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Fairness, Power and their Relationship

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Advances in Behavioral Economics

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

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Abstract

The discussion of power measures and fairness concepts follows two isolated strings of thought that have rather different traditions. This paper argues that it is exactly this restriction that confuses the discussion. By making use of the theory of power indices and Binmore’s theory of justice, this paper illustrates where the problems lie. The paper contains a brief introduction into the theory of power indices such as Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel indices, as well as the Public Good Index and the member-MWC index. The monotonicity properties of these measures is analyzed, and it is demonstrated that these properties refer to implicit notions of fairness. In contrast, a critical examination of Binmore’s theory of justice suggests that his theory is one of power, with bargaining power, threats, and reciprocity as the main constituents.

The author wrote the first draft of this paper while he was Malmsten Visiting Professor at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

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Authors
  1. Manfred J. Holler
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie (Mikroökonomie), Europa-Universität Viadrina, Grosse Scharrnstraße 59, 15230, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

    Friedel Bolle

  2. Institut für Theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität der Bundeswehr, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043, Hamburg, Germany

    Michael Carlberg

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Holler, M.J. (2001). Fairness, Power and their Relationship. In: Bolle, F., Carlberg, M. (eds) Advances in Behavioral Economics. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57571-6_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57571-6_5

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1358-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57571-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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