Abstract
IPR protection and R&D subsidy are simultaneously implemented in many economies. Are they complementary policies for improving the welfare of consumers? We address this question in a dynamic general equilibrium model with innovation-driven growth. Under concave utility, the answer is yes for two cases: (1) the economy does not begin from steady state and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is relatively large; (2) the economy begins from steady state with either a sufficiently small initial consumption and a relatively large EIS or a sufficiently big initial consumption and a relatively small EIS. Under linear utility, the answer is yes if the discounted lifetime utility is finite in equilibrium, no matter the economy begins from the steady state or not. As empirical evidence finds cross-country heterogeneity in EIS, they are not complementary for all economies. We also identify reasonable cases whereby they are substitute policies, so we show when it is not welfare-enhancing to simultaneously implement both policies.
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Notes
The U.S. policy has provided very substantial R&D subsidies to many industries. Precisely, the U.S. government pays for about one-third of all domestic research and for most basic science (The Economist, Mar 2nd, 2013). Central planners in China want to triple the number of patents by 2020, to 14 per 10,000 people. Also, they aim to increase R&D spending to eventually match the U.S.’s current level of 2.8% of GDP, in the hope that China will become an innovation superpower (The Economist, Sep 12th, 2015).
Technically, welfare evaluation is much more challenging than growth evaluation. As will be clear soon, existing literature evaluates these innovation policies from the growth perspective whereas we emphasize the welfare perspective. Also, for the sake of technical simplicity, the related literature usually assumes a log utility or a linear utility.
In this article we focus on the theoretical interest of these questions. We believe that an empirical investigation of these issues should be of independent interest, and hence it is left to future research.
That is, the cross-partial derivative is strictly negative.
That is, the cross-partial derivative is strictly positive.
In fact, even for a given economy, economists usually estimate quite different values of EIS, precisely from below 1 to above 2 (see, e.g., Hansen and Singleton 1982; Hall 1988; Crossley and Low 2011). Given the importance of EIS in the current welfare analysis, our theoretical results also call for more reliable estimations of EIS.
Though Furukawa (2013) emphasizes the interdependence between IPR protection and R&D subsidy, he focuses on the joint effect imposed on growth rather than on welfare.
In particular, labor supply is assumed to be inelastic and hence \(L>0\) is fixed over time.
Similar to Segerstrom (2000), we also impose the cost-reducing type of R&D subsidy policy.
As shall be seen shortly, this is useful even if the model has no uncertainty or risk.
I wish to thank a referee for pointing out this intuition.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the editor, Giacomo Corneo, and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own responsibility.
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Appendix: Proofs
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
For problem (19), the Hamiltonian can be written as
where \(\lambda (t)>0\) denotes the costate variable. Then we get the following first-order necessary conditions:
in which (24) gives the consumption Euler equation. By using (24), we have \(\lambda (0)=u'\left[ C(0) \right] \), which combined with (25) imply that \(\lambda (t)=u'\left[ C(0) \right] e^{-rt}\). Plugging this \(\lambda (t)\) in (24) gives the desired equation in Lemma 3.1. To complete the proof, let us take log on both sides of the consumption Euler equation, then we have \(-\rho t +\ln u'\left[ C(t) \right] =\ln \lambda (t)\). Thus, under Assumption 3.1, differentiating both sides of this equation with respect to t and also applying (25), we obtain
by which the remaining parts of Lemma 3.1 easily follow. \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 3.1:
By using Assumption 3.1 and (20), we have
As we have from Lemma 3.1 that \(u'\left[ C^{*}(t) \right] =u'\left[ C(0) \right] e^{(\rho -r)t}\), applying Implicit Function Theorem to this equation yields
and
Applying Implicit Function Theorem again and differentiating both sides of equation (27) with respect to s, we then have
In what follows, we shall consider two cases. First, if \(\zeta (0)\ne \bar{\zeta }\), then we get from (16)–(18) that
Applying (30)–(31) to (27) yields that
for \(\forall t\ge 0\). Using Assumption 3.1, we thus have \(\partial C^{*}(t)/\partial \mu \le 0\). Similarly, applying (30)–(31) to (28) yields that
for \(\forall t\ge 0\). We thus get from using Assumption 3.1 that \(\partial C^{*}(t)/\partial s \ge 0\). Based on these results, applying (30)–(31) to (29) shows that
for \(\forall t\ge 0\). Solving for \(\partial C^{*}(t)/\partial \mu \) from (32) and plugging it in (34) leads to
In consequence, using (26), (32) and (35), we can obtain
for \(\forall t\ge 0\). Therefore, using (36) produces part (i) of Theorem 3.1.
Second, if \(\zeta (0)=\bar{\zeta }\), then we get from (16)–(18) and (9) that
Applying (30) and (37) to (27) gives rise to
thus the sign of \(\partial C^{*}(t)/\partial \mu \) is not immediate right now. Also, applying (30) and (37) to (29) gives rise to
by which we obtain
It follows from (38) that
Solving for \(\partial C^{*}(t)/\partial s\) from (33) gives
Solving for \(\partial C^{*}(t)/\partial \mu \) from (38) gives
Plugging (41) in (40) shows that
Using (41) and (42), we obtain
Applying (39), (43) and (44) to (26), we thus have
for \(\forall t\ge 0\). Noting from Lemma 3.1 that
thus this combined with (45) produces the desired results in part (ii). \(\square \)
Proof of Corollary 3.2:
As shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we just need to consider two cases. First, if \(\zeta (0)\ne \bar{\zeta }\), then the proof is exactly as that of Theorem 3.1 because the corresponding proof does not rely on whether or not g is completely independent of the IPR policy variable \(\mu \). Second, if \(\zeta (0)=\bar{\zeta }\), then we have
whenever \(\partial g/ \partial \mu <\frac{g}{\mu }\). Therefore, similar to (37), we arrive at
Since it is easy to verify that the rest of the proof is unchanged under the current assumptions, we claim that Theorem 3.1 holds as well. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
By applying Lemma 3.1, we see that \(C^{*}(t)=C(0)e^{(r-\rho )t}\) under the log utility with \(\text {EIS}=1\) assumed in part (i) and \(C^{*}(t)=C(0)e^{\sigma ^{-1}(r-\rho )t}\) under the more general CRRA utility with \(\text {EIS}\ne 1\) assumed in part (ii). So, given log preference and (20), we obtain
Thus, making use of L’Hospital Rule and the Formula of Integration by Parts gives (22), as desired in (i). Similarly, noting that
under the more general CRRA preference, thus (23) can be accordingly derived. \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
If \(\zeta (0)\ne \bar{\zeta }\), then we get from (16)–(18) that
If \(\zeta (0)=\bar{\zeta }\), then we get from (16)–(18), (46) and (9) that
First, as we see that C(0) and r are additively separated in (22), then a direct application of (46)–(48) yields the desired assertion in part (i). For (23), if \(\zeta (0)\ne \bar{\zeta }\), then we use (46) and (47) to get
by which the assertion in part (ii-a) immediately follows. If, however, \(\zeta (0)=\bar{\zeta }\), then we can use (46) and (48) to get
in which we can show that
the desired assertion in part (ii-b) accordingly follows. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 3.3:
Under Assumption 3.2, the Hamiltonian of problem (19) can be written as
where \(\lambda (t)>0\) denotes the costate variable. Then we get the first-order necessary conditions:
It follows from (49) that \(\dot{\lambda }(t)/\lambda (t)=-\rho \), which combined with (50) produces the desired result. \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 3.2:
It follows from Lemma 3.3, (4), (11) and (12) that \(\pi b^{-1}(1-s)^{-1}-\mu =\rho \), by which we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem to get \(\partial \mu /\partial s>0\). It is easy to see from (9), (15)–(18) and Lemma 3.3 that
by which, (20) and Assumption 3.2 we thus obtain
We next analyze two cases. First, we consider the simpler case with \(\zeta (0)=\bar{\zeta }\), then we get from (17), (51) and Assumption 3.2 that
Noting that
thus the desired assertion immediately follows from applying (52). Second, if \(\zeta (0)\ne \bar{\zeta }\), then we can rewrite (51) as
where we have used (17) and Assumption 3.2. We thus have
by which we arrive at:
Substituting
into equation (54) and rearranging the algebra give rise to
as desired. \(\square \)
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Dai, D. Intellectual property rights and R&D subsidies: are they complementary policies?. J Econ 125, 27–49 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0580-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0580-2
Keywords
- Intellectual property right
- R&D subsidy
- Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
- Policy complementarity
- Policy substitutability