Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Using panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973–2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Abrams, B. A., & Lewis, K. A. (1993). Human rights and the distribution of US foreign aid. Public Choice, 77(4), 815–821.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), 33–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., & Weder, B. (2002). Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? American Economic Review, 92(4), 1126–1137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barnebeck Andersen, T., Harr, T., & Tarp, F. (2006). On US politics and IMF lending. European Economic Review, 50, 1843–1862.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barro, R. J., & Lee, J.-W. (2005). IMF-programs: who is chosen and what are the effects? Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1245–1269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bennis, P. (1997). The United Nations and Palestine: partition and its aftermath—UN stance on Palestine’s displacement by creation of Israel. Arab Studies Quarterly, 19(3), 47–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernstein, S. J., & Alpert, E. J. (1971). Foreign aid and voting behavior in the United Nations: the admission of communist China. Orbis, 15(3), 963–977.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berthelemy, J.C., & Tichit, A. (2004). Bilateral donors aid-aid allocation decisions: a three-dimensional panel analysis. International Review of Economics and Finance, 13(3), 253–274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boockmann, B. (2006). Participation and voting in committees: evidence from the ILO. Public Choice, 126, 405–427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Broz, J. L., & Hawes, M. B. (2006). US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy. In D. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and agency in international organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Canavire, G., Nunnenkamp, P., Thiele, R., & Triveño, L. (2006). Assessing the allocation of aid: developmental concerns and the self-interest of donors. Indian Economic Journal, 54(1), 26–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dahlberg, M., & Johansson, E. (2002). On the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. American Political Science Review, 96, 27–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dollar, D., & Levin, V. (2006). The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984–2003. World Development, 34(12), 2034–2046.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doucouliagos, H., & Paldam, M. (2005). The aid effectiveness literature: the sad results of 40 years of research. Working Paper 2005.15. Department of Economics, University of Aarhus.

  • Doucouliagos, H., & Paldam, M. (2007). A meta-analysis of development aid allocation: the effects of income level and population size (Working paper 2007-15). University of Aarhus, School of Economics and Management, Aarhus.

  • Doyle, M. (1986). Liberalism and world politics. American Political Science Review, 80, 1151–1169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dreher, A., & Sturm, J.-E. (2006). Do IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly? (KOF working paper 137). ETH Zurich.

  • Eldar, O. (2007). Vote trading in international institutions. New York University School of Law.

  • Escaleras, M., Anbarci, N., & Register, C. A. (2007). Public sector corruption and major earthquakes: a potentially deadly interaction. Public Choice, 132(12), 209–230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feyzioğlu, T., Swaroop, V., & Zhu, M. (1998). A panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid. World Bank Economic Review, 12(1), 29–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2002). Reassessing the role of constituency in congressional voting. Public Choice, 112, 31–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2006a). How do political changes influence U.S. bilateral aid allocations? Evidence from panel data. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 210–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2006b). World Bank independence: a model and statistical analysis of U.S. influence. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 224–240.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Freedom House. (2004). Freedom in the world. Annual Report. http://www.freedomhouse.org.

  • Gates, S., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Global aid allocation: are Nordic countries different? (Working paper 2004-34). Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford.

  • Harrigan, J., Wang, C., & El-Said, H. (2006). The economic and political determinants of IMF and World Bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa. World Development, 34(2), 247–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harms, M., & Lutz, M. (2005). The macroeconomic effects of foreign aid. In H. Ahrens (Ed.), Development cooperation—evaluation and new approaches. Berlin.

  • Hawes, M. B. (2004). Inflationary influence—the diminishing effect of U.S. aid on U.N. voting. University of California, San Diego.

  • Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2006). Democratic politics in the European Union. Mimeo.

  • Holcombe, R. G., & Sobel, R. S. (1996). The stability of international coalitions in United Nations voting from 1946 to 1973. Public Choice, 86, 17–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • International Country Risk Guide. (2006). PRS group. http://www.marketresearch.com/.

  • Jensen, S. P., & Paldam, M. (2006). Can the new aid-growth models be replicated? Public Choice, 127, 147–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kato, M. (1969). A model of US foreign aid allocation: an application of a rational decision-making scheme. In Mueller, J. E. (Ed.), Approaches to measurement in international relations. Appleton Century Croft, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kegley, C. W. Jr., & Hook, S. W. (1991). U.S. foreign aid and U.N. voting: did Reagan’s linkage strategy buy defense or defiance?. International Studies Quarterly, 35(3), 295–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kegley, C. W. Jr., & McGowan, P. J. (1981). The political economy of foreign policy. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, R. O. (1967). The study of political influence in the General Assembly. International Organization, 21(2), 221–237.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kilby, C. (2006). Donor influence in MDBs: the case of the Asian Development Bank. The Review of International Organizations, 2(1), 173–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the security council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy, 114, 905–930.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Langhammer, R. J. (2004). Halving poverty by doubling aid: is there reason for optimism? The World Economy, 27(1), 81–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levitt, S. D. (1996). How do Senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and Senator ideology. American Economic Review, 86, 425–441.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levitt, S. D., & Snyder, J. M. (1997). The impact of federal spending on house election outcomes. Journal of Political Economy, 105, 30–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lundborg, P. (1998). Foreign aid and international support as a gift exchange. Economics & Politics, 10(2), 127–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGillivray, M. (2003). Aid effectiveness and selectivity: integrating multiple objectives into aid allocations. DAC Journal, 4(3), 27–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGillivray, M., & White, H. (1993). Explanatory studies of aid allocation among developing countries: a critical survey (Working paper 148). Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

  • Morey, D., & Lai, B. (2003). Liberalism, realism, and United Nations voting: an empirical test of contending theories. Department of Political Science, University of Iowa.

  • Neumayer, E. (2003). Rutledge studies in development economics: Vol. 34.The pattern of giving aid: the impact of good governance on development assistance. London and New York.

  • OECD. (2005). Statistical compendium (CD-Rom). Paris.

  • Oneal, J., & Russett, B. (1999). Assessing the liberal peace with alternative specifications: trade still reduces conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 423–443.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palmer, G., Wohlander, S., & Morgan, T. C. (2002). Give or take: foreign aid and foreign policy substitutability. Journal of Peace Research, 39, 5–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Papke, L. E., & Wooldridge, J. M. (1996). Econometric methods for fractional response variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11(4), 619–632.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rai, K. B. (1980). Foreign aid and voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967–1976. Journal of Peace Research, 17(3), 269–277.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R., & Subramanian, A. (2005). Aid and growth: what does the evidence really show (IMF working paper WP/05/127). International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

  • Roodman, D. (2004). An index of donor performance. (Working paper 42). Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.

  • Roodman, D. (2006). How to do xtabond2: an introduction to “difference” and “system” GMM in Stata (Working paper 103). Center for Global Development.

  • Roodman, D. (2007). xtabond2: stata module to extend xtabond dynamic panel data estimator. Center for Global Development, Washington, DC. Retrieved January 9, 2008, from http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s435901.htm.

  • Rothenberg, L. S., & Sanders, M. S. (2000). Legislator turnout and the calculus of voting: The determinants of abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Public Choice, 103, 259–270.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russett, B. M. (1967). International regions and the international system. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruttan, V. W. (1996). United States development assistance policy: the domestic politics of foreign economic aid. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schraeder, P., Hook, S., & Taylor, B. (1998). Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: a comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows. World Politics, 50, 294–323.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, J. D., Bremer, S., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution uncertainty and major power war 1820–1965. In B. Russett (Ed.), Peace, war, and numbers (pp. 19–48). Beverly Hills: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, J. M. Jr., & Groseclose, T. (2000). Estimating party influence in Congressional roll-call voting. American Journal of Political Science, 44, 187–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica, 65(3), 557–586.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stokke, O. (Ed.) (1989). Western middle powers and global poverty: the determinants of the aid policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sobel, R. S., & Leeson, P. T. (2006). Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina: a public choice analysis. Public Choice, 127(1–2), 55–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone, R. W. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. American Political Science Review, 98(4), 577–592.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thacker, S. C. (1999). The high politics of IMF lending. World Politics, 52, 38–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thiele, R., Nunnenkamp, P., & Dreher, A. (2007). Do donors target aid in line with the millennium development goals? A sector perspective of aid allocation. Review of World Economics, 143(4), 596–630.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voeten, E. (2000). Clashes in the assembly. International Organization, 54(2), 185–215.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voeten, E. (2004). Documenting votes in the UN General Assembly. The George Washington University. http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNVoting.htm.

  • Wang, T. Y. (1999). US foreign aid and UN voting: an analysis of important issues. International Studies Quarterly, 43(1), 199–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Windmeijer, F. (2005). A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126(1), 25–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wittkopf, E. (1973). Foreign aid and United Nations votes: a comparative study. The American Political Science Review, 67(3), 868–888.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • World Bank. (2006). World development indicators (CD-Rom). Washington DC.

  • Zimmermann, R. (1993). Dollars, diplomacy and dependency—dilemmas of U.S. economic aid. Colorado: Lynne Reiner.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. KOF, ETH Zurich, Weinbergstrasse 35, 8092, Zurich, Switzerland

    Axel Dreher

  2. CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Axel Dreher

  3. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Duesternbrooker Weg 120, 24105, Kiel, Germany

    Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele

Authors
  1. Axel Dreher
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Peter Nunnenkamp
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Rainer Thiele
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rainer Thiele.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P. & Thiele, R. Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis. Public Choice 136, 139–164 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9286-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9286-x

Keywords

JEL

Search

Navigation