Abstract
Tobias Rosefeldt argues that in order to reconcile a physics-based fundamental ontology with the ontological implications of our everyday utterances, philosophers should pursue a ‘linguistics-based conciliatory’ strategy: They should refer to the results of linguistic research in order to avoid ontological commitment to problematic entities. Whereas Rosefeldt is not an advocate of radical forms of naturalized metaphysics, his argument is driven by the motivation behind pleas for a naturalization of the discipline. I claim that although there is a need for reconciliation, Rosefeldt’s favored account falls short of this goal. More generally, I argue that so-called ‘conciliatory accounts’ fail to do justice to the motivation that necessitated them in the first place, as the role they assign to analyses of everyday speech in search of ontological commitments is at odds with said motivation. ‘Conciliatory accounts’, hence, sit uneasily between radically naturalistic and traditional armchair approaches to metaphysics.
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Notes
This paper is about academic metaphysics rooted in the analytic-philosophical tradition, and, unless specified otherwise, it is analytic metaphysics that I refer to. Speaking of ‘the analytic-philosophical tradition,’ I have in mind authors like David Armstrong, David Lewis, Michael Loux, Jonathan Lowe, and Peter van Inwagen, building, in some way or other, on the work of the Logical Empiricists, American Pragmatists, and W.V.O. Quine (as well as many others, who shall remain unnamed). I believe that the philosophers referenced in “Should Metaphysics Care about Linguistics?” (and its author) partake of this tradition, too.
In fact, there is no clear-cut divide between analytic and naturalized metaphysics. In principle, analytic philosophers are ‘science-friendly’, and advocates of naturalized metaphysics were themselves raised in the analytic-philosophical tradition. I will, however, neglect the grey areas in-between and use Ladyman et al. (2007) as a foil for naturalized metaphysics—not because I agree with most of their claims or because its radical tone has stirred a lot of attention, but because it is the most solid, consistent and sincere attempt at a naturalization of metaphysics that I know of.
For similar or identical statements refer to any random introductory textbook on metaphysics.
The following points are partly inspired by Ladyman et al. (2007).
What is gained is, of course, greater simplicity; but simplicity is not a desideratum that dissolves the challenge at hand.
Note that what follows is strictly conditional: if you accept the motivation that drives naturalized metaphysics, and you agree that information derived from physics should set the foundation for ontology, then you should follow through, unless you have compelling reasons not to. Personally, I prefer to conceive of metaphysics more broadly than in terms of the study of fundamental physical reality.
Accordingly, the currently most prominent proponents of naturalized metaphysics, James Ladyman and Don Ross (collaborating with David Spurrett and John Collier on Ladyman et al. 2007) do exactly that: they redefine the subject matter of metaphysics.
References
Hetherington, S. (2014). Introduction. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), Metaphysics and epistemology: a guided anthology (pp. 17–18). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ladyman, J., Ross, D., Spurrett, D., & Collier, J. (2007). Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E. J. (2002). A survey of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1980). On what there is. In W. V. O. Quine (Ed.), From a logical point of view: nine logico-philosophical essays (pp. 1–19). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rosefeldt, T. (2018). Should metaphysics care about linguistics? Journal for General Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9386-8
Acknowledgements
For their enlightening contributions to the colloquium and interesting discussions, I would like to thank all speakers of the GAP 2015 colloquium on Meta2physics: Analytic vs. Naturalized Metaphysics. For their support in organizing the event, my thanks go to the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP) and the research group Causation, Laws, Dispositions and Explanations at the Intersection of Science and Metaphysics (CLDE), which was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and participation in which enabled me to write this paper. For helpful comments on two very different versions of the latter, I am indebted to Markus Seidel and two anonymous referees. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my co-editors of this Special Section, Kristina Engelhard and Markus Schrenk, without whom this paper may never have seen the light of day.
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Göhner, J.F. Commentary on Rosefeldt: Should Metaphysics Care About Ontological Commitment from Casual Utterances?. J Gen Philos Sci 49, 179–186 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9400-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9400-9