Abstract
During the course of life, it is common to make some decisions that prove to be correct. Some of these choices are made without a specific reason, but only out of habit or intuitively, while others are based on judgments and motivations. However, when we claim that a decision is “right”, what kind of judgment are we referring to? On the one hand, the term “right” (or “wrong”) often refers to abstract norms. Usually, truth and falsehood serve as criteria in these cases. In such situations, judgments about what is “right” or “wrong” depend strictly on an accurate rational evaluation, which is instrumental in guiding individuals to undertake or avoid certain actions. On the other hand, there is a sense of justice that concerns ethics and values. In these circumstances, a decision is generally considered “right” if it is based on a criterion of judgment that allows individuals to make a decision freely, without being bound by an abstract norm, but rather by elaborating the choice as the realization of what they consider good and just. In this paper will examine and redefine the concept of “right choice”, acknowledging the above mentioned dual nature of its meaning. It will be argued there is a link between what abstract norms dictate to do, in order to reach a formally correct decision, and what, instead, depends on merely reasons and attitudes. This connection is indeed ensured by wise decisions.
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Notes
For instance, Robert Nozick argues that such concern implies defending a specific distributive pattern that can only be maintained by infringing on individuals’ freedom to take actions and make choices (cf. Nozick 1974). In particular, Nozick questions why we should strive to preserve an arbitrary distributive pattern at the expense of individual freedom, constantly interfering with it. (cf. Nozick 1974).
See e.g. Sen (1999) for an account.
As stated by Sen (1992), there is something that consistently assumes a prominent role in the various theories considered from time to time. This is why, in certain circumstances, that something can be linked to income (as in the case of income egalitarians), or to well-being, or even to the weight of individual utilities (as in the case of classical utilitarians).
It is equally true that the values and the voice of the people (often associated with populism) are not always entirely agreeable or useful when it comes to making decisions on contentious issues such as climate change, public health, terrorism, and earthquakes, which involve diverse public sensitivities. In situations where a general consensus on contentious matters cannot be reached, as Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein suggest (2008), it is permissible to seek the intervention of experts who, through the use of technical and scientific analysis that does not rely on a general consensus of what is “right” or “good,” can exclude subjective values from public discourse.
For instance, Oliver Scholz highlights additional crucial aspects that merit consideration, including justification, coherence of the expert’s ideas, understanding, and more (cf. Scholz 2009).
Typically, in personal reflection, reasoning, according to the two authors, tends to serve as a confirmation mechanism for arguments that align with individuals’ preexisting attitudes and impressions.
In this perspective, the theory put forth by Sperber and Mercier bears a striking resemblance to what Haidt proposes with his “social intuitionist model” (cf. Haidt 2001).
The distinction lies in the fact that the former are beliefs without mentally represented reasons (such as believing that it rained yesterday because it seems like we remember it), whereas the latter are beliefs that are accepted because there are good reasons to do so (for example, believing that it will rain tomorrow because the weather forecast has issued a bulletin predicting it).
In contrast to the atomism of virtues, which presupposes the unlimited proliferation of virtues based on all possible, even small, contextual variables, the molecularism of virtues posits that an agent’s character is, in fact, not constituted by a set of discrete and independent traits but, conversely, by a unified ethical competence that enables them to navigate specific and often unique situations (cf. De Caro et al. 2018; De Caro et al. 2021).
Thomas Aquinas underscored that practical wisdom extends to all aspects of human life and to the ultimate aim of human existence. In other words, practical wisdom is not confined to any particular area but instead encompasses every facet of human existence and the attainment of its highest objective. Wisdom pertains to behavior that encompasses the entirety of human life. It involves comprehending what kind of existence is worth living, and this understanding is the fruit of a distinctive type of reflection. Individuals who possess practical wisdom must have engaged in profound contemplation of what it means to live well, not just focusing on the best means to attain that end. In essence, practical wisdom goes beyond theoretical knowledge and entails practical experience and a profound grasp of fundamental existential matters.
Thus, its worth cannot be determined by the goals that the agent had prior to attaining it. Otherwise, practical wisdom would be reduced to a mere instrument serving one’s desires or personal interests.
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Graziano, M. Beyond Right Choices: The Art of Wise Decision Making. Topoi (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-10005-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-10005-8