Abstract
This article investigates how density ceiling controls in a monocentric city with a stochastic population affect housing prices and the location of the city boundary. We employ a real options model in which each landowner owns one unit parcel of land and chooses the timing and the level of capital intensity for development of the parcel. The landowner incurs up-front development costs that are irreversible and thereafter receives stochastic urban rents. A tighter density ceiling control will extend the urban boundary and decrease housing prices. The urban spatial expansion problem will be intact, but the landowner will delay development when city population is expected to grow less rapidly over time or becomes more volatile.
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Notes
Brueckner and Sridhar (2012) confirm the spatial expansion effect by using the data on India’s cities.
See empirical studies such as Hamilton (1978), Mills and Oats (1975), Thorsnes (2000), Fu and Somerville (2001), Glaser, Gyourko and Saks (2005), Cunningham (2007), and Ihlanfeldt (2007). These studies use proxies to measure the level of density ceiling controls because various forms of land use controls are usually imposed at the same time (Mills 2005).
See also the study by Pines and Kono (2012), which shows that in a fully closed monocentric city, with a homogeneous population, floor area ratio regulation cannot replace the fiscal instruments for achieving the second-best allocation if land prices are negative.
It is possible to consider a circular city, which, however, would complicate the analysis substantially.
One can generalize our model so that it can be applied to a risk aversion environment in the manner of Cox and Ross (1976).
As shown in Capozza and Li (1994), we must assume that the undeveloped land yielding no return so as to derive a closed-form solution for a landowner’s choice of capital intensity.
Our specification is in line with that assumed in Capozza and Helsley (1990), Capozza and Li (1994), and Capozza and Sick (1994). The arithmetic Brownian motion of urban rents is supported by the empirical data but suffers the shortcoming that urban rents may be negative. See a thorough discussion in Capozza and Li (1994).
This functional form is supported by the empirical study of Thorsnes (1997).
If we assume that the development cost in Eq. (6) is equal to εkD λ, where λ > 0, then we will reach the same conclusion as those of Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) and Mills (2005). That is, the development density will decline with the distance from the CBD. However, the evolution of x(t) will then not follow an arithmetic Brownian as conjectured in Eq. (4). Consequently, we do not make this assumption.
However, we make assumptions about landowners and renters that are different from that of Bertaud and Brueckner (2005). They employ a static model in which landowners make no profits in competitive equilibrium, while renters can choose the sizes of their dwellings as they wish. In contrast, we employ a dynamic model in which a landowner has some leeway in developing his/her vacant parcel of land and in which each resident occupies one unit of floor area.
Mills (2005, p.579) provides an example of the reaction of a developer in the north shore community areas in Chicago: “A common scenario is that a developer proposes to build a condo building on or near the lakefront that current controls may allow to be 40 stories. The local homeowners’ association lobbies its city council representative who gets the council to restrict the proposed building to 15–25 stories. The developer then abandons the proposal.”
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the editor (James B. Kau), one anonymous reviewer, and participants at the Global Chinese Real Estate Congress (GCREC) 2012 annual conference for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. We also thank Wan-Rong Hong for research assistance. Financial support under Grant 101R001-26 from College of Social Sciences, National Taiwan University, is gratefully acknowledged.
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Appendices
Appendices
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (27) indicates the condition
while Eq. (32) indicates the condition
Totally differentiating Eqs. (A1) and (A2) with respect to \( \widehat{q} \) yields
and
where
and
Solving Eqs. (A3) and (A4) simultaneously yields
where
and
Given that x* = u* − y(t), it follows that the sign of du*/dq, which is the same as that of dx*/dq, is indeterminate.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 2
Note that Eq. (32) indicates that D r (t) is independent of θ, ε, α N , and σ N . Furthermore, recall that
and
Totally differentiating Eqs. (B1) and (B2) with respect to θ, ε, α N , and σ N , and then rearranging yields
where
and
We find that β1β2 = − 2ρ/σ2 and β1 + β2 = − 2α/σ2 such that \( \frac{\alpha }{\rho }-\frac{1}{\upbeta_1}=\frac{1}{\upbeta_2} \). Substituting this relationship into Eq. (30), and then totally differentiating the result with respect to θ, ε α N , and σ N yields
where
Q.E.D.
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating R* in Eq. (29) with respect to \( \widehat{q} \) yields
Differentiating V u (x, D) in Eq. (33) with respect to \( \widehat{q} \) yields
Differentiating V a (x, D) in Equation (34) with respect to \( \widehat{q} \) yields
given that \( \widehat{q}<{\widehat{q}}_0. \)
Q.E.D.
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Jou, JB., Lee, T. How Do Density Ceiling Controls Affect Housing Prices and Urban Boundaries?. J Real Estate Finan Econ 50, 219–241 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-014-9460-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-014-9460-5