Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic trade model with a stock of public infrastructure, which has a property of “unpaid factor of production”. We show that a country with a smaller (larger) labor endowment tends to become an exporter of a good whose productivity is more (less) sensitive to the stock of public infrastructure. We also show that after the opening of trade, the labor-scarce country becomes unambiguously better off but the labor-abundant country may become worse off. Overall, these results contrasts with those obtained in the case of public intermediate goods with a “creation of atmosphere” property.
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Khan (1983) integrates public inputs into the conventional (Ricardo–Viner and Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson) trade models under the assumption that their production is financed through Lindahl pricing rules, with special attention to the re-examination of Stolper–Samuelson and Rybczynski Theorems.
Figuières et al. (2013) develop a two-country dynamic model of endogenous growth, where each country government strategically supply the public intermediate good with cross-border spillovers, and investigate the role of public investments to economic growth in each country. Assuming two factors of production, labor and capital, Figuières et al. (2013) consider both types, namely “creation of atmosphere” type and “unpaid factors” type, of public intermediate goods. Although the authors consider governments that determine their policies dynamically, it is assumed that each country produces only one of two traded goods in their model. In other words, trade patterns are exogenously determined in Figuières et al. (2013).
We assume that labor is measured in effective units. Therefore, a bigger country with larger population does not necessarily mean that the country has a higher labor endowment.
Aschauer (1989) is known as a landmark paper that tests the impact of public capital on the economy under the assumption of a generalized Cobb–Douglas form for the production technology with constant returns to scale over all inputs, inclusive of government services. A large empirical literature has followed. See Batina and Ihori (2005, Chapter 14) for a survey.
The conditions for optimal static and dynamic resource allocation are derived by solving a social planner’s dynamic optimization problem in which the Lagrangian is defined as \(\mathscr {L}=\mathscr {H}+\pi [p R^{\alpha _1}L_1^{1-\alpha _1}+R^{\alpha _2}L_2^{1-\alpha _2}-p C_1-C_2]+w[L-L_1-L_2-L_R]\), with \(\mathscr {H}=\gamma \ln C_1+(1-\gamma )\ln C_2+\theta [f(L_R)-\beta R]\) the current value Hamiltonian, \(\pi \) the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint, and w the Lagrange multiplier associated with the full employment constraint. Details are available from the authors upon request. As discussed later, these conditions are also satisfied under the competitive economy with the introduction of the Lindahl pricing rule on the public intermediate good supply.
Kalaitzidakis and Tzouvelekas (2011) develop an endogenous growth model of a decentralized market economy with N different types of productive public capital, the investment costs of which are financed by tax revenue. The authors show that the growth-maximizing tax rate and the growth-maximizing shares of public investment also maximize welfare.
Details are available upon request.
We define \(\bar{z}\) as a steady-state solution of a variable z.
Details are available from the authors upon request.
Since \(y=p Y_1/(p Y_1+Y_2)\), \(0<\bar{y}<1\) indicates that incomplete specialization prevails in this economy.
See Appendix A.2 for the signs of \(a_{ij}\)’s.
As shown by Tawada (1980) in a general framework, the production possibility frontier with public intermediate goods of an unpaid-factors type becomes strictly concave even when the number of commodities exceeds that of factors.
In static models, where there is no accumulation of public intermediate goods, the production possibility frontier remains unchanged before and after opening of trade.
To see this, let us denote the nominal wage by w. It then follows from (7) and (8) that \(y = wL_1 /[(1 - \alpha _1 )w(L_1 + L_2 )]\), which is greater than \(\lambda _1\) because \(L_1 + L_2 < L\) and \(1-\alpha _1>0\). Analogously, we obtain that \(1 - y = wL_2 /[(1 - \alpha _2 )w(L_1 + L_2 )] > \lambda _2\).
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ping Wang, Kaz Miyagiwa, Jota Ishikawa, Ishidoro Mazza, Nicola Coniglio, Giuseppe Celi, Takao Ohkawa, Minoru Kunizaki, Ryuhei Okumura, Kazuyuki Nakamura, Naoki Kakita, Ryoko Morozumi, Tetsushi Homma, Shigeto Kitano, Takumi Haibara, Takeho Nakamura, Hisayuki Okamoto, Yasuyuki Sugiyama, Yasuhiro Takarada, Domenico Lisi, and seminar participants at Nanzan University, Nagoya University, Toyama University, Academia Sinica, University of Bari, and University of Catania, and anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. We also gratefully acknowledge the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for its financial support (No. 16H03612; No. 26380333).
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Making use of (7), the production functions (1) can be rewritten as
Also, using (7), the full employment condition (3) can be rewritten as
Therefore, the temporary equilibrium solutions for \(Y_1\), \(Y_2\), y, and \(L_R\) are derived from the system of Eqs. (A.1), (A.2), and (8). Totally differentiating the system, we have
Of great interest are the effects on the temporary equilibrium solutions for y and \(L_R\), which can be obtained by solving (A.3):
where
It is clear from (A.4) that under Assumption 1, y is increasing in R and \(\theta \) but decreasing in L, and that an increase in p unambiguously increases y. It is also verified from (A.5) that \(L_R\) is unambiguously increasing in R, \(\theta \), and L, and under Assumption 1, an increase in p increases \(L_R\). \(\square \)
1.2 A.2 The linearized dynamic system
Let us denote the right-hand side of (11) and that of (12) by \(\varPhi (R,\theta ;L,p)\) and \(\varPsi (R,\theta ;L,p)\), respectively. Then, we have
where the sign of \(\partial \varPsi /\partial R\) comes from
Although the signs of \(\partial \varPhi /\partial R\) and \(\partial \varPsi /\partial \theta \) are generally ambiguous, we can determine the signs when they are evaluated at the steady state. Eq. (A.6 A.7 A.8) is rewritten as
where \(\epsilon _f(L_R) \equiv f'(L_R) L_R/f(L_R)<1\) \(\forall L_R>0\) because \(f(L_R)\) is assumed to be concave. Moreover, from (7) and (A.5), we have
where \(\lambda _i \equiv L_i /L\), \(i = 1,2\). Notice that \(y > \lambda _1\) and \(1 - y > \lambda _2\) must hold,Footnote 17 and thus, \((\partial L^R /\partial R)(R/L_R )\) must be smaller than 1. Therefore, we have \(\partial \varPhi /\partial R < 0\) evaluated at the steady state. Finally, in light of (9) and (A.4), (A.9) is rewritten as
1.3 A.3 Comparative statics for the steady-state equilibrium
Totally differentiating the steady-state conditions, we have
where \(a_{ij}\)’s are defined in (18) and
Solving (A.12), we have
Substituting the values of \(a_{ij}\)’s and the derivatives into (A.13), we have the comparative static results for \(\bar{R}\), i.e., (19) and (20). The comparative statics for \(\bar{\theta }\) can be analogously derived from (A.14).
1.4 A.4 Derivation of (28)
Totally differentiating (27), we have
In light of (A.4), (23), and (26), the coefficient of dL is rewritten as
Substituting (A.16) into (A.15) and making use of (A.4), we have (28).
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Yanase, A., Tawada, M. Public infrastructure for production and international trade in a small open economy: a dynamic analysis. J Econ 121, 51–73 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0519-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0519-z
Keywords
- Semi-public intermediate good
- Dynamic Lindahl pricing
- Trade patterns
- Long-run production possibility frontier
- Gains or losses from trade