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Does the Principle of Computational Equivalence Overcome the Objections against Computationalism?

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Computing Nature

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 7))

Abstract

Computationalism has been variously defined as the idea that the human mind can be modelled by means of mechanisms broadly equivalent to Turing Machines. Computationalism’s claims have been hotly debated and arguments against and for have drawn extensively from mathematics, cognitive sciences and philosophy, although the debate is hardly settled. On the other hand, in his 2002 book New Kind of Science, Stephen Wolfram advanced what he called the Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE), whose main contention is that fairly simple systems can easily reach very complex behaviour and become as powerful as any possible system based on rules (that is, they are computationally equivalent). He also claimed that any natural (and even human) phenomenon can be explained as the interaction of very simple rules. Of course, given the universality of Turing Machine-like mechanisms, PCE could be considered simply a particular brand of computationalism, subject to the same objections as previous attempts. In this paper we analyse in depth if this view of PCE is justified or not and hence if PCE can overcome some criticisms and be a different and better model of the human mind.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Matemáticas, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Ciudad Universitaria, D.F. 04510, Mexico

    Alberto Hernández-Espinosa & Francisco Hernández-Quiroz

Authors
  1. Alberto Hernández-Espinosa
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  2. Francisco Hernández-Quiroz
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alberto Hernández-Espinosa .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , School of Innovation, Design and Eng., Mälardalen University, Västerås, 72123, Sweden

    Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic

  2. , Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran University, Piazza S. Giovanni in Laterano 4, Vatican City, 00120, Italy

    Raffaela Giovagnoli

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Hernández-Espinosa, A., Hernández-Quiroz, F. (2013). Does the Principle of Computational Equivalence Overcome the Objections against Computationalism?. In: Dodig-Crnkovic, G., Giovagnoli, R. (eds) Computing Nature. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 7. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37225-4_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37225-4_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-37224-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-37225-4

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