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Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances

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Abstract

Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.

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Elbourne, P. Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances. J Philos Logic 39, 101–111 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9112-z

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