Introduction: The relevance of public choice for constitutional political economy Charles K. Rowley OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 10
Constitutions for new democracies: Reflections of turmoil or agents of stability? Peter C. Ordeshook OriginalPaper Pages: 55 - 72
The balanced budget amendment: Clarifying the arguments James M. Buchanan OriginalPaper Pages: 117 - 138
The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence Michael MungerThomas Schaller OriginalPaper Pages: 139 - 163
Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California's state legislative races Kermit DanielJohn R. Lott Jr OriginalPaper Pages: 165 - 184
Choosing free trade without amending the U.S. Constitution Willem Thorbecke OriginalPaper Pages: 185 - 200
Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation Keith L. DoughertyMichael J.G. Cain OriginalPaper Pages: 201 - 213
On the (relative) unimportance of a balanced budget Laura RazzoliniWilliam F. Shughart II OriginalPaper Pages: 215 - 233
Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective Dennis C. Mueller OriginalPaper Pages: 255 - 280
Subsidiarity and ecologically based taxation: A european constitutional perspective Jurgen G. Backhaus OriginalPaper Pages: 281 - 310
Rule and policy spaces and economic progress: Lessons for Third World countries Gerald W. Scully OriginalPaper Pages: 311 - 324
