Abstract
In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27–42, 2003) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of competition in prices. Further we compare the incentives to merge with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Comparing quantity with price competition we can show that a merger is more likely with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition.
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Andree, K. A note on merger in mixed duopoly: Bertrand versus Cournot. J Econ 108, 291–298 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x