Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, I want to present the infinitist solution to the problem and defend it against some of the well known objections to it.
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Acknowledgement
I want to thank Anne Ashbaugh, Michael Bergmann, Tito Flores, Brian Mclaughlin and Ernest Sosa for many helpful discussions concerning issues in this paper.
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Klein, P. Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning. Philos Stud 134, 1–17 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9012-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9012-9