Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

, 39:251

Group cooperation under uncertainty

Authors

    • Center for Research on Environmental DecisionsColumbia University
  • Jonathan Baron
    • Department of PsychologyUniversity of Pennsylvania
  • Howard Kunreuther
    • Decisions Sciences and Public Policy, Wharton SchoolUniversity of Pennsylvania
    • Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11166-009-9080-2

Cite this article as:
Gong, M., Baron, J. & Kunreuther, H. J Risk Uncertain (2009) 39: 251. doi:10.1007/s11166-009-9080-2

Abstract

Previous research has shown an ‘interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect’: intergroup interactions generally lead to less cooperative outcomes than interindividual interactions. We replicate the discontinuity effect in the deterministic prisoner’s dilemma, but find that groups are more cooperative than individuals in a stochastic version of the game. Three major factors that underlie the usual discontinuity effect are reduced in the stochastic environment: greed, fear, and persuasion power. Two group mechanisms are proposed to explain the reversed discontinuity effect: the motivation to avoid guilt and blame when making decisions that affect others’ welfare, and the social pressure to conform to certain norms when one is in a group setting.

Keywords

Group decisionUncertaintyCooperationExperimental economics

JEL Classification

D81

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009