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Comparing the Determinants of US-Funded NGO Aid Versus US Official Development Aid

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Abstract

Using a principal–agent approach, I seek to determine if differences exist between official US development aid (ODA) and US-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) development aid allocation. NGO scholars have expressed concern regarding NGOs' relationships with their government funders (Hulme and Edwards, NGOs, States, and Donors, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997); (Smillie, Stakeholders, Earthscan, London, 2000). Studies of European state-funded NGOs have found that need rather than political or economic interests determines state-funded NGO aid (Nancy and Yontcheva, Does NGO Aid Go to the Poor? Empirical Evidence from Europe. International Monetary Fund Working Paper 06/39, 2006; Dreher et al. 2009; World Economy 33:147–176, Kiel Working Paper No. 1486. Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2010) however; no study has examined US-funded NGO aid allocations. Results indicate that US-funded NGO aid mirrors US ODA allocations.

Résumé

`1Par le biais d’une approche de type mandant-mandataire, je m’efforce de déterminer s’il existe des différences entre l’aide officelle au développement (AOD) des États-Unis et les organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) financées par les États-Unis en matière d’attribution d’aide au développement. Les chercheurs dans le secteur des ONG ont fait part d’une inquiétude quant aux relations des ONG avec leurs bailleurs de fonds gouvernementaux (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smillie 2000). Les études des ONG financées par un état européen ont mis en évidence que la nécessité, bien plus que les intérêts politiques ou économiques, justifie l’aide d’une ONG financée par un état (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006; Dreher et al. 2009; Dreher et al. 2010); cependant, aucune étude ne s’est intéressée aux subventions des ONG financées par les États-Unis. Les résultats indiquent que l’aide aux ONG financée par les États-Unis est identique aux contributions des États-Unis en faveur de l’AOD.

Zusammenfassung

Unter Anwendung des Prinzipal-Agent-Ansatzes versuche ich zu bestimmen, ob bei der Verteilung der Entwicklungshilfe Unterschiede bestehen zwischen der öffentlichen U.S.-Entwicklungshilfe (Official Development Aid, ODA) und den von den USA finanzierten nicht-staatlichen Organisationen. Wissenschaftler und Gelehrte haben ihre Besorgnis über die Beziehungen der nicht-staatlichen Organisationen zu ihren Regierungsgeldgebern ausgedrückt (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smillie 2000). Studien über europäische nicht-staatliche Organisationen, die von der Regierung unterstützt werden, zeigen jedoch, dass Bedürfnisse und nicht politische oder wirtschaftliche Interessen die Hilfeleistungen seitens der vom Staat finanzierten nicht-staatlichen Organisationen bestimmen (Nancy & Yontcheva 2006; Dreher et al. 2009; Dreher et al. 2010). Allerdings gibt es keine Studie zur Hilfeverteilung der von den USA finanzierten nicht-staatlichen Organisationen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Hilfeleistungen der von den USA finanzierten nicht-staatlichen Organisationen die Verteilungen der öffentlichen U.S.-Entwicklungshilfe widerspiegeln.

Résumé

Utilizando un enfoque de agente principal, trato de determinar si existen diferencias entre la ayuda oficial al desarrollo estadounidense (AOD/ODA) y la asignación de la ayuda al desarrollo de organizaciones no gubernamentales financiadas por los Estados Unidos (ONG/NGO). Los estudiosos de las ONG han expresado preocupación con respecto a la relación de las ONG con sus financiadores gubernamentales (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smillie 2000). Estudios de ONG financiadas por estados europeos han encontrado que la necesidad más que los intereses políticos o económicos determina la ayuda a las ONG financiadas por el estado (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006; Dreher et al. 2009); Dreher et al. 2010). Sin embargo, ningún estudio ha examinado las asignaciones de la ayuda de las ONG financiadas por los Estados Unidos. Los resultados indican que la ayuda de las ONG financiadas por los Estados Unidos refleja las asignaciones de la AOD/ODA estadounidense.

ملخص

بإستخدام منهج الوكيل الأساسي، أسعى لتحديد ما إذا كان يوجد إختلافات بين معونة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الرسمية للتنمية (ODA) والمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs)التي تمولها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية والتي تخصص المعونة للتنمية. أعرب علماء المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGO) عن قلقهم بشأن علاقات المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) مع الممولين من حكومتهم (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Smillie 2000). قد وجدت الدراسات أن المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) الممولة من الدولة الأوروبية التي بدلا˝ من المصالح السياسية أو الإقتصادية تحدد الدولة المعونة للمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs)الممولة “نانسي و يونتشيفا 2006” (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006) ؛”دريهر و وايزر2009” (Dreher et al. 2009) ؛ “دريهر و مولدر و نوننكمب 2010” (Dreher et al. 2010) لكن؛ لم تفحص أي دراسة مخصصات المعونة للمنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs)التي تمولها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. تشير النتائج إلى أن معونة المنظمات الغير حكومية (NGOs) الممولة من الولايات المتحدة تعكس مخصصات المساعدة الإنمائية الرسمية في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.

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Notes

  1. Although USAID uses three mechanisms, the data provided in Yellowbook does not make those distinctions so I am unable to assess the differences.

  2. Although the approaches are treated as separate hypotheses in this study, there is certainly an opportunity for overlap among the explanations and variables. For example, many US allies are also important economic trading partners.

  3. The dataset is limited by these years due to USAID Yellowbook data availability.

  4. A Hausman test was performed using State 11.0 to determine if a fixed or random effect model should be used. The test indicated that fixed effects was the appropriate method for my data.

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  1. University of Texas at Brownsville, Brownsville, TX, USA

    Michelle Keck

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Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 3, 4, 5.

Table 3 US-funded NGO and US ODA aid allocations
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Table 4 NGOs that received foreign aid from USAID, 1982–1996
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Table 5 Correlation matrix
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Keck, M. Comparing the Determinants of US-Funded NGO Aid Versus US Official Development Aid. Voluntas 26, 1314–1336 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-014-9464-z

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