Abstract
This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
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Turri, J. On the regress argument for infinitism. Synthese 166, 157–163 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9270-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9270-x