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Market Democracy, Market Anarchy, and Global Justice

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Radicalizing Rawls

Part of the book series: Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law ((PPPTL))

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Abstract

A cosmopolitan account of global justice can provide normative grounding for a variety of anarchism. It is possible to frame a model of global justice featuring peoples with con-strained sovereignty in light of John Tomasi’s suggested Rawlsian defense of “free market fairness” (Part II). But a more radicalized version of Tomasi’s proposal—one in accordance with which the demands of justice would be compatible with, and might even require, some variety of anarchy—can be effectively articulated in dialogue with Andrew Kuper’s somewhat similar suggestion (Part III). A broadly Rawlsian cosmopolitanism can be worked out in anarchic terms (Part IV).

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Notes

  1. Cf. Thomas W. Pogge, Rawls on International Justice, 51 PHIL. Q. 246, 251–53 (2001).

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© 2014 Gary Chartier

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Chartier, G. (2014). Market Democracy, Market Anarchy, and Global Justice. In: Radicalizing Rawls. Philosophy, Public Policy, and Transnational Law. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137382979_6

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