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Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Binary relations are at the heart of much of economic theory, both in the context of individual choice and in multi-agent decision problems. A fundamental coherence requirement imposed on a relation is the well-known transitivity axiom. If a relation is interpreted as a goodness relation, transitivity postulates that whenever one alternative is at least as good as a second and the second alternative is, in turn, at least as good as a third, then the first alternative is at least as good as the third. However, from an empirical as well as a conceptual perspective, transitivity is frequently considered too demanding and weaker notions of coherence have been proposed in the literature. Two alternatives that have received a considerable amount of attention are quasi-transitivity and acyclicity. Quasi-transitivity demands that the asymmetric factor of a relation (the betterness relation) is transitive, whereas acyclicity rules out the presence of betterness cycles. Quasi-transitivity is implied by transitivity and implies acyclicity. The reverse implications are not valid.

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Bossert, W. (2008). Suzumura Consistency. In: Pattanaik, P.K., Tadenuma, K., Xu, Y., Yoshihara, N. (eds) Rational Choice and Social Welfare. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_9

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