Abstract
This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. This account does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat.
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Notes
Throughout this paper I shall employ the Pali terms, nibbāṇa and kamma. Some readers may be more familiar with the Sanskrit, nirvāṇa and karma.
See Bodhi (1992, pp. 14–15). Although I will not go into such details in this paper it should be noted that the term sekha is a general term covering seven out of eight categories of noble person (ariya-puggala) who have not yet reached the fruit of arahathood. This group includes those who have attained the path and the fruit of the stages of Stream-Enterer (sotāpanna), Once-Returner (sakadāgāmin), and Never-Returner (anāgāmin), as well as those who have attained the path but not the fruit of the stage of the arahat. Each of these stages is distinguished on the basis of the progressive elimination of different kinds of defilement. The eighth class of noble person, no longer a disciple, is the individual who has attained the fruit of arahathood—one who has completely purified his or her mind. Such persons are termed asekha.
Sabbākusaladhammapahīno … Tathāgato kusaladhamma samannāgato ti/(MN ii 116, quoted in Keown 1992, p. 118).
“O Puṇṇa, there are four kinds of action taught by me after realizing them directly myself. What are the four? There is, O Puṇṇa, dark action with dark result. There is, O Puṇṇa, bright action with bright result. There is, O Puṇṇa, action which is dark and bright, with dark and bright result. There is, O Puṇṇa, action which is neither dark nor bright, with neither dark nor bright result, action that conduces to the destruction of actions.” Cattār’ imani, puṇṇa, kammāni mayā sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā paveditāni, katamāni cattāri: atthi, puṇṇa, kammaṃ kaṇhaṃ kaṇhavipākaṃ; atthi, puṇṇa, kammaṃ sukkaṃ sukkavipākaṃ; atthi, puṇṇa, kammaṃ kaṇhasukkaṃ kaṇhasukkavipākaṃ; atthi, puṇṇa, kammaṃ akaṇhaṃ asukkaṃ akaṇhāsukkavipākaṃ, kammaṃ kammakkhayāya saṃvattati. (MN i 389)
The idea behind the third category is that we are beings of mixed motive: our intentions are a confusion of the positive and the negative. But there are conceptual problems here; strictly speaking, there can be no shades of grey. The description of a “single” action as “mixed” must be understood as indicating a rapid fluctuation in underlying motive (Harvey 2000, p. 44).
In this context it is necessary to remember that in Buddhist thinking the concept of “action” is understood in terms of the underlying volition or intention (cetanā) of the agent. In one of the more commonly quoted passages of the Pali Canon (Aṅguttara Nikāya iii 415), the Buddha states: “It is intention, O Monks, that I call action; having formed the intention one performs acts by body, speech and mind.” Thus every action, whether it be of body, speech or mind is defined in terms of its underlying intentional state.
In a previous paper, i.e., Adam (2005), I have referred to the two value domains as the kammatic and the soteriological, or nirvanic (nibbanic). Here, on the other hand, for pairs A and B I prefer samsaric and nibbanic respectively. The reason for this is threefold. First of all, the notion of merit is a soteriological notion, in the most general sense. Second, the terms kusala and akusala are, in the Pali Canon, regularly applied as adjectives qualifying action (kamma). Third, by employing the starkly opposed terminology of saṃsāra and nibbāṇa, greater logical clarity is achieved in analysis—and in terms originating within the Buddhist tradition itself.
It also indicates the relative preponderance of the different terms in the texts under consideration. We find a predominance of kusala language employed when the morality of the sekha is under discussion, while a predominance of puñña talk is found in discussions of the puthujjana’s moral behavior.
I have explored this distinction elsewhere employing the terms “teleological” and “instrumental” for “primary” and “secondary” respectively (see Adam 2005). All action is both teleological and instrumental. An action is teleological in that it is oriented towards a goal. It has an aim. An action’s telos then, is that for the sake of which it is undertaken. The notion of “instrumentality” on the other hand is understood as referring to the side effects and sub-goals of an action, of which the agent is aware but which do not constitute her primary motivation for acting. Thus the sekha’s good actions are teleologically nibbanic (kusala), but they are also correctly viewed as instrumentally samsaric (puñña). The good actions of the puthujjana mirror those of the sekha; they are teleologically samsaric (puñña) and instrumentally nibbanic (kusala).
Also see Harvey (2000, pp. 44–45).
This reflects the Abhidhammic understanding. See Gethin (2004, pp. 198–199).
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Adam, M.T. Classes of Agent and the Moral Logic of the Pali Canon. Argumentation 22, 115–124 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9075-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9075-6