Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

An Interview with Kotaro Suzumura

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. Negishi’s book later formed the core of his classic, Negishi (1972), whereas Nikaido’s book was subsequently translated by Kazuo Sato into Nikaido (1970). Needless to say, Arrow’s treatise is one of the greatest classics in the theory of social choice.

  2. Hukukane Nikaido (1923-2001) used to be a colleague of Michio Morishima (1923-2004) at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. Subsequently, he moved to the Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, where Suzumura was a third-year graduate student. Thus, he could belatedly but fortunately study mathematical economics under Nikaido’s supervision.

  3. The Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society in the 1960s was started by Michio Morishima, but it was soon discontinued. After a long and big sleep, it resurged in 1987. It was Suzumura who played a crucial role in its revival. See Suzumura (1999b) for the history of the Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society.

  4. Observe that Suzumura’s Introduction to Arrow et al. (2002) used the Economic Planning Controversy as the basic frame of reference in order to give a clear structure to the multifaceted developments of the theory of social choice.

  5. The basic reference to the Economic Planning Controversy is Hayek (1935).

  6. A zaibatsu is a family-dominated financial combine that supposedly exerted strong controls over the Japanese economy in the prewar period.

  7. See (Sen (1970a, b), Chap. 6*, 1992).

  8. When Arrow first presented his General Impossibility Theorem in the Cleveland Meeting of the Econometric Society held in 1949, there was a contentious Canadian political economist among the audience by the name of David McCord Wright. He harshly criticized Arrow and his theorem, because Arrow did not include the respect for individual liberty among the axioms to be satisfied by the Arrow social welfare function. When Suzumura read this episode in Kelly (1987) “An Interview with Kenneth Arrow,” he asked Arrow what was his spontaneous response to Wright’s criticism. Although Arrow didn’t remember his initial response, he could have answered Wright’s criticism simply by saying: “Give me your definition of individual liberty in the form of an axiom, then the augmented set of axioms would be all the more inconsistent.” Nevertheless, the fact is that nobody actually tried to formulate the concept of individual liberty until Sen’s paper (Sen 1970a) was published in the Journal of Political Economy more than 20 years later.

  9. Let \(R \) and \(R^{*}\) be two binary relations on the universal set \(X. R^{*}\) is said to be an ordering extension of \(R\) if we have (i) \(R\subseteq R^{*}\), (ii) \(P(R) \quad \subseteq P(R^{*})\) and (iii) \(R^{*}\) is an ordering on \(X,\) where \(P(R)\) [resp. \(P(R^{*})\)] is the asymmetric part of \(R\) [resp. \(R^{*}\)].

  10. There are many concepts of consistency in the literature. To avoid confusion, Bossert (2008) coined a new term of Suzumura consistency for the consistency concept introduced by Suzumura (1976b). From this point onward, we will be using this new nomenclature.

  11. The extended sympathy approach will be discussed further in the context of interpersonal comparisons of well-being.

  12. The axiom (FE) requires that the social choice set \(C(S)\) should coincide with the fair set \(F(S)\), which is defined by the intersection of the Pareto efficient set \(E_{f}(S)\) and the no-envy set \(E_{q}(S)\), whenever \(S\) is such that \(F(S)\) is non-empty. The axiom (SUA) is a weak choice-consistency condition to the effect that \( [S_{1}\subseteq S_{2 }\, \& \,C(S_{2})\,{\subseteq }\, C(S_{1})]\) implies \(C(S_{1})=C(S_{2})\), which is much weaker than Arrow’s collective rationality condition.

  13. According to Suzumura’s “Introduction” to the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1 (Arrow et al., eds. 2002, pp. 1–32), “[s]ocial choice theory is concerned with the evaluation of alternative methods of collective decision-making, as well as with the logical foundations of welfare economics. In turn, welfare economics is concerned with the critical scrutiny of the performance of actual and/or imaginary economic systems, as well as with the critique, design and implementation of alternative economic policies.”

  14. B-P is the abbreviation of Bentham and Pigou.

  15. B-S is the abbreviation of Bergson and Samuelson.

  16. This issue is discussed more in detail in Chap. 28 of Suzumura (forthcoming).

  17. On some aspects of this development, see Roemer and Suzumura (2007). See also Bossert and Suzumura (2010, Chap. 10) for Suzumura’s own work in this arena.

References

  • Arrow KJ (1951; 2nd edition 1963) Social choice and individual values, Wiley, New York

  • Arrow KJ (1959) Rational choice functions and orderings. Economica 26:121–127

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow KJ (1987) Arrow’s theorem. In: Eatwell J, Milgate M, Newman P (eds) The new Palgrave: a dictionary of economics, vol 1. Macmillan, London, pp 124–126

  • Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (2002; 2011) Handbook of social choice and welfare. North-Holland/Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1st vol (2002); 2nd vol (2011)

  • Austen-Smith D (1982) Restricted Pareto and rights. J Econ Theory 10:89–99

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumol WJ (1982) Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of industrial structure. Am Econ Rev 72:1–15

    Google Scholar 

  • Bentham J (1789) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Payne, London. Republished in 1907 by Clarendon Press, Oxford

  • Bentham J (1843) Anarchical fallacies. In: Bowring J (ed) The works of Jeremy Bentham, vol II. William Tait, Edinburgh, pp 489–534

  • Berlin I (1958) Two concepts of liberty. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Bossert W (2008) Suzumura consistency. In: Pattanaik PK, Tadenuma K, Xu Y, Yoshihara N (eds) Rational choice and social welfare: theory and applications. Springer, Berlin, pp 159–179

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bossert W, Sprumont Y, Suzumura K (2005) Consistent rationalizability. Economica 72:185–200

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bossert W, Suzumura K (2010) Consistency, choice, and rationality. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Champernowne DG (1969) Uncertainty and estimation in economics, vol I. Holden-Day, San Francisco

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond P (1965) The evaluation of infinite utility streams. Econometrica 33:170–177

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gaertner W, Pattanaik PK, Suzumura K (1992) Individual rights revisited. Economica 59:161–177

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard A (1974) A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim. J Econ Theory 7:388–410

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goto A, Suzumura K (eds) (1999) Competition policy of Japan. The University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo (in Japanese)

  • Hansson B (1968) Choice structures and preference relations. Synthese 18:433–458

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek FA (ed) (1935) Collectivist economic planning. Routledge, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hegel GWF (1991) Elements of the philosophy of right. In: Wood AW (ed) Cambridge texts in the history of political thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Hicks J (1981) Wealth and welfare, collected essays on economic theory, vol I. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Houthakker HS (1950) Revealed preference and the utility function. Economica 17:159–174

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hurwicz L (1972) On informationally decentralized systems. In: McGuire CB, Radner R (eds) Decision and organization. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 297–336

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurwicz L (2008) But who will guard the guardians? Am Econ Rev 98:577–585

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelly JS (1987) An interview with Kenneth Arrow. Soc Choice Welf 4:43–62

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kolm S-Ch (1972/1997) Justice et Equité, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris. English translation: Justice and Equity, The MIT Press, Cambridge

  • Kolm S-Ch (1996) Modern theories of justice. The MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Komiya R, Okuno M, Suzumura K (eds) (1988) Industrial policy of Japan. Academic Press, San Diego

    Google Scholar 

  • Konishi H, Okuno-Fujiwara M, Suzumura K (1990) Oligopolistic competition and economic welfare: a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax-subsidy schemes. J Public Econ 42:67–88

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mas-Colell A (1982) Revealed preference after Samuelson. In: Feiwel GR (ed) Samuelson and neoclassical economics. Kluwer, Amsterdam, pp 72–82

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Maskin E (1977/1999) Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev Econ Stud 66:23–38. Originally circulated as MIT Working Paper in 1977

  • Maskin E (2008) Mechanism design: how to implement social goals. Am Econ Rev 98:567–576

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mishan EJ (1960) A survey of welfare economics, 1939–1959. Econ J 70:197–257

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Negishi T (1972) General equilibrium theory and international trade. North-Holland, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Nikaido H (1970) Introduction to sets and mappings in modern economics. North-Holland, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state and Utopia. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Okuno-Fujiwara M, Suzumura K (1993) Symmetric oligopoly and economic welfare: a synthesis. Econ Theory 3:43–59

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Pigou AC (1920) The economics of welfare. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Richter MK (1966) Revealed preference theory. Econometrica 34:635–645

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robbins L (1932) An essay on the nature and significance of economic science. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Roemer J, Suzumura K (eds) (2007) Intergenerational equity and sustainability. Elsevier, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson PA (1938) A note on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour. Economica 5:61–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson PA (1947) Foundations of economic analysis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson PA (1948) Consumption theory in terms of revealed preference. Economica 15:243–253

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson PA (1950) The problem of integrability in utility theory. Economica 17:355–385

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (1969) Quasi-transitivity, rational choice and collective decisions. Rev Econ Stud 36:381–393

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (1970a) The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. J Political Econ 78:152–157

  • Sen AK (1970b) Collective choice and social welfare. Holden-Day, San Francisco

  • Sen AK (1971) Choice functions and revealed preference. Rev Econ Stud 38:307–317

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (1976) Liberty, unanimity and rights. Economica 43:217–245

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (1985) Commodities and capabilities. Elsevier, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (1992) Minimal liberty. Economica 59:139–159

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (1993) Internal consistency of choice. Econometrica 61:495–521

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen AK (2009) The idea of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sidgwick H (1874; 7th edition 1907) The methods of ethics. Macmillan, London

  • Solow RM (1987) James Meade at eighty. Econ J 97:986–988

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sugden R (1985) Liberty, preference and choice. Econ Philos 1:185–205

    Google Scholar 

  • Suppes P (1966) Some formal models of grading principles. Synthese 6:284–306

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (1976a) Rational choice and revealed preference. Rev Econ Stud 43:149–158

  • Suzumura K (1976b) Remarks on the theory of collective choice. Economica 43:381–390

  • Suzumura K (1977) Houthakker’s axiom in the theory of rational choice. J Econ Theory 14:284–290

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (1978) On the consistency of libertarian claims. Rev Econ Stud 45:329–342

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (1981) On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity. J Econ Theory 25:367–379

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (1983a/2009) Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare. Cambridge University Press, New York, first edition, 1983; Paperback edition, 2009

  • Suzumura K (1983b) Resolving conflicting views of justice in social choice. In: Pattanaik PK, Salles M (eds) Social choice and welfare. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 125–149

  • Suzumura K (1992) Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in oligopoly with spillovers. Am Econ Rev 82:1307–1320

    Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (1999a) Consequences, opportunities and procedures. Soc Choice Welf 16:17–40

  • Suzumura K (1999b) Report on the far eastern activities of the Econometric Society. Econometrica 67:221–233

  • Suzumura K (2000) Welfare economics beyond welfarist-consequentialism. Jpn Econ Rev 51:1–32

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (2011) Welfarism, individual rights, and procedural fairness. In: Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol II. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 605–685

    Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (forthcoming) Consequences, opportunities, and procedures: selected papers on social choice and welfare. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

  • Suzumura K, Kiyono K (1987) Entry barriers and economic welfare. Rev Econ Stud 54:157–167

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K, Xu Y (2001) Characterizations of consequentialism and non-consequentialism. J Econ Theory 101:423–436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K, Xu Y (2003) Consequences, opportunities, and generalized consequentialism and non-consequentialism. J Econ Theory 111:293–304

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K, Xu Y (2004) Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem. Soc Choice Welf 22:237–251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Szpilrajn E (1930) Sur l’extension de l’ordre partiel. Fundamenta Mathematicae 16:386–389

    Google Scholar 

  • Tadenuma K (2002) Efficiency first or equity first: two principles and rationality of social choice. J Econ Theory 104:462–472

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Varian HR (1974) Equity, envy and efficiency. J Econ Theory 9:61–91

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Varian HR (1975) Distributive justice, welfare economics, and the theory of fairness. Philos Public Affairs 4:223–247

    Google Scholar 

  • World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our common future. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Walter Bossert

  2. Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Marc Fleurbaey

Authors
  1. Walter Bossert
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Marc Fleurbaey
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Walter Bossert.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Bossert, W., Fleurbaey, M. An Interview with Kotaro Suzumura. Soc Choice Welf 44, 179–208 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0827-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0827-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation