Abstract
We can distinguish two kinds of moral universalization tests for practical principles. One requires that the universal practice of the principle, i.e., universal conformity to it by all agents in a given world, satisfies some condition. The other requires that conformity to the principle by any possible agent, in any situation and at any time, satisfies some condition. We can call these universal practice (UP) and universal applicability (UA) tests respectively. The logical distinction between these tests is rarely appreciated, and many philosophers systematically confuse them with each other. In practice, UP tests are more frequently used to defend deontological norms, while UA tests are used to defend consequentialist norms. Both conceptual argument and practical examples of their applications will show that UA tests are decisively superior to UP tests for grounding moral norms, casting greater doubt upon deontological theories which rely upon the latter unless they can reformulate their arguments using some version of a UA test.
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Notes
In using the term “maxim” or abbreviation “M” I am not subscribing to any specific theory of maxims, Kantian or otherwise; in general, my analysis should apply, mutatis mutandis, for those who consider the basic feature of practical action to be principles, rules, norms, prescriptions, responses-to-reasons, etc.
Some theories treat the relevant C as some description of an agent’s actual circumstances, others as her beliefs or evidence about her circumstances; I take no stand here on the merits of these respective “objective” and “subjective” theories of behavior evaluation.
E.g., many universalization principles may specify a more or less vague test predicate, leaving its interpretation sufficiently open or contestable that it cannot be treated as a test condition. I will suggest below that some such principles are closer to being universalizability constraints than tests, although the difference may be a matter of degree rather than absolute.
Note that universal “conformity” to, i.e., governance by, M, does not entail the universal practice of B, for it is possible that not all agents are in C—indeed, this might be conceptually impossible for some C’s. But it does mean that any agents may B if they find themselves in C, even if all other agents are prepared to do likewise. Some ethicists, e.g., Kantians, have disagreed as to whether the specification of C may include facts about other agents’ conformity to M, or practice of B; we will return to this issue below.
The term is appropriated from Wood (1990: 165–166), but repurposed, for Wood’s conception involved what I am calling the UA constraint combined with the test condition of instrumental rationality from each acting agent’s perspective, which as Wood noted is too weak to rule out, e.g., a maxim of egoism. Separating the universalization constraint from the test conditions, as I do, permits a more general analysis of universalizability tests, including many more plausible ones.
It is often but mistakenly supposed that the FUL’s test condition is only violated when M’s universalization frustrates a given agent’s satisfaction of E, the end of M itself. Actually Kant never explicitly says this, and clearly assumes otherwise in his illustrations. In his third and fourth examples, the universal practice of maxims of failing to either develop one’s talents or to be benevolent toward others respectively clearly need not frustrate the ends of the maxims in question (laziness, convenience, pleasure, etc.), but rather some other “possible purposes” (i.e., ends of yet other, but presumably morally-acceptable, maxims) which the agent might have in the future. (G 4:423).
We will see below that Kant also offers an alternative and broader conception of willing which might provide a more plausible test condition than the one used in the FUL. His “contradiction in conception” test uses yet another test condition, but I shall not discuss this in the present article, beyond noting that it cannot possibly solve the many problems generated by his UP constraint.
The more general term “rule consequentialism” is sometimes used for IRC, and at other times for the much broader category of theories which evaluate, via their respective consequences, rules rather than acts—including subjective rules governing the behavior of isolated individuals. As the latter lend themselves to evaluation via a UA constraint, the UP-UA confusion may also underlie the common equivocation between these two meanings of “rule consequentialism,” but there is no room to explore the issue here.
Most objections to MS (e.g., Alexander 2011; Harrison 2013) are only directed against a narrower version which restricts the supervenience base to natural properties—this was the view of Hare, who largely introduced the term moral supervenience to the philosophical world. But there is no reason in principle that the base could not include the supernatural or locational properties these authors respectively suggest could underlie moral facts, requiring more substantive arguments beyond MS itself to rule them out (which we surely can provide, as such views are strongly implausible). In principle it could also be rejected by defenders of “robust realism,” but even many of these (e.g., Enoch 2011: 143–144) are often content to argue simply that supervenience does not require ontological reduction of moral facts and predicates to non-moral ones.
Cf. Rabinowicz (1979: 14), who makes the same contrast in a work otherwise focused on a UA test.
Note, for instance, that Broad (1916: 377) was correct that in this sense, “something very like [IRC] was regarded by Kant as the fundamental law of ethics,” while McNaughton and Rawlings (2015: 516) are wrong to call Broad’s claim “surely mistaken” because the two tests use test conditions which are “quite distinct.” Broad’s point was that despite their different test conditions, their form of universalization (viz., UP) was identical, and they are hence subject to similar criticisms.
Ironically, Harrod promoted the UP test of IRC under the impression that it would better address the reverse kind of non-linear harm, where maxims of lying or otherwise destroying social institutions and trust cause more harm when everyone else is doing the same than when they are not (1936: 148). Actually UA tests can adequately condemn such maxims, while avoiding the disaster that UP tests generate when the harm of a maxim vanishes just under cases of full conformity.
Herman (1993: 139) and Wood (1999: 106) object to this solution, for it would also permit similarly qualified free-riding maxims. This is not a problem with the solution, but an artefact of Kant’s overly-narrow test conditions for non-contradictory willing: namely that G must not will the impossibility of satisfying her ends in a UP world. If we adopt the broader condition that willing the decreased probability of her doing so also generates a contradiction in will, the cases are easily distinguished, as universal conformity to harmless coordination maxims increases the chance that G satisfies her rational ends, while universal conformity to free-riding maxims decreases the same. See Forschler (2013: 61).
They also generate no contradiction in conception, so this alternate test condition is of no avail (G 4: 424).
It has long been common knowledge among traffic safety engineers that it is safer to drive at approximately the same speed as the majority of other drivers, even if they are exceeding the local speed limit (Solomon 1964).
Suggested by Rees (1970–1971: 250), who also described the pacifist maxim to critique a UP test.
See also Ross (1954: 45), Lewis (1956: 92–99), Herman (1990: 170), Allison (1990: 205), Reath (2006: 73, 107, 2010: 38), and Korsgaard (2009: 214). A related mistake is to slide, without argument, from treating the FUL’s UP test as a necessary condition of morality (which it is) to treating it, erroneously, as a sufficient condition (which it is not), as is done by Kitcher (2004: 571).
This might even be required if, as might be plausibly argued, any other interpretation is one that no rational agent could want other agents to guide their actions by. Hence the golden rule—however interpreted—rules out these implausible interpretations at the second-order level, when applied to itself. Cf. the use of recursion to eliminate other purported counter-examples to universalizability tests in Forschler (2007) and Sneddon (2011).
Lyons (1965: 107–108) makes a very similar point about how such rules are decisively superior to those recommended by IRC.
We must not suppose that a reference to rules necessarily refers only to social or legal rules which are universally followed. A single individual can follow a rule for her own guidance even if no one else is doing so—as Kant, for instance, suggested of his “principle of volition” which guides our will as we make judgments.
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While some authors distinguish the “moral” from the “ethical” for particular purposes. I will use generally use “moral” for all topics that would fall under either term.
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Forschler, S. Universal practice and universal applicability tests in moral philosophy. Philos Stud 174, 3041–3058 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0845-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0845-6