968), 306–316.
Harsanyi, J. C., ‘Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players’, Part I, Management Science 14 (1967), 159–182.
Kelly, J. S., ‘Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives’, Econometrica 42 (1974), 239–251.
Niemi, R. G. and Weisberg, H. F., ‘A Mathematical Solution for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting’, Behavioral Science 13 (1968), 317–323.
Pattanaik, P. K., ‘Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules’, The Review of Economic Studies 42 (1975), 93–103.
Peleg, B., ‘Consistent Voting Systems’, Econometrica 46 (1978), 153–161.
Sen, A. K., Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Holden-Day, San Francisco, 1970.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Peleg, B. A note on manipulability of large voting schemes. Theor Decis 11, 401–412 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139450
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139450