Abstract
In this paper I criticize Alvin Goldman's simulation theory of mindreading which involves the claim that the basic method of folk psychologically predicting behaviour is to form pretend beliefs and desires that reproduce the transitions between the mental states of others, in that way enabling to predict what the others are going to do. I argue that when it comes to simulating propositional attitudes it isn't clear whether pretend beliefs need to be invoked in order to explain relevant experimental results, and whether pretend desires can be distinguished from 'real' ones as forming a separate kind of mental states. Since belief-desire model underlies the conception of pretend states in higher-level mindreading, dropping pretend attitudes from the picture isn't possible and, due to that, this model may be incoherent. Nevertheless, Goldman's theory could still survive because it includes an additional model of mindreading, but simulation is given much lesser role there.
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Notes
This kind of defensive strategy can be found from numerous passages in his book (e.g. Goldman 2006, 34; 83; 89; 140; 164; 170; 174; 184).
This paper entirely ignores the issue of low-level mindreading, the understanding of emotions, where Goldman’s approach is probably much more promising.
What additionally characterizes that simulation model is the quarantining mechanism which is supposed to keep subject’s real attitudes from entering the simulation procedure because they may diverge from the attitudes of the target and shouldn’t obstruct the simulation process. The aim is, after all, to get other’s attitudes right and these may not correspond to subject’s own (Goldman 2006, 29).
For a proposal to bring both phenomena under an unified theory of thinking, see Hesslow (2002).
I’m not even sure if they are meant to demonstrate that. But since the objects of interest here are pretend beliefs and pretend desires, this is the only place in Goldman’s book which can be interpreted as an attempt to argue for the cognitive reality of pretend beliefs.
The idea of similar functional effects between imagination and belief is quite popular and is also reflected in so-called “single-code hypothesis”. For a tentative defense, see Nichols (2006).
I actually love broccoli. The example was chosen while keeping in mind experiments by Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) who discovered that already 18-year-old children are able to understand other’s wishes that diverge from their own. If the arguments presented here have force then one shouldn’t assume–if anyone does–that children pretend to desire broccoli.
Why take the desire concerning Holmes, rather than the desire about fiction, to be a pretend desire? Well, since Holmes doesn’t exist, the desire for his success could be considered as irrational if it were conceived of as a real desire. One could claim that pretend desires, unlike the real ones, need not follow the requirements of rationality (Currie 2002: 211).
It is interesting to note that Doggett and Egan themselves lean toward the neural criterion (2007: 12).
I should note that Funkhouser and Spaulding see desires as inherently motivating, which I denied. Nothing hangs from that in the present context, though.
Experimental results indicate that the endowment effect in one’s own valuations appears also in ascribing valuations to others, which indicates that the subject is projecting one’s own valuations to the other person (Van Boven et al. 2000).
Of course, if we allow theoretical information to contribute also to the input of the mindreading process (as hybrid theorists can allow), then the quarantining mechanism may be of use initially, in keeping the theorizing accurate. But then the projection-plus-theory model–which is already a hybrid model, in any case–would rather be a theory-plus-projection-plus-theory model where the projection would turn out to be much less significant than Goldman seems to require.
The work on this paper has been supported by Estonian Science Foundation Grant GFLFI9117.
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Tooming, U. Without pretense: a critique of Goldman’s model of simulation. Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 561–575 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9343-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9343-x