Abstract
Ontic Structural Realism is a version of realism about science according to which by positing the existence of structures, understood as basic components of reality, one can resolve central difficulties faced by standard versions of scientific realism. Structures are invoked to respond to two important challenges: one posed by the pessimist meta-induction and the other by the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics, which arises in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. We argue that difficulties in the proper understanding of what a structure is undermines the realist component of the view. Given the difficulties, either realism should be dropped or additional metaphysical components not fully endorsed by science should be incorporated.
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Notes
A classification of distinct versions of OSR is presented in Ainsworth (2010).
For a succinct discussion of partial structures and their application in the philosophy of science, see Bueno and da Costa (2007).
Landry (2007) also highlights the intimate connection between the semantic view and set theory, although her concerns are different from ours.
Note that we are not invoking the indispensability argument here, as will become clear below. Our point is that by using set theory, the structural realist is thereby committed to objects—unless a proper nominalization of set theory itself is developed. (But, we will also argue, such a nominalization may conflict with the realist component of structural realism.) Note also that the point goes through independently of how much set theory is ultimately used. So it doesn’t matter whether one is dealing with a highly mathematized science or with a less mathematized one. As long as set theory is used by the structural realist (absent a full nominalization of that theory), a commitment to objects emerges.
One may worry about the full success of Lewis’ construction. Since the notion of inaccessibility is fundamentally set-theoretic in nature, aren’t sets still presupposed (Bueno 2010)? Even if the proposed reconstruction is expressively equivalent to set theory, is it in fact as effective for the formulation of empirical theories as set theory is? These are fair concerns, but they are also beside the point in this context. The purpose of the Lewis example is just to make a conceptual point, namely, that the inseparability and the indispensability theses are not the same. We need not argue that the indispensability thesis is in fact false; only that it can be.
More generally, one of the crucial features of Anjan Chakravartty’s semirealism (Chakravartty 2007) is to argue that realists need the commitment to both objects and some properties and relations—and, thus, some structures—in order to get off the ground. Clearly, given the commitment to objects, this is not a move open to ontic structural realists.
This line of response has been suggested by Steven French and James Ladyman in conversation.
Building from an argument advanced by Bueno 2011, this section examines additional considerations regarding the philosophical significance of elementarily equivalent but non-isomorphic models to the OSR debate.
Demopoulos (2003) also discusses this worry, and he links it to Putnam’s model-theoretic argument and to the semantic view of theories, but it is independent from the concerns we raise here.
For an excellent discussion of second-order logic, see Shapiro (1991).
To ask questions about the metaphysical nature of structures is not forbidden, since ontic structural realists admit that philosophy of science is also in the business of dealing with metaphysical issues arising from science.
We consider the mathematical framework for clarity purposes only. If a metaphysical characterization of structure is advanced independently of any such framework, problems analogous to those raised here will also emerge. After all, the issue of whether the structures in question are individuals or not can always be raised, and the problems discussed in this paragraph will return.
We focus on the particular category of individuality (or non-individuality) of the relevant structures, rather on some other category in metaphysics, since this is the one invoked by ontic structural realists in their case for metaphysical underdetermination. So this is the relevant category to consider in this context.
In this respect, there is a concern for ontic structural realists that their view may collapse into standard scientific realism. Psillos (1999) raises this point for the epistemic version of the view.
Our thanks go to Newton da Costa, Steven French, Décio Krause, and James Ladyman for extremely helpful discussions about the issues examined in this work. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Epistemology and Philosophy of Science Workshop at the University of Miami. Many thanks for all the feedback we received, in particular, from Ed Erwin, Fredrik Haraldsen, Peter Lewis, Yuki Onishi, and Harvey Siegel. Peter Lewis also gave us detailed and perceptive comments on the entire manuscript, which led to significant improvements. We are very grateful for his help. Thanks are also due to two anonymous reviewers for this journal who also provided extensive and extremely helpful comments. Needless to say, we are responsible for any mistakes and infelicities that remain.
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Arenhart, J.R.B., Bueno, O. Structural realism and the nature of structure. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 5, 111–139 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0100-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0100-y