Summary
The paper considers the determinacy of the equilibrium price level in the cash-in-advance monetary economy of Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987), in the case of deterministic “fundamentals”. The possibilities both of a multiplicity of perfect foresight equilibria and of “sunspot equilibria” are considered. Two types of monetary policy regimes are considered and compared, one in which the money supply grows at a given exogenous rate (that may be positive or negative), and one in which the nominal interest rate on one-period government debt is pegged at a given non-negative level. In the case of constant money growth rate regimes, it is shown that one can easily have both indeterminacy of perfect foresight equilibrium and existence of sunspot equilibria; indeed, in the case of negative rates of money growth (as called for by Friedman (1969)), both types of indeterminacy necessarily occur. On the other hand, sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium (and non-existence of equilibria other than a deterministic steady state) are also given, and a class of cases is identified in which a sufficiently high rate of money growth guarantees this. Thus there may be a conflict between the aims of choosing a rate of money growth that results in a high level of welfare in the steady state equilibrium and choosing a rate that makes this steady state the unique equilibrium.) In the case of the interest rate pegging regimes, sufficient conditions are given for uniqueness of equilibrium (and impossibility of sunspot equilibria), and it is shown that these necessarily hold in the case of any low enough nominal interest rate. Thus the nominal interest rate peg allows simultaneous achievement of price level determinacy and a high level of welfare in the unique (steady state) equilibrium.
In this paper I consider the consequences of alternative choices of the monetary policy regime for the determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium value of money, and in particular for the existence or not of “sunspot” equilibria, i.e., rational expectations equilibria in which fluctuations in the price level occur in response to random events that represent no change in economic “fundamentals”, simply due to self-fulfilling revisions of people's expectations. I am interested in particular in making the point that a consideration of the complete set of possible equilibria associated with a given policy regime may alter one's evaluation of the relative desirability of alternative policies, relative to the conclusion that one might reach if one considered only a single possible equilibrium associated with each policy regime (perhaps a unique equilibrium involving a “minimum set of state variables”). In view of this I give particular attention to policy regimes of types that have sometimes been advocated as ways of reducing the inefficiency associated with a rate of return differential between money and other financial assets, and show that policies that might otherwise be desirable (policies that make possible a more desirable equilibrium than would otherwise be possible) can have the unfortunate consequence of rendering equilibrium indeterminate and making possible equilibrium fluctuations in response to “sunspot” events.
Two classes of policy regimes are considered in particular: on the one hand, alternative constant rates of growth or contraction of the money supply, financed through lump sum taxes or transfers, with zero net government assets at all times; and on the other, alternative constant nominal interest rate pegs, to be maintained through open market operations between money and interest-bearing debt, with an exogenously fixed level of net transfer payments. The first class of policies is considered because of Friedman's (1969) well-known proposal that a constant contraction of the money supply of this sort would be welfare improving. I find that while thestationary equilibrium associated with the Friedman regime achieves the maximum possible level of utility for the representative consumer, and while the level of utility associated with stationary equilibrium may be monotonically decreasing in the rate of money growth, lower rates of money growth (in particular, rates near that called for by Friedman) are associated with indeterminacy of equilibrium and the existence of sunspot equilibria, while these problems need not arise in the case of higher rates of money growth.
The second class of policies is considered because they represent an obvious alternative approach to the elimination of the same rate of return differential with which Friedman is concerned. Achievement of permanently low nominal interest rates through a simple interest rate peg is not often advocated; one reason is that it is often asserted that such a policy must result in price level indeterminacy. In fact, I find that if the interest rate pegging regime is properly specified, it results in aunique rational expectations equilibrium, regardless of the level at which interest rates are to be pegged. Thus not only does the interest rate peg not result in price level indeterminacy but it allows nominal interest rates to be maintained permanently at a level lower than that which can be obtained through a policy regime of the first sort without creating price level indeterminacy. It would hence appear, at least in the case of the kind of economy modeled here, that interest rate pegging is a more reliable way of trying to reduce the inefficiency associated with consumers being forced to “economize on liquidity”.
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This paper represents a revision of Woodford (1988). I would like to thank Leonardo Auernheimer, Buz Brock, Willem Buiter, Peter Howitt, Teh-Ming Huo, David Laidler, David Levine, Bennett McCallum, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments, and the National Science Foundation for research support.
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Woodford, M. Monetary policy and price level determinacy in a cash-in-advance economy. Econ Theory 4, 345–380 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01215377
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01215377