Abstract
We propose a simple Pólya-variety urn model for calculating paradox-of-voting probabilities. The model contains a homogeneity parameter, and for specific values of this parameter the model reduces to cases previously discussed in the literature. We derive a Dirichlet family of distributions for describing the assignment of preference profiles in large committees, and we show how the homogeneity parameter relates to measures of similarity among voters, suggested in prior studies.
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Part of this work was supported by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Stockholm.
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Berg, S. Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity. Public Choice 47, 377–387 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127533
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127533