Abstract
In the “Introduction,” Solov’ëv aims to show that all human beings, even those in tribal societies, have an inner moral awareness independent of religion. In time, this fundamental awareness acquires content and becomes moral philosophy. From another perspective, moral philosophy is independent of the philosophical disciplines of epistemology and metaphysics in that in the first our concern is our attitude towards our own actions, independently of our knowledge of externality. Solov’ëv argues that we can speak of the morality of actions apart from their relation to others. Moral philosophy is also independent of the metaphysical issue of free will in that all our actions are motivated. Those who claim that ethics is dependent on a particular resolution of this issue fail to differentiate between the various forms of determinism.
E] This chapter originally appeared with the subtitle “A Chapter from a Work in Progress Entitled ‘Foundations of Moral Philosophy’.” In the first edition of the compiled book, the first chapter spans pp. 34–58.
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Notes
- 1.
C] to provide a definite… our lives] to answer the chief questions: How should I live, what should I do, what should I strive for. AB.
- 2.
C] Higher animals… unpleasant nature are] Independent of the level of their awareness, we find that all animals possess a certain rudimentary idea of the good, which determines the basis of their relations and actions. Each of the so-called protozoa relates to its environment in a certain way: it is attracted to some objects as good, i.e., as useful for it and is averted from others as bad, i.e., as harmful. There is no reason to deny that this obvious external distinction is connected in the organism itself with certain agreeable or disagreeable sensations, which correspond to good or bad (for it) properties of the respective objects. If the faculty for such a rudimentary evaluation of things can arguably be seen in protists, then it, undoubtedly, is found in higher animals where it is AB.
- 3.
F] In these preliminary remarks, which are merely introductory, I intentionally take the idea of the good at first in its original complexity, i.e., not only in the sense of the value of our actions, but also in the sense of objects that, in general, are viewed as desirable to enjoy or possess (“all his goods, etc.”). Some doctrines, in essence, deny this distinction, and I cannot immediately presuppose it before undertaking a philosophical elucidation.
- 4.
C] ascribes a universal validity… putrid fat is disgusting] ascribes to his ideal the character of an absolute norm valid for all time and people and even in the world to come. If he should hear of barbarians for whom putrid fat is an abomination, A.
- 5.
C] Similarly,] In the same way, A.
- 6.
C] formal] ideal AB.
- 7.
C] constant norm for all.] constant norm for all or as something universally applicable. A.
- 8.
C] The ability of… conscious of them] In AB this entire paragraph is simply presented as a footnote to the next sentence “Thanks to a rational consciousness….” except that the last sentence in this paragraph in AB reads: The theory of innate ideas is sometimes understood by its opponents in just such an absurd way.
- 9.
C] present] present in turn A.
- 10.
C] positive religion] religion A.
- 11.
C] positive religion] religion A.
- 12.
F] Cf. Kritika otvlechennykh nachala, §XXVI. E] PSS, vol. 3: 175–177; SS, vol. 2: 189–192.
- 13.
C] [moral] philosophy] the [moral] discipline AB.
- 14.
C] Those who reject the independence of morality say “only] “Only A.
- 15.
C] that is supposedly… apostle Paul,] which directly contradicts the teaching of the apostle Paul, the greatest defender of the eternal rights of faith. He, A.
- 16.
F]otan gar eqnh ta mh nomon econta fusei ta tou nomou poih outoi nomon mh econteV eautoiV eisin nomoV oitineV endeiknuntai to ergon tou nomou grapton en taiV kardiaiV autwn summarturoushV autwn thV suneidhsewV kai metaxu allhlwn twn logismwn kathgorountwn h kai apologoumenwn (Romans 2: 14–15)
- 17.
F] What the apostle says about the pagans of his time is undoubtedly applicable to those who after the appearance of Christianity were unable to accept it either because they did not hear about it or because it was presented to them in a distorted form. When they do good, they do so according to the natural law “written in their hearts.”
- 18.
C] good] good (like everything else) A.
- 19.
C] that in a certain sense morality] that morality AB.
- 20.
C] positive religion] religion A.
- 21.
F] What is denied here is a dependence in the strict sense, i.e., that there is a relation between the two objects such that one of them entirely depends on the other and cannot exist without it. All I am claiming at this point is that ethics does not depend on positive religion, without at all deciding anything with regard to their actual connection or their mutual dependence in concreto. As will be shown later, the very concept of so-called natural, or rational, religion, arose on the basis of moral philosophy and has no sense outside ethics. I have in mind the view, which recently has become widespread, that moral life is entirely determined by the dogmas and the institutions of positive religion and must be absolutely subordinate to them. C] The lines “As will be … subordinate to them.” were absent in A.].
- 22.
C] lightly. If] lightly. For example, the Slavophile writer Khomjakov neither mocked nor became indignant upon reading Chateaubriand’s [Le]Génie du Christianisme, where, among other things, the aesthetic impression of the peeling of a bell, of an altar illuminated by twinkling candles, etc. is pointed out. The Orthodox believer forgot that if A] lightly. For example, the Slavophile writer Khomjakov did not become indignant upon reading Chateaubriand’s [Le]Génie du Christianisme, where, among other things, the aesthetic impression of the peeling of a bell, of an altar illuminated by twinkling candles, etc. is pointed out. The Orthodox believer forgot that if B.
- 23.
C] impression] effect AB.
- 24.
C] probably] perhaps AB.
- 25.
C] Orthodox.] Orthodox, and it would not have to distinguish itself so arrogantly from Western Christianity. AB.
- 26.
C] some sort of beauty] a beauty of whatever sort it may be AB.
- 27.
C] But when such sorts of beauty] In brief, every artistic work is independent of its subject and character. But when such elements of beauty AB.
- 28.
C] (in the broad sense).] Absent in AB.
- 29.
C] and never have served, as a the initial means of convincing] cannot serve as the means of convincing AB.
- 30.
F] One critic—God help him!—took this as claiming that that religion is true to which the greatest number of good people belong. With this I wish he would have hinted to some method for compiling such moral statistics! C] This entire note is absent in A.
- 31.
C] having originally separated] having separated AB.
- 32.
C] various, in their opinion, nonsensical] various nonsensical AB.
- 33.
C] fanaticism,] cruelty, AB.
- 34.
C] In A alone, we find the following footnote to these words: Even in Khomjakov, who sees “rationalism” as the greatest of Western errors, this theoretical sin somehow is imperceptibly absorbed in the moral act of “fratricide.” I suppose that Khomjakov’s polemic is bound to do this, because of its relatively popular style. Only the Slavophile circle, whose members are anchored more firmly in Hegel’s “phenomenology of spirit” than in church dogmatics and history, can comprehend the accusation of rationalism (particularly against Catholicism, subordinating theoretical reason to a mystical faith and practical reason to authority). At least the reproach of “fratricide,” for all its improbability, was understood by everyone.
- 35.
C] going] intruding AB.
- 36.
F] Concerning the reproach of “moral fratricide” see my article “Dogmaticheskoe razvitie cerkvi” in Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie, 1885. E] See Solov’ëv 1885.
- 37.
C] their Greco-Russian opponents] we AB.
- 38.
E] Romans 2: 15.
- 39.
C] the two contending sides in a trial are] the way a defendant, even if he is a holy man whose piety is toward a higher law, is not automatically excused. He is A.
- 40.
C] bases] basis A.
- 41.
C] The ideal content of morality] Morality AB.
- 42.
C] that (in this respect) creates] that creates AB.
- 43.
C] The first is] The first point is AB.
- 44.
C] own] inner A.
- 45.
C] and upon the social order.] Absent in A.
- 46.
C] thereby] eo ipso A.
- 47.
C] , involving a relatively worthless object (in terms of the penal code),] Absent in A.
- 48.
C] Extreme idealism … to actions] Entire paragraph absent in A.
- 49.
C] my moral interest concerning my own individual self, my obligations to myself, would] my purely moral interest would AB.
- 50.
C] proper, fundamental] inner AB.
- 51.
C] But this … various spheres.] Since there are various sorts of necessity, which is a general or generic concept, there happen to be various determinations. AB.
- 52.
E] Solov’ëv’s term “veshchestvo” is here translated as “matter” even though elsewhere he distinguishes this term, which can also be rendered as “substance,” from the term “materija.” In his respective contribution to the Brockhaus-Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, Solov’ëv wrote, “Usually this word [veshchestvo] is used as equivalent to the word “matter” [materija]. However, we can establish a definite distinction between the two terms. Matter in the metaphysical sense appears in the Pythagoreans, Plato and Aristotle as a potential principle of bifurcation, separation and variability, as possibly taking on numerous forms. Such a conception of matter is not that of substance. … Substance is matter not in itself, but already formed, actually determined and differentiated in various ways. It exhibits certain properties according to certain laws. These particular properties and laws are a subject of study in physics and chemistry. Philosophers since the time of Descartes have posed the question: ‘What is substance in general, i.e., what is every substantial object composed of?’” Solov’ëv 1997: 29. Here in the Justification of the Moral Good, there is no reason to think that Solov’ëv is using the term “veshchestvo” in a technical sense.
- 53.
F] In a certain sense, we can certainly say the same about plants and even about different parts of the inorganic world, because pure mechanism or absolute callousness do not exist in nature. In these preliminary considerations, however, I am trying to stick to what is indisputable and generally understandable. On the various sorts of causality and necessity in connection with the problem of freedom of the will, see in particular Schopenhauer’s “Grundproblemen der Ethik” and “Wille in der Natur.” I reproduced the essence of his discussion in my Kritik otvlech. nach., pp. 85–96. E] See PSS, vol. 3: 81–89; SS, vol. 2: 78–89. C] pp. 85–96.] The page references in SS are replaced by the chapter reference: Chap. IX.
- 54.
E] Kant 1996a: 218.
- 55.
E] Naturphilosophen] A movement within German idealist philosophy in the early nineteenth century.
- 56.
F] In Polish the word sam retains only this negative sense, not the others (the derivative samotny means “lonely”). In Russian and German both senses are possible. If the positive sense (one's own, inner causality) is given, then the negative (the absence of another cause) is presupposed but not vice versa. Thus, the word samouchka [self-educated -TN] means a man who has educated himself and studied alone without the help of others (both senses here are combined as in similar words in German, e.g., Selbsterziehung or, for example, in the English word “self-help”). But when we say that the spit moves by itself alone ( selbst), only the negative sense is given, i.e., that at the present moment nothing external pushes this object and not of course that it is the cause of its own motion. Rather, on the contrary, the cause is entirely given in the earlier push, independent of it.
- 57.
C] mechanisms adapted for certain movements.] organisms adapted for certain organs. A.
- 58.
F] The logical right to doubt the mental activity of animals can rest only on the same grounds on which I can doubt the mental activity of all other people besides myself (cf. above). The exact resolution of this purely theoretical doubt is impossible in the field of ethics. Indeed, it is unnecessary for it: This task is epistemological and metaphysical. E] Solov’ëv surely has in mind a contemporary dispute within Russian philosophy initiated by Aleksandr I. Vvedenskij at St. Petersburg University concerning the grounds for ascribing to other people mental activity in all essentials similar to my own.
- 59.
C] excitement,] affect A.
- 60.
C] If someone … powerful of them.] Absent in AB.
- 61.
E] Duns Scotus 1974: 599.
- 62.
C] its origin.] its origin (but is posited by reason). B.
- 63.
C] sufficient] Absent in A.
- 64.
C] action] effect AB.
- 65.
C] stimuli] motives AB.
- 66.
C] deer,] cow, AB.
- 67.
C] If the indifference … good reason.] Absent in A.
- 68.
E] See Genesis 22: 1–13.
- 69.
C] as the expression of a higher will] Absent in AB.
- 70.
C] or an object of God’s will] Absent in AB.
- 71.
C] In the biblical text … Christian light.)] Absent in AB.
- 72.
C] In opposition to Abraham and] On the other hand, AB.
- 73.
E] See Numbers 22.
- 74.
C] The action that results … choice.] Absent in AB.
- 75.
C] unconditional freedom of choice.] freedom of the will. A.
- 76.
C] an arbitrary] a free AB.
- 77.
C] Given the appropriate … the subject,] Absent in A.
- 78.
C] final] sole AB.
- 79.
C] and full] Absent in A.
- 80.
C] The good determines … arbitrariness.] Absent in A.
- 81.
C] Given such … irrational.] In this case, an insensitivity to the good would be something completely irrational. A.
- 82.
C] (with its serious resolution)] Absent in AB.
- 83.
F] A significant part of my theoretical philosophy will be devoted to a special investigation of the question of freedom of the will. For the time being, it was enough to show that moral philosophy, as the doctrine of the good, has its own content, because the good remains the good regardless of whether we see it as the object of an arbitrary choice or as a motive that necessarily determines the activity of rational moral beings. Further on in this book, in discussing human freedom, individual freedom, etc., I will always mean either moral freedom, which is an ethical fact, or civil freedom, which is an ethical postulate, without reverting to an unconditional freedom of choice, which is simply a metaphysical problem. C] This entire note absent in A] my theoretical philosophy will] my metaphysics will B] Further on in … metaphysical problem.] Absent in B.
- 84.
C] Prior to … moral perfection.] Absent in A.
- 85.
C] complete moral perfection.] an absolute moral ideal. B.
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Nemeth, T. (2015). [24]Introduction. In: Nemeth, T. (eds) Vladimir Solov’ëv's Justification of the Moral Good. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12775-0_1
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