Abstract
The core of ann-person game is the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. A convex game is defined as one that is based on a convex set function. In this paper it is shown that the core of a convex game is not empty and that it has an especially regular structure. It is further shown that certain other cooperative solution concepts are related in a simple way to the core: The value of a convex game is the center of gravity of the extreme points of the core, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set solution of a convex game is unique and coincides with the core.
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Shapley, L.S. Cores of convex games. Int J Game Theory 1, 11–26 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753431
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753431