Abstract
This paper deals with the question: What are the criteria that an adequate theory of computation has to meet? (1) Smith’s answer: it has to meet the empirical criterion (i.e. doing justice to computational practice), the conceptual criterion (i.e. explaining all the underlying concepts) and the cognitive criterion (i.e. providing solid grounds for computationalism). (2) Piccinini’s answer: it has to meet the objectivity criterion (i.e. identifying computation as a matter of fact), the explanation criterion (i.e. explaining the computer’s behaviour), the right things compute criterion, the miscomputation criterion (i.e. accounting for malfunctions), the taxonomy criterion (i.e. distinguishing between different classes of computers) and the empirical criterion. (3) Von Neumann’s answer: it has to meet the precision and reliability of computers criterion, the single error criterion (i.e. addressing the impacts of errors) and the distinction between analogue and digital computers criterion. (4) “Everything” computes answer: it has to meet the implementation theory criterion by properly explaining the notion of implementation.
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Notes
Throughout this paper I use computationalism and the computational theory of mind interchangeably to denote the same thing.
It may easily turn out that some phenomena like consciousness can’t be explained in computational terms as its essence can’t be fully captured by simply appealing to algorithmic processes or information processing accounts and the likes. However, certain kinds of cognitive processes and capacities such as learning, inferring, calculating etc. may still be given computational accounts. This may lead to providing a weaker version of computationalism rather then dismissing it altogether.
Ian Hinckfuss presented the problem case (known as ‘Hinck’s pail’) to attack the functionalist theory of mind in a discussion at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, Canberra, 1978. He described a pail of spring water in which at the micro level a vast complexity of things is going on. At the molecular level an even more complex activity is required to sustain the micro level ‘things’ in the water. Some may argue that this underlying complex activity might realize a human program for a brief period (Copeland 1996, p. 336).
This is not to say that every program inevitably contains bugs, but it rather refers to the more complex programs, which can be found in commercial use, for instance. Clearly, a trivial program comprised of a single line of code, which prints ‘Hello World’, will be most likely bug free.
Von Neumann refers to analogue computers as analogy machines or analogy automata. I choose to use the more common term analogue to avoid the debate about the analogue–analogy comparison.
It can also be interpreted as a sufficiently complex physical object similar to Searle’s (1990) thesis that any physical system can be seen to implement any computation, so that even the wall behind him might be seen as implementing the Wordstar program.
Computationalism also becomes trivial, since if everything computes, then it’s trivially true that minds compute as well. This is exactly what Searle and Putnam have tried to show by arguing that (almost) everything computes.
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Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2007 AAP conference in Armidale, Australia. I’m greatly indebted to Phillip Staines, whose trenchant comments and insights made this paper appreciably better. I’m grateful to Joseph Agassi, who thought me what philosophy is all about and that conflict is not to be feared. I also thank Gualtiero Piccinini for his comments on the latest version of this paper. Many thanks to Calanit Sabaz for her constant support and feedback.
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Fresco, N. An Analysis of the Criteria for Evaluating Adequate Theories of Computation. Minds & Machines 18, 379–401 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9111-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9111-9