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I am grateful to William Lucas and the Department of Operations Research at Cornell University, where this work was done. Many of my ideas on this subject were clarified in discussions with David Heath of that department.
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Straffin, P.D. Homogeneity, independence, and power indices. Public Choice 30, 107–118 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718820
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718820