Abstract
Infinitism is often presented as a rival to foundationalism and coherentism as available answers to the epistemic regress problem. The most prominent contemporary defense of infinitism, due to Peter Klein, rests on the notion that an agent can perpetually amplify the justification for her belief insofar as they are able to iteratively answer an interlocutor’s questions why the proffered grounds for their belief should count as providing justification for that belief. We show that this argument does not offer any basis for preferring infinitism over foundationalism and coherentism, because those views are able to accommodate the insight that justification for a belief can be continually amplified. Klein’s argument for infinitism thus falls short of its aspirations of proving that infinitism qua rival of foundationalism and coherentism is the most credible solution to the epistemic regress problem.
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Notes
There is a considerable literature exploring how to best think about inferential justification, including a stimulating investigation into probability-based understandings of justification transmitted by inference. On this see for instance Peijnenberg (2007) and Meester and Kerkvliet (2021), among other important contributions. But nothing we say here will require choosing between different accounts of inferential justification; it is enough for our purposes to observe the distinction drawn here between transmissional and generative understandings of inferential justification.
See for instance Sosa (1980).
Ibid.
See Klein (2007: pp. 7–8) for this characterization of substantive foundationalism.
On this distinction, see Rescorla (2009). Machuca (2019) also discusses the dialectical regress from a Pyrrhonist angle and interprets Pyrrhonism in a non-epistemic way. Fantl (2003) and Lehrer (1990) are examples of epistemologists who argue conversely that the agent’s capacity to answer dialectical challenges is relevant to epistemic justification. Thanks to anonymous referees for suggesting the need to reframe and develop in detail this section of the paper.
See Lammenranta (2018) among others for a similar claim.
We can for present purposes understand maximal justification in the same way that Fantl (2003: p. 538) posits, as justification for which there is no higher degree.
See Klein (2007: p. 10).
See for instance Klein (2005: pp. 132–134) resting the argument against foundationalism on the claim that continued reasoning on part of the agent increases the credibility of the agent’s belief. In (2007: p. 10) Klein argues that infinitism is preferable to foundationalism because the infinitist will contend that continuing to provide further reasons will further justify her beliefs. Aikin (2014) and Fantl (2003) offer similar comments in support of infinitism.
Per above see Fantl (2003), Aikin (2008), and Turri (2009). Since Fantl and Aikin each argue for views that incorporate both foundationalist and infinitist components, they may find welcome a conclusion that Klein’s dilemma argument may still offer support for that kind of view even if Klein’s argument falls short of establishing the conclusion Klein himself favors, that the best solution to the epistemic regress problem is a purely infinitist view. Turri’s conclusion like ours is that considerations that an infinitist would offer in support of their view fail to discredit foundationalism, and as such he argues for a result similar to ours, though on different grounds.
As noted above, we take this to be essential to a satisfactory response to Rescorla’s objections, and evident in Klein’s argument at for instance (2007: p. 10) in saying the “difference between infinitism and the other two forms of doxastic justification underscores an inherent, non-dogmatic tendency in infinitism. For the infinitist grants that she has not finished the process of justifying her beliefs. There is always a further step that can be taken should we become dissatisfied with the point at which we stopped the progress of inquiry.”
We can connect our present argument with a view defended in Aikin (2008) that there is a distinction between “pure foundationalism’ and “impure foundationalism”, where the former identifies all epistemic justification as coming from non-inferential justification while the latter merely cites non-inferential justification as the source of some epistemic justification. In these terms, Klein’s dilemma argument is putting pressure on pure foundationalism but not on impure foundationalism. Aikin argues that impure infinitism is preferable to pure infinitism, while noting that Klein should be seen as advocating for pure infinitism. Aikin’s arguments in favor of impure infinitism over a view like Klein’s are different than the arguments here, but our arguments here would offer additional reason to think we lack an argument for pure infinitism over an impure infinitism that could in virtue of its “impurity” incorporate foundationalist elements into the theory.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to audiences at the Central States Philosophical Association (particularly my commentator Rodrigo Borges), the Indiana Philosophical Association (particularly my commentator Kris Rhodes), and the Long Island Philosophical Society for helpful discussion. Thanks also to anonymous referees for extremely helpful feedback.
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Murday, B. Infinitism: rival or common ground in answering the epistemic regress?. Synthese 203, 53 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04476-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04476-w