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Can consumption habit spillovers be a source of equilibrium indeterminacy?

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether the external consumption habit can be a source of indeterminacy in a one-sector growth model when the labor supply is elastic. When there is a proper habit effect with a positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we find that the model exhibits indeterminacy if the coefficient of the habit formation is sufficiently large that allows for a substantial impact of current consumption on the habit. Indeterminacy arises even though the elasticity of the Frisch labor supply is positive and the elasticity of the labor demand in negative. In a calibrated version, we find that indeterminacy is empirically plausible when the habit effect is negative that features the “catching up with the Joneses” effect. Under given “catching up with the Joneses” effects, the external consumption habit can be a source of indeterminacy even if more than a half of the external consumption habit comes from past average consumption.

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Notes

  1. The Frisch labor supply is the labor supply when the marginal utility of consumption is constant.

  2. Consumption externalities affect the time preference in Drugeon (1998) and the utility in Chen and Hsu (2007). Chen et al. (2010) extended these models and considered the external consumption habit.

  3. Woodford (1994) found that in a monetary economy with a CIA constraint, the equilibrium path is indeterminate under a given exogenous growth rate of the money supply but is unique under a pegged nominal interest rate.

  4. The concept of the consumption habit may be traced to Hume (1748) who argued that preferences were influenced not simply by what a person did in the past, what his parents did, and what contemporary peers were doing but also by the behavior of past generations of peers. Similar contemporary ideas dated to Marshall (1898), Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950), and Hicks (1965). Subsequent research has identified two kinds of habit formation. One is referred to as external habit formation, expressed in terms of the past consumption of some outside reference group, usually the past consumption of the overall economy, and is the focus in the current study. The other is termed internal habit formation based upon an individual’s own past consumption level.

  5. Recently, Wirl (2011) has analyzed general conditions for indeterminacy and multiple steady states in a model with an external stock in payoffs wherein the dynamical system includes a control and a stock. There are similarities between Wirl and our paper. First, both papers consider externalities. Moreover, externalities are both generated by stock variables. Finally, both papers derive the conditions that lead to indeterminacy. Our model has a negative externality and is a three-equation dynamical system and is different from a two-equation system in Wirl (2011) which considers a positive externality. Like our paper, the model by Antoci et al. (2009) has negative externalities and is a three-equation dynamical system. Unlike our paper, the negative externalities in the latter paper are generated by aggregate output which generates pollutions and reduces natural resources. Thus, their negative externalities affect the supply side, whereas our negative externalities affect the demand side. Moreover, Antoci et al. (2009) focus on global indeterminacy as opposed to local indeterminacy in our paper.

  6. Evidence of the external habit effect has been prevalent and was confirmed as early as the 1950s by Brown (1952) who estimated the habit effect by using the aggregate data in Canada. Recently, a growing body of empirical evidence concerning external habit persistence has emerged. Using time-series data in the US, Fuhrer (2000) strongly supported the hypothesis of consumption habit formation. More recently, using panel data in the US, Ravina (2005) and Korniotis (2010) both have provided strong evidence about external habit persistence in household consumption choices. Using data from other countries, supportive evidence of external habits has been offered by, among others, van de Stadt et al. (1985) who used longitudinal panel surveys of households in the Netherlands, Guariglia and Rossi (2002) who used the British Household Panel Survey, Case (1991) who used an Indonesian socio-economic survey, and Carrasco et al. (2005) who used household panel data from Spain.

  7. The formulation is different from that in Auray et al. (2002); Auray et al. (2005) which assumed \(H_{t}=C_{t-1}\) and thus their habit is determined by the society’s consumption last period. The Ryder and Heal’s formulation is more general. Constantinides (1990) used the same habit formation regime as ours except his habit is internal.

  8. Readers are referred to the paper by Chen (2007) which found multiple balanced growth paths in a one-sector endogenous growth model with a negative consumption habit effect.

  9. When equilibrium is indeterminate, the equilibrium system cannot pin down the location of initial control variables (consumption) for given initial state variables (capital and habits). Agents’ expectations about other’s behavior affect the location of initial control variables. Since agents’ expectations are like animal’s spirits which can fluctuate a lot, the location of initial control variables fluctuates a lot. Thus, there are endogenous fluctuations in the economy. For a better account, see survey by Benhabib and Farmer (1999).

  10. While \(\sigma +\varsigma >0\), the condition (ii) in Theorem 1 is \(\phi _ +\sigma -\chi <\eta -\varepsilon <0,\) where the sign of \(\eta -\varepsilon <0\) follows from (10a).

    Fig. 1
    figure 1

    Labor supply and the determinacy of the equilibrium path

  11. Carroll et al. (2000) and Chen (2007) used the utility function with \(\psi <0\) in a one-sector endogenous growth model with inelastic leisure.

  12. The slope of \(\Phi (l,\psi )\) is dictated by \(\textstyle {{d\Phi (l,\psi )} \over {dl}}=\textstyle {1 \over \nu }l^*{\psi (\textstyle {1 \over \nu }-1)-2}\{[\psi (1-v)-v]-\psi (1-v)l\}.\)

  13. While Constantinides (1990) employed \(\beta =0.6\), Carroll et al. (1997) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) used \(\beta =0.2\). Our value lies within these existing values used. As we will see from the quantitative results in Fig. 5 below, there is a tradeoff between the coefficient of the habit formation \(\beta \) and the CUJ effect \(\psi (1-\nu )\). Thus, if we parameterize \(\beta =0.6\), the required CUJ effect that creates indeterminacy is smaller. Alternatively, if we parameterize \(\beta =0.2\), the required CUJ effect that creates indeterminacy is larger.

  14. Prescott (2006) pointed out that 25 % of productive time was allocated to market in the US.

  15. There is another steady state with \(l_{2}^{*}\) \(=\) 0.2674 which is a saddle.

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Acknowledgments

We thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments. We benefited from suggestions made by Jang-Ting Guo, Chong K. Yip and participants at the 2010 Meeting of the Society of Advanced Economic Theory (SAET) held in Singapore.

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Correspondence to Been-Lon Chen.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The elasticity of the Frisch labor supply

If we differentiate (5a) and keep \(\lambda \) fixed, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} dc=\displaystyle {{u_{13} dl-u_{12} dH} \over {u_{11} }}. \end{aligned}$$
(19)

Under given \(\lambda \), differentiating (5b) gives

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle {{dw} \over w}=\displaystyle {{u_{31} dc+u_{32} dH-u_{31} dl} \over {u_3 }}. \end{aligned}$$
(20)

Substituting (19) into (20) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \zeta (k,l,H)&\equiv&\displaystyle {{\textstyle {{dw} \over w}} \over {\textstyle {{dl} \over l}}}=\displaystyle {l \over {u_3 }}\left[ {\displaystyle {{u_{13} (u_{31} +u_{32} \textstyle {{dH} \over {dc}})} \over {u_{11} +u_{12} \textstyle {{dH} \over {dc}}}}-u_{33} } \right]\\&= \left[ {\textstyle {{\textstyle {{lu_{13} } \over {u_1 }}(\textstyle {{u_{31} } \over {u_3 }}c+\textstyle {{u_{32} } \over {u_3 }}H\textstyle {c \over H}\textstyle {{dH} \over {dc}})} \over {\textstyle {{u_{11} } \over {u_1 }}c+\textstyle {{u_{12} } \over {u_1 }}H\textstyle {c \over H}\textstyle {{dH} \over {dc}}}}-\displaystyle {{lu_{33} } \over {u_3 }}} \right], \end{aligned}$$

and thus the elasticity of the Frisch labor supply

$$\begin{aligned} \zeta (k,l,H)=\left\{ {\displaystyle {{\varepsilon [\phi -(\varsigma +\chi )\textstyle {C \over H}\textstyle {{dH} \over {dC}}]} \over {-\sigma -\varsigma \textstyle {C \over H}\textstyle {{dH} \over {dC}}}}-\eta } \right\} . \end{aligned}$$
(21)

In order to obtain dH/dC, we rewrite \(H_{t}\) as

$$\begin{aligned} H_t =\int _{-\infty }^t {D(t,\tau )C_\tau d\tau ,} \end{aligned}$$
(22)

where \(D(t,\tau )=\beta e^{-\beta (\tau -t)}\) which satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \int _{-\infty }^t {D(t,\tau )d\tau =1.} \end{aligned}$$
(23)

Hence, \(D(t,\tau )\) measures the influence of \(C_{\tau }\) on \(H_{t}\) at time \(\tau \in (-\infty ; t]\) and is thus a weight function defined on \(\tau \in (-\infty ; t]\) with the total weight equal 1 for all \(\beta >0\). \(D(t,\tau )\) is a decreasing function of \(\beta \) for \(\beta \ge \textstyle {1 \over {t-\tau }}\) that approaches 0 as \(\beta \rightarrow \infty \). Thus, as \(\beta \rightarrow \infty \), \(D(t, \tau )\) approaches to the function \(\Upsilon _{t }(\tau )\) that satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \Upsilon _t (\tau )=\left\{ {{\begin{array}{*{20}c} {0,\quad \tau <t,} \\ {\infty ,\quad \tau =t,} \\ \end{array} }} \right. \end{aligned}$$

and \(\int _{-\infty }^t {\Upsilon _t (\tau )d\tau =1.} \) This indicates that for \(\beta \rightarrow \infty \), \(H_{t}=C_{t}\).

To explore further how the change in \(C_{t}\) affects \(H_{t}\), let us consider the case wherein \(C_{\tau }\) is changed to \(C_{\tau }+dC_{\tau }\) and \(H_{t}\) is changed to \(H_{t}+dH_{t}\). Using (22), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} dH_t =\int _{-\infty }^t {D(t,\tau )dC_\tau } d\tau . \end{aligned}$$
(24)

We assume that for some \(t_{1}<t\),

$$\begin{aligned} dC_\tau =\left\{ {{\begin{array}{l@{\quad }l} 0,&\tau <t_1 , \\ q,&t_1 \le \tau \le t.\\ \end{array} }} \right. \end{aligned}$$

Denote \(\Delta t=t-t_{1}>0\). Then by (24), \(dH_t =(1-e^{-\beta \Delta t})q\) and the effect of the change in \(C_{t}\) on \(H_{t}\) becomes \(x(\beta )\equiv \textstyle {{dH_t } \over {dC_\tau }}=\textstyle {{dH_t } \over q}=(1-e^{-\beta \Delta t}).\) One can see that \(0<x(\beta )<1\) and \(x(\beta )\) is increasing in \(\beta \), with \(x(\beta )\rightarrow 0\) as \(\beta \rightarrow 0\) and \(x (\beta )\rightarrow 1\) as \(\beta \rightarrow \infty \).

Therefore, (21) can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle \zeta (\beta )=\left\{ {\textstyle {{\varepsilon [\phi -(\varsigma +\chi )\textstyle {C \over H}x(\beta )]} \over {-\sigma -\varsigma \textstyle {C \over H}x(\beta )}}-\eta } \right\} . \end{aligned}$$

 

Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 1

In the Appendix, we prove the Theorem 1. Denote \(f_{i}\), \(i=l\), \(k\) and \(lj\), \(j=C\), \(k\), \(H\), as partial derivatives with respect to \(i\) and \(j\). If we take the linear Taylor’s expansion of the dynamic equilibrium system (2), (6c) and (16) in the neighborhood of a steady state, along with the use of (8), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \left[ {{\begin{array}{*{20}c} {\dot{C}_t } \\ {\dot{k}_t } \\ {\dot{H}_t } \\ \end{array} }} \right]=\left[ {{\begin{array}{*{20}c} {J_{11} }&\quad {J_{12} }&\quad {J_{13} } \\ {f_l l_c -1}&\quad {f_k -\delta -f_l l_k }&\quad {f_l l_H } \\ \beta&\quad 0&\quad {-\beta } \\ \end{array} }} \right]\left[ {{\begin{array}{*{20}c} {C_t -C^*} \\ {k_t -k^*} \\ {H_t -H^*} \\ \end{array} }} \right], \end{aligned}$$
(25)

where

$$\begin{aligned} J_{11}&= \displaystyle {C \over \Omega }\left\{ [(\alpha +\varepsilon -\eta )\varsigma +\varepsilon \chi ]\displaystyle {\beta \over H}+(\eta -\varepsilon -\alpha )f_{kl} l_c +\displaystyle {{\alpha \varepsilon } \over k}(f_l l_c -1)\right\} ,\\ J_{12}&= \displaystyle {C \over \Omega }\left\{ (\eta -\varepsilon -\alpha )(f_{kl} l_k +f_{kk} )+\displaystyle {{\alpha \varepsilon } \over k}(f_l l_k +f_k -\delta )\right\} ,\\ J_{13}&= \displaystyle {C \over \Omega }\left\{ -[(\alpha +\varepsilon -\eta )\varsigma +\varepsilon \chi ]\displaystyle {\beta \over H}+(\eta -\varepsilon -\alpha )f_{kl} l_H +\displaystyle {{\alpha \varepsilon } \over k}f_l l_H \right\} . \end{aligned}$$

Let \(J\) denote the Jacobean matrix in (25) and \(\omega \) denote its corresponding eigenvalue. The characteristic polynomial is in (11), with Det(\(J)\), Tr(\(J)\) and Ds(\(J)\) defined in (12a)–(12c).

It is clear from (11) that \(G(\omega )=-\infty \) when \(\omega =\infty \) and \(G(\omega )=\infty \) when \(\omega =-\infty \). A sink requires three stable roots. The necessary conditions for the presence of three stable roots are: (i) \(G(0)=Det(J)<0\) and (ii) \(G^{\prime }(0)=-Ds(J)<0\). Moreover, according to the Routh-Hurwitz theorem, the requirement of no eigenvalues with positive real parts in the above characteristic polynomial suggests no variation in signs in the following series: \(\left\{ {-1, Tr( J),_ -Ds( J)+Det( J)/Tr( J), Det( J)} \right\} .\) This indicates the additional requirement of (iii) Tr \((J)<0\) and (iv) \(-Ds( J)+Det( J)/Tr( J)<0.\)

To investigate these conditions,

  1. (i)

    \(G( 0)=Det( J)<0\) Since \(Det( J)=\beta ( {1-\alpha })( {\rho +\delta })\left[ {\rho +\delta ( {1-\alpha })} \right][(\phi +\sigma +\varepsilon -\eta )-\chi ]\)/(-\(\Omega \alpha )\) and \(\Omega <0\), it is obvious that this requires \(\chi >\phi +\sigma -\eta +\varepsilon \).

  2. (ii)

    \(Tr( J)<0\). As \(T>0\), Tr \((J)<0\) requires both

    $$\begin{aligned} \Gamma _{1}<0 \quad \text{ and}\quad \beta >\beta _{a}\equiv T/(-\Gamma _{1})>0. \end{aligned}$$
    (26a)
  3. (iii)

    \(G^{\prime }(0)= -Ds(J)<0\) As \(M<0, Ds(J)\,>\,0\) requires both

    $$\begin{aligned} \Gamma _2 >0 \quad \text{ and}\quad \beta >\beta _b \equiv M/( {-\Gamma _2 })>0. \end{aligned}$$
    (26b)
  4. (iv)

    \(-Ds(J)+Det(J)/Tr(J)<0\) Under Tr \((J)<0\) in (ii), condition (iv) is equivalent to \(-Ds(J)Tr(J)+Det(J)>0\). Using (12a)–(12c), this requires

    $$\begin{aligned} L(\beta )=\beta ^2-\beta \left\{ \frac{M}{-\Gamma _2}+\frac{T}{-\Gamma _1}+ \frac{N}{-\Gamma _1 \Gamma _2}\right\} + \frac{MT}{\Gamma _1 \Gamma _2}>0, \end{aligned}$$
    (27a)

    where \(N=\textstyle {{(1-\alpha )(\rho +\delta )} \over {(-\Omega )}}\textstyle {{\rho +\delta (1-\alpha )} \over \alpha }(\phi +\sigma -\eta +\varepsilon -\chi )<0,\) whose the negative sign comes from using (i).

When \(L({\beta })=0\) the polynomial has two roots \({\beta }_{1}\) and \({\beta }_{2 }, {\beta }_{1}\ge {\beta }_{2}\), as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle {1 \over 2}\left\{ \displaystyle {\mathrm{N} \over {\Gamma _1 \Gamma _2 }}+\displaystyle {\mathrm{M} \over {-\Gamma _2 }}+\displaystyle {\mathrm{T} \over {-\Gamma _1 }}\pm \left[(\displaystyle {\mathrm{N} \over {\Gamma _1 \Gamma _2 }}+\displaystyle {\mathrm{M} \over {-\Gamma _2 }}+\displaystyle {\mathrm{T} \over {-\Gamma _1 }})^2-4\displaystyle {{\mathrm{M}\mathrm{T}} \over {\Gamma _1 \Gamma _2 }}\right]^{1 / 2}\right\} . \end{aligned}$$

Under (i) Det \((J)<0\), (ii) Tr \((J)<0\) and (iii) Ds \((J)>0\), both \({\beta }_{1}\) and \({\beta }_{2}\) are positive, as verified by

$$\begin{aligned} \beta _{1}{\beta }_{2}={MT}/(\Gamma _{1}\Gamma _{2})>0 \quad \text{ and}\quad {\beta }_{1}+{\beta }_{2}=\{ \Gamma _{1}M+\Gamma _{2}T- N \}/(-\Gamma _{1}\Gamma _{2})>0. \end{aligned}$$

The inequality sign in (26a) is satisfied if any one of the following two cases holds: (a) \(\beta >\beta _{1}\ge \beta _{2}\) or (b) \(\beta <\beta _{2}\le \beta _{1}\). However, case (b) is impossible as case (b) implies \(\beta _{2}<T/(-\Gamma _{1})\equiv \beta _{a}\), which is against the requirement of \(\beta >\beta _{a}\) for Tr \((J)<0\) in (ii).

Therefore, (27a) and \(-Ds(J)Tr(J)+Det(J)>0\) both can be met only if

$$\begin{aligned} \beta >\beta _1. \end{aligned}$$
(27b)

It is straightforward to show that \(\beta _{1}>\beta _{a}\) and \(\beta _{1}>\beta _{b}\). Thus, (26a), (26b) and (27b) indicate that the requirement of \(\beta >\beta _{1}\).

Therefore, under \(\beta >\beta _{1}\), the conditions of a sink are: \(\chi >\phi +\sigma -\eta +\varepsilon \), \(\Gamma _{1}<0\) and \(\Gamma _{2}>0\).

 

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Chen, BL., Hsu, YS. & Mino, K. Can consumption habit spillovers be a source of equilibrium indeterminacy?. J Econ 109, 245–269 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0301-9

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