Abstract
This article analyzes the sustainability of market-based instruments such as tradable permits for the management of a renewable aquifer used for irrigated agriculture. In our dynamic hydro-economic model, a water agency aims at satisfying a food security constraint within a tradable permit scheme in the presence of myopic heterogeneous agents. We identify analytically the viability kernel that defines the states of the resource yielding inter-temporal feasible paths able to satisfy the set of constraints over time and the associated set of viable quota policies. We then illustrate the theoretical results of the paper with numerical simulations based on the Western La Mancha aquifer.
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Notes
The model could be extended by allowing farmers to lease part of their water rights to other users and to reduce their acreage temporarily through crop rotation or fallowing. A major improvement could be a joint analysis of land and water markets. When water pumping rights are attached to land ownership, the land price will reflect the value of the rent attached to the water quota in the event of land transactions.
See Appendix.
Simple manipulations give the irrigation water demand function of Gisser and Sanchez (1980) \(W=g-k p_w\). Assuming \(m(t)=0\), we obtain \(g=\overline{W}, k=\beta /p_y\) and \(p_w\) the price of water. This equivalence will be used to calibrate the model for numerical simulations.
The authors (p.1123) derived a similar condition \(c_0 \ge g/k\) that eliminates the possibility of a corner solution for which \(H \le 0\).
The proof is given in the Appendix.
See Appendix.
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Acknowledgements
This study has been carried out with financial support from the French National Research Agency (ANR) in the frame of the Investments for the future Program, within the Cluster of Excellence COTE (ANR-10-LABX-45). We thank the two referees and the co-editor for their suggestions, always stimulating.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Optimality Conditions
The Lagrangian corresponding to the problem (4) with \(w_{i} \ge 0\) and \(q_{i} \ge 0\) is
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
If \(\lambda _{i}=0\), the constraint does not bind then \(w_{i}^{*}\) is solution of \(\partial \pi _{i}\left( H,w_{i}\right) /\partial w_{i}=0\) and \(q_{i}=0\). Otherwise \(\lambda _{i}>0\) implies a positive quota price \(m>0\). It shows that the constraint binds \( q_{i}=w_{i}\) and \(\frac{\partial \pi _{i}\left( H,q_{i}\right) }{\partial q_{i}}=m\) which gives Eq. (5).
1.2 Proof of the Viability Kernel
Proof
Consider the dynamics
with \(Q_{R}=\frac{R}{1-\mu }\).
We first show that \(Q_{FS}\le Q_{R}\) implies \(Viab=\left[ H_{\lim }, S_L \right] \).
Assume that \(H_0 \ge H_{\lim }\), choose \(Q(t)=Q_{FS}\) then
Hence \(\left[ H_{\lim }, S_L \right] \) is viable and \(Viab=\left[ H_{\lim }, S_L \right] \).
Now if \(Q_{FS}>Q_R\), we show by forward induction that \(\forall H_0 \ge H_{\lim }\)
Hence \(\exists t^{*}\) such that \(H(t^{*})< H_{\lim }\), it implies that \( Viab=\emptyset \).
1.3 Dynamic Constraint \(Q_D\)
The constraint on the state variable \(H_{\lim } \le H(t+1)\) implies
By denoting \(Q_D= Q_{R}-\frac{AS}{(1-\mu )}H_{\lim } +\frac{AS}{(1-\mu )}H(t)\), it gives \(Q(t)\le Q_D(H(t))\). We look at the conditions depending on the sign of \(Q_M-Q_D\) under which this dynamic constraint is binding and reduces the viability kernel. By definition, \(Q_D(H_{\lim })=Q_R\) and since Q is bounded by \(Q_R\), it implies that for \(H=H_{\lim }\)
It yields
The expression of \(Q_M-Q_D\) is given by
Using the two previous expressions gives
When \(H>H_{\lim }\) the condition ensuring \(Q_M-Q_D>0\) is
and corresponds to Eq. (29) in the text.
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Pereau, JC., Mouysset, L. & Doyen, L. Groundwater Management in a Food Security Context. Environ Resource Econ 71, 319–336 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0154-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0154-3
Keywords
- Groundwater
- Agriculture
- Irrigation
- Food security
- Individual permits
- Sustainability
- Dynamic model
- Viability kernel