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Russia and the Caucasus in the Polish Ethnopolitical Myth

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Abstract

The perception of the Caucasus by Polish society is analyzed in the light of the Polish ethnopolitical myth, according to which Russia appears as an “historical enemy.” The myth’s influence is also traced in the concept of national security, formed by politicians. This myth has noticeably been manifested since Poland restored its independence after WWI but was not apparent for obvious reasons during the existence of the Polish People’s Republic, when the image of the “historical enemy” was formed in relation to Germany. The author concludes that the ethnopolitical myth predetermines Poles’ attitudes to movements for independence of ethnic groups that have no statehood at present. This attitude is of a positive hue primarily toward those movements that are aimed against Russia and that can allegedly hinder the political leverage of Poland’s “historical enemy.”

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Notes

  1. The rule of the Piast dynasty ended in 1370 with the death of Casimir the Great.

  2.  This refers to the Polish–Bolshevik War.

  3. The Orientalist Youth Circle operated under the Oriental Institute, which played a key role in promoting the Promethean views in Polish society.

  4. Obviously, Poland’s possible influence through European structures on post-Soviet countries should be linked to the concept of Polish policy, which assumes the establishment of a steadfast stand in the European Union. Poland without allies and support from the main states within the organization (primarily Germany) does not have enough influence for the effective use of European structures in its political intentions.

  5. This is illustrated, e.g., by a pejorative perception of Abkhazian strivings for independence, which boils down in the narrative of Polish politicians, analysts, and commentators almost exclusively to the role of a passive instrument of Russian imperial policy. Abkhazians cannot reckon on Poland’s support because their separatist movement weakens Georgia, a key link in the part of the neo-Promethean concept that concerns the Caucasus. This particular country is seen through the prism of the dominant Polish ethnopolitical myth as a potential ally in the struggle against the “historical enemy.”

  6. The attitude of the Polish authorities to the events in the Caucasus is very demonstrative. As a matter of fact, the only politician who stressed more than once the necessity to preserve the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan during the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was President L. Kaczyński, which should be linked to his neo-Promethean views that assumed the rapprochement with Poland of states that formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Politicians who try to use European structures to implement the neo-Promethean concept no longer accentuate so much the preservation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan [7].

  7. The Democratic Left Alliance, the successor to the Polish United Workers’ Party, as well as the Polish Peasants’ Party, the successor of the United Peasants’ Party.

  8. M. Kamiński has been present in the Polish parliament since 1997, initially from the Solidarity Electoral Action and after its disintegration from the Law and Justice party. From 2006 through 2009, he headed the Central Anticorruption Bureau, and since 2015, he has been coordinator of special services.

  9. Practically all Karabakh Armenians are Christians (members of the Armenian Apostolic Church), as well as Ossetians from South Ossetia (Orthodox). Only Abkhazia has a relatively large Muslim group (15−20% of the population); however, the majority, over 60%, claim to be Christians.

  10. Poles felt most sympathetic toward Czechs, Italians, Spaniards, the French, and Slovaks.

  11. Poles were even less disposed to Turks, Romanians, Arabs, and Gypsies than to Chechens.

  12. According to the survey, Poles are most disposed to Catholics and then in turn to Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Judaists, Baptists, atheists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Muslims find themselves in the last place.

  13. The Kosovo precedent may be considered as a showcase for the United States that it can reckon on Poland’s support in its international politics. Note also that, through the prism of Wendt’s social theory of international relations, Poland perceives the United States as “a country that achieved success”; therefore, it should be copied.

  14. However, it is impossible to assert that one neo-Promethean concept has been constantly present in Poland’s political thinking after the change in the political system at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. We should rather speak about its numerous variations, which include L. Kaczyński’s concept of direct relations between Poland and post-Soviet states, as well as D. Tusk and R. Sikorski’s idea, which also envisages close relations with them but using European structures. However, common for these concepts is the desire to limit Russia’s influence in post-Soviet states and to increase Poland’s influence, which, consequently, should strengthen the national security of Poland.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was supported by the Polish National Science Center, project no. 2016/20/S/HS5/00047.

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Correspondence to P. Adamczewski.

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Translated by B. Alekseev

Przemysław Adamczewski, Cand. Sci. (Hist.), is an Associate of the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences.

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Adamczewski, P. Russia and the Caucasus in the Polish Ethnopolitical Myth. Her. Russ. Acad. Sci. 88, 405–412 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331618040093

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