Abstract
In a theoretical co-investment problem, a set of agents face a surplus-sharing situation with a single input and a single output exhibiting increasing average returns. All agents contribute their respective inputs and expect part of the collective output. Focusing on the core of the problem, we analyze whether a core allocation of the output is acceptable or compatible with a variation of input contributions, where larger payoffs are expected by those agents whose contribution has increased. We state a necessary and sufficient condition for a core allocation to be acceptable. We also introduce and study the acceptable core, that is, those core allocations acceptable for any possible increase of inputs. Finally, we axiomatically characterize when a set-solution that contains acceptable core allocations shrinks into the proportional allocation.
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Notes
Committed capital is the amount of money that a limited partner commits to invest in a private equity fund.
Metrick and Yasuda comment that “The exact origin of the 20% focal point is unknown, but previous authors have pointed to Venetian merchants in the Middle Ages, speculative sea voyages in the age of exploration, and even the book of Genesis as sources”.
We identify any real value function \(x\in {\mathbb {R}}^N\) on N with the n-tuple \(x=(x_1,x_2,\ldots ,x_n)\in {\mathbb {R}}^n\) of real numbers. See Driessen (1988).
The marginal contribution of an agent \(i\in N\) measures the effect on the total output of adding agent i, i.e. \(f(\omega _N)-f(\omega _{N\setminus \{i\}})\). It is easy to check that for any core element \(x\in C(N,f,\omega )\), the payoff \(x_i\) of any agent \(i\in N\) cannot exceed its marginal contribution; otherwise \(x_i>f(\omega _N)-f(\omega _{N\setminus \{i\}})\) and thus \(f(\omega _N)-x_i=x_{N}-x_i=x_{N\setminus \{i\}}<f(\omega _{N\setminus \{i\}})\), but this would contradict x to be a core element.
Given \(R\subseteq N\), we denote by \(\Theta ^R\) the set of all permutations of the elements of R.
see Klement et al. (2011) , for example.
These properties are adapted from Di Luca et al. (2013).
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Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge support from research Grant ECO2017-86481-P (Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, AEI and FEDER, UE) and 2017SGR778 (Government of Catalonia).
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Appendix
Appendix
Given a co-investment problem \((N,f,\omega )\), \(\omega '\in {\mathbb {R}}^N\), \(\omega '\ge \omega \), \(\omega '\ne \omega \) and vector z defined in (7) we have
Claim
For any \(R\in {\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\) and for any pair of coalitions \(S_1\) and \(S_2\) such that \(\varnothing \ne S_1\subseteq S_2\subseteq N\setminus R\) we have
Proof
The proof will be argued by induction on the cardinality of the size of coalition R. If \(|R|=1\), i.e. \(R=\{j_1\}\in {\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\) there are just two cases. If \(Q=\varnothing \) then (14) is
and it follows just by (1). If \(Q=\{j_1\}\) then (14) is
To check this last inequality, notice that
where the first inequality follows by (1) and the second one since, by definition of the set \({\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\), we have \(z_{j_1}\ge \displaystyle \frac{f(\omega '_N)}{\omega '_N}\cdot \omega '_{j_1}\ge \frac{f(\omega '_{S_2\cup \{j_1\}})}{\omega '_{S_2\cup \{j_1\}}}\cdot \omega '_{j_1}\), and thus \(\displaystyle \frac{f(\omega '_{S_2\cup \{j_1\}})}{\omega '_{S_2\cup \{j_1\}}}\cdot \omega '_{j_1} \displaystyle -z_{j_1}\le 0\).
Suppose now that for any \({\widetilde{R}}\in {\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\) such that \(1\le |{\widetilde{R}}|\le k\) and all \(Q \subseteq {\widetilde{R}}\) we have
for all \(\varnothing \ne {\widetilde{S}}_1\subseteq {\widetilde{S}}_2\subseteq N\setminus {\widetilde{R}}\). Let \(R\in {\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\), with \(|R|=k+1\), that is \(R=\{j_1,j_2,\ldots ,j_k, j_{k+1}\}\) where \(\theta =(j_1,j_2,\ldots ,j_k, j_{k+1})\) is the ordering in which the inequalities required to be in the set \({\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\) are satisfied. Let us remark that the coalition \(R\setminus \{j_{k+1}\}\) is also in \({\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\).
We have to prove (14) for all coalitions \(\varnothing \ne S_1\subseteq S_2\subseteq N\setminus R\) and coalition \(Q\subseteq R=\{j_1,j_2,\ldots ,j_k,j_{k+1}\}\). To this aim consider two cases:
Case 1 Coalition \(Q\subseteq R\) satisfies \(j_{k+1}\not \in Q\). In this case (14) holds simply by applying (15) to \({\widetilde{R}}=R\setminus \{j_{k+1}\}\) and taking \({\widetilde{S}}_1=S_1\) and \({\widetilde{S}}_2=S_2\).
Case 2 Coalition \(Q\subseteq R\) satisfies \(j_{k+1}\in Q\). Taking into account \(\varnothing \ne S_1\subseteq S_2\subseteq N\setminus R\) we have,
where the first inequality comes from (15) applied to \({\widetilde{R}}=\{j_1,\ldots , j_k\}\), \({\widetilde{S}}_1=S_1\cup \{j_{k+1}\}\) and \({\widetilde{S}}_2=S_2\cup \{j_{k+1}\}\) and the second inequality follows since it can be proved that
Indeed, being \(R=\{j_1,\ldots , j_k,j_{k+1}\}\in {\mathscr {D}}_{S^*}\), this inequality follows since
where the third inequality follows from (15) by taking \({\widetilde{R}}=R\setminus \{j_{k+1}\}=\{j_1,\ldots , j_k\}\), \({\widetilde{S}}_1=S_2\cup \{j_{k+1}\}\) and \({\widetilde{S}}_2=N\setminus \{j_1,\ldots ,j_k\}\). Therefore, the claim is proved.\(\square \)
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Izquierdo, J.M., Rafels, C. Core Allocations in Co-investment Problems. Group Decis Negot 29, 1157–1180 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09700-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09700-3