Abstract
In Why Not Socialism?, G. A. Cohen argues that market society and capitalism are intrinsically repugnant. He asks us to imagine an ideal camping trip, which becomes increasing repugnant as it shifts from living by socialist to capitalist principles. In this paper, I expose the limits of this style of argument by making a parallel argument, which shows how an ideal anarchist camping trip becomes increasingly repugnant as the campsite turns from anarchism to democracy. When we see why this style of argument fails to generate interesting objections to democracy, we then see why it also fails to generate interesting objections to market society.
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Notes
Readers will not that my language and organization here parallels Cohen’s (pp. 1–2). Throughout this piece, I will sometimes paraphrase Cohen, often substituting “anarchism” for “socialism”, and so on. I will cite the text where doing so would be illustrative for the reader.
As Cohen might note, even defenders of the free market often assert such things. For instance, F. A. Hayek says, “…if we were always to apply the norms of the extended order [i.e., large-scale societies] to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them.” Hayek (1991, p. 18).
In a review of Cohen’s book, Sharon Krause notes that Cohen never establishes that these principles cannot be realized under capitalism (or under some other non-socialist regime). Instead, Cohen seems simply to equate socialism with the realization of these principles. But, as Krause says, socialism is not equality and community. Instead, it is a form of economic organization, which may or may not be compatible with various moral values in principle, and which may or may not be tend to be successful in realizing these values in practice. See Krause (forthcoming).
Cohen (1995, p. 256).
Kavka (1995).
This amalgamates and partially quotes from Gaus (2003, pp. 207–208).
Gaus (2010, pp. 233–275), here p. 234.
This paragraph paraphrases Cohen (2009, p. 46).
This paragraph paraphrases and quotes from Cohen (2009, pp. 49–50), in some parts.
This paragraph also paraphrases and quotes from Cohen (2009, pp. 49–50), in some parts.
Rawls (2001, p. 178).
Zak (2008, p. xv).
Larmore (2010).
Rawls (1996, pp. 56–57).
See De Soto (2000).
Rawls (2007, p. 11).
Cohen (2009, pp. 148, 155).
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Brennan, J. Is Market Society Intrinsically Repugnant?. J Bus Ethics 112, 271–281 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1248-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1248-z