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Conversations Across Meaning Variance

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Abstract

Progressive interpretations of scientific theories have long been denounced as naïve, because of the inescapability of meaning variance. The charge reportedly applies to recent realist moves that focus on theory-parts rather than whole theories. This paper considers the question of what “theory-parts” of epistemic significance (if any) relevantly accumulate through theory-change and identifies a form of theory-parts seemingly suitable for the realist agenda. My starting point is a notion of cumulative theoretical description lifted from instances of inter-theoretic dialogue in scientific practice.

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Notes

  1. Variously made in Kitcher (1993), Leplin (1997), and Psillos (1999).

  2. Fresnel had in mind some mechanically-based propagation that, it turned out, doesn’t exist in nature.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CUNY Graduate Center & Queens College CUNY, Flushing, NY, USA

    Alberto Cordero

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  1. Alberto Cordero
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Correspondence to Alberto Cordero.

Additional information

Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at the 11th IHPST Conference (Thessaloniki, Greece, July 2011) and at the 14th World Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Nancy, France, August, 2011). My thanks to the audiences for their valuable comments.

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Cordero, A. Conversations Across Meaning Variance. Sci & Educ 22, 1305–1313 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-012-9540-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-012-9540-y

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