Abstract
Under what conditions do business groups become large, and under what conditions do they become integrated? As business units with ambiguous boundaries, especially in East Asia, business groups have been the subject of many studies, both theoretical and empirical. Although previous studies on business groups have generally followed the performance approach, we introduce two dimensions of group-likelihood – extension and integrity – as the substance of business groups. On the basis of this theoretical background, we analyze the influences of various elements on group-likelihood, especially in China, by observing 1561 listed companies in the Chinese A stock market. We conclude that (i) marketization decreases only extension, not integrity; (ii) surplus resources increase both; (iii) state ownership increases extension, whereas private ownership increases integrity; (iv) indirect control increases extension, whereas direct control increases integrity; and (v) government promotions increase both. These conclusions help understand the substance of the business group phenomenon and clarify the complex business conditions in China, an economy undergoing incremental transition for more than 30 years.
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Choi, P., Ning, X. Extension and integrity of business groups: Evidence from China. Asian Bus Manage 12, 253–280 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/abm.2012.19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/abm.2012.19