Notes
Henceforth I will usually be speaking of plural “ends,” but I do not mean thereby to take a position on the interpretation of Aristotle or of the correct conception of a good life. There may be one dominant end, but even so, we will have to have subordinate ends.
Hence, it is unlike the view advocated in Tiberius (2008).
As Annas notes (1995).
As Julia Annas explicitly undertakes to do. See “Précis of Intelligent Virtue” in Journal of Value Inquiry (forthcoming).
As is admitted to be the case by Valerie Tiberius in her account of reflective virtues (2008).
More recently, Valerie Tiberius asserts, “human nature does not impose norms on us in the way that some versions of the Aristotelian picture assume” (2008).
A slightly modified version of Swartwood’s wording of the argument (2013).
A term used by Aquinas in relation to practical wisdom, for which he identifies eight integral parts: memory, reason, understanding, aptness to be taught, ingenuity, foresight, circumspection, and caution (1974).
References
Annas J (1995) Virtue as a skill. Int J Philos Stud 3(2):227–243
Annas J (2011) Intelligent virtue. Oxford University Press, New York
Aquinas T (1974) In: Gilby T (ed) Summa Theologiae. Vol 36. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Aquinas T (1998) In: McInerny R (ed) Selected writings. Penguin, New York
Bloomfield P (2000) Virtue epistemology and the epistemology of virtue. Philos Phenomenol Res 50:23–43
Bloomfield P (2001) Moral reality. Oxford University Press, New York
Bloomfield P (2012) Eudaimonia and Practical Rationality. Oxf Stud Anc Philos Suppl Vol: 265–286
Copp D, Sobel D (2004) Morality and virtue: an assessment of recent work in virtue ethics. Ethics 114(3):514–554
Foot P (2002) Virtues and vices, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, New York
Richardson H (1994) Practical reasoning about ends. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rorty A (1988) Mind in action. Beacon, Boston
Stanley J (2011) Know How. Oxford University Press, New York
Stanley J, Krakauer J (2013) Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. Front Hum Neurosci 7:503. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00503
Stichter M (2007) Ethical expertise: the skill model of virtue. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10(2):183–194
Stichter M (2011) Virtue, skills, and right action. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 14(1):73–86
Swartwood J (2013) Wisdom as an expert skill. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 16:511–528
Thompson M (2004) Apprehending Human Form. In: O’Hear A (ed) Modern moral philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 47–74
Thompson M (2008) Life and action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Tiberius V (2008) The reflective life. Oxford University Press, New York
Wiggins D (1998) Needs, values, truth. Oxford University Press, New York
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Cristina Carrillo, Micah Lott, Nancy Snow, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments that greatly improved this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hacker-Wright, J. Skill, Practical Wisdom, and Ethical Naturalism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 983–993 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9566-8
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9566-8