Abstract
One of the most well-known theories of decision making under risk is expected utility theory based on the independence axiom. The independence axiom postulates that decision maker’s preferences between two lotteries are not affected by mixing both lotteries with the same third lottery (in identical proportions). The probabilistic independence axiom (also known as the cancelation axiom) extends this classic independence axiom to situations when a decision maker chooses in a probabilistic manner (i.e., she does not necessarily prefer the same choice alternative when repeatedly presented with the same choice set). Probabilistic choice may occur for a variety of reasons such as unobserved attributes of choice alternatives, imprecision of preferences, random errors/noise in decisions. According to probabilistic independence axiom, the probability that a decision maker chooses one lottery over another does not change when both lotteries are mixed with the same third lottery (in identical proportions). This paper presents a model of probabilistic binary choice under risk based on this probabilistic independence axiom. The presented model generalizes an incremental expected utility advantage model of Fishburn (Int Econ Rev 19(3):633–646, 1978) and stronger utility model of Blavatskyy (Theory Decis 76(2):265–286, 2014).
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Notes
Machina (1985) and Chew et al. (1991) develop models of probabilistic choice under risk as a result of deliberate randomization by decision makers with (deterministic) quasi-concave preferences. Carbone and Hey (1995) find that conscious randomization cannot rationalize their experimental data but Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) reach the opposite conclusion.
An outside observer cannot observe choice decisions when a decision maker faces a binary choice between two identical lotteries.
i.e., when one lottery does not first-order stochastically dominate the other.
Other possible distributions of random errors are detailed in Blavatskyy (2014, p. 270).
i.e., utility of the least desirable outcome is zero and utility of the most desirable outcome is one.
For any two lotteries \(L, L^{\prime} \in {\mathcal{L}},\) a contextual probability equivalent of lottery L is probability α ∈ [0,1] such that a decision maker is indifferent between L and a compound lottery that yields the least upper bound on L and L′ (in terms of the first-order stochastic dominance) with probability α and the greatest lower bound on L and L′ (in terms of the first-order stochastic dominance) with probability 1 − α. Under expected utility theory, contextual probability equivalents of any two lotteries should sum up to one.
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Funding
Pavlo Blavatskyy is a member of the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Chair, which is part of LabEx Entrepreneurship (University of Montpellier, France) and funded by the French government (Labex Entreprendre, ANR-10-Labex-11-01).
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider any two distinct lotteries \(L\left( {p_{ 1} , \ldots ,p_{n} } \right) \in {\mathcal{L}}{\text{ and}}\;L^{{\prime }} \left( {q_{ 1} , \ldots ,q_{n} } \right) \in {\mathcal{L}}\) such that pi≥ qi for all i ∊ {1,…,k} and qj> pj for all j ∊ {k + 1,…,n} for some k ∊ {1,…,n − 1}.
First, lottery L′(q1,…,qn) is a reduced-form of a compound lottery \(q_{ 1} \varvec{x}_{{\mathbf{1}}} \, + \,\left( { 1 - q_{ 1} } \right)L_{1}^{{\prime }} ,\) where x1 denotes a degenerate lottery that yields outcome x1 for sure and \(L_{1}^{{\prime }}\) denotes lottery
Similarly, lottery L(p1,…,pn) is a reduced-form of a compound lottery \(q_{ 1} \varvec{x}_{{\mathbf{1}}} \, + \,\left( { 1- q_{ 1} } \right)L_{ 1} ,\) where L1 denotes lottery
If Axiom 1 holds then \(P\left( {L,L^{{\prime }} } \right)\, \equiv \,P\left( {q_{ 1} x_{{\mathbf{1}}} \, + \,\left( { 1- q_{ 1} } \right)L_{ 1} ,q_{ 1} x_{{\mathbf{1}}} \, + \,\left( { 1- q_{ 1} } \right)L_{1}^{{\prime }} } \right)\, = \,P\left( {L_{ 1} ,L_{1}^{{\prime }} } \right).\)
Second, \(L_{1}^{{\prime }}\) is a reduced-form of a compound lottery \(\left[ {q_{ 2} /\left( { 1 - q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]\varvec{x}_{{\mathbf{2}}} \, + \,\left[ { 1 - q_{ 2} /\left( { 1 - q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]L_{2}^{{\prime }} ,\) where x2 denotes a degenerate lottery that yields outcome x2 for sure and \(L_{2}^{{\prime }}\) denotes lottery
Similarly, lottery L1 is a reduced-form of a compound lottery \(\left[ {q_{ 2} /\left( { 1 - q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]\varvec{x}_{{\mathbf{2}}} \, + \,\left[ { 1 - q_{ 2} /\left( { 1 - q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]L_{2} ,\) where L2 denotes lottery
If Axiom 1 holds then \(P\left( {L_{ 1} ,L_{1}^{{\prime }} } \right)\, \equiv \,P\left( {\left[ {q_{ 2} /\left( { 1- q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]x_{{\mathbf{2}}} \, + \,\left[ { 1- q_{ 2} /\left( { 1- q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]L_{ 2} ,\left[ {q_{ 2} /\left( { 1- q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]x_{{\mathbf{2}}} \, + \,\left[ { 1- q_{ 2} /\left( { 1- q_{ 1} } \right)} \right]L_{2}^{{\prime }} } \right)\, = \,P\left( {L_{ 2} ,L_{2}^{{\prime }} } \right).\)
Iterating such application of Axiom 1 for the first k outcomes we obtain that \(P\left( {L,L^{{\prime }} } \right)\, = \,P\left( {L_{k} ,L_{k}^{{\prime }} } \right),\) where Lk denotes lottery
and \(L_{k}^{{\prime }}\) denotes lottery
Lottery Lk is a reduced form of a compound lottery
where xk+1 denotes a degenerate lottery that yields outcome xk+1 for sure and Lk+1 denotes lottery
Similarly, lottery \(L_{k}^{{\prime }}\) is a reduced form of a compound lottery
where \(L_{k + 1}^{{\prime }}\) denotes lottery
Axiom 1 then implies \(P\left( {L_{k} ,L_{k}^{{\prime }} } \right)\, = \,P\left( {L_{k + 1} ,L_{k + 1}^{{\prime }} } \right).\)
Iterating such application of Axiom 1 for the remaining n − k − 1 outcomes we obtain that \(P\left( {L,L^{{\prime }} } \right)\, = \,P\left( {L_{n} ,L_{n}^{{\prime }} } \right)\) where Ln denotes lottery
and \(L_{n}^{{\prime }}\) denotes lottery
The last non-zero probability in lottery Ln is one minus the sum of the first k − 1 probabilities:
The last probability in lottery \(L_{n}^{{\prime }}\) is one minus the sum of the proceeding n − k − 1 probabilities:
Thus, P(L,L′) can be written as function (1) of n − 2 probabilities, where function \(F:\left[ {0,1} \right]^{n - 2} \to \left[ {0,1} \right]\) denotes the probability that a decision maker chooses lottery Ln over lottery \(L_{n}^{{\prime }} .\)****
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Blavatskyy, P. Probabilistic independence axiom. Geneva Risk Insur Rev 46, 21–34 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s10713-019-00046-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s10713-019-00046-8