Abstract
We investigate whether the display of portfolio performance as coming from one large portfolio or two smaller subportfolios matters to individuals and whether prospect theory can explain this preference. To this end, we run a large survey experiment of 3267 individuals in 5 European countries presenting an identical overall return as coming from one portfolio or two smaller subportfolios to individuals. We also elicited the coefficients of the prospect theory value function through price list lotteries. In losses, following prospect theory and mental accounting predictions, we observe emprically a preference for the display of returns as coming from 2 subportfolios, one displaying a small gain and the other a large loss, over a unique portfolio displaying the aggregated resulting loss. As expected, for an overall gain, individuals favor one portfolio over two subportfolios, one displaying a small loss and the other a larger gain. The shape of the value function does not explain individuals’ preferences. The reference point seems to be the main factor involved in explaining individuals’ choice of two subportfolio presentations of the outcome.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Appart in cases of excessively high loss tolerance.
Note that while conceptually different, particularly as it regards the periodicity of decisions being taken, the regret proof policy we depicted here is reminiscent of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Gneezy & Potters, 1997), as both entail a subjective editing of the overall outcome. Regarding myopic loss aversion, when decisions are made periodically, individuals often fail to consider their overall impact. It leads them to take a string of short-sighted loss averse decisions over time, while they would have taken more risk had they consider the ultimate result of this string of decisions, hence the term ”myopic" loss aversion. In the case of the policy we depict here, individuals are also ”myopic" in the sense that they engage in hedonic editing, favoring the outcome presentation that maximize their satisfaction at a given point in time, thus often disregarding the overall outcome. While we do not directly test it here, presenting outcomes in a certain way could thus influence decisions over portfolio allocation, in the same way that myopic loss aversion leads to equity being valued at a premium (the so called equity premium puzzle).
Appart in cases of excessively high loss tolerance.
Twelve potential ranges of income were displayed to participants, who were asked to select the one that most closely corresponded to theirs.
We explained to participants that the amounts seen for lotteries on screen would be divided by 100 before being paid out, a scaling technique used for instance in Bougherara et al. (2017), as a way to display relatively high amounts on screen while still contending with a limited budget. Participants were informed that they would receive an additional 3 EUR if one of the lotteries in the choice task could entail losses, regardless of their choice and of the lottery result. Any loss would thus be subtracted from these 3 EUR (see for instance Schleich et al., 2019, where such a mechanism is used as well). The maximum loss of 2.10 EUR could thus wipe out almost entirely this additional endowment.
Note that we have used two tailed tests in this paper, even though our hypotheses were directional. This tends to be the norm in economics, and provide more conservative results Cho and Abe (2013).
Note that less than 10% of respondents displayed loss aversion coefficients of clearly below 1, and the rest displayed an interval for the loss aversion coefficient including 1.
Given that age, gender and education may be related to the value function parameters, we ran the regressions without control variables. The results of the probit estimates remain essentially unchanged when controls variables are excluded.
To clarify, this question about the reference point was answered by all participants, including those in the control groups.
Again, if we restrict our sample to individuals displaying loss aversion and risk aversion, the significance of loss aversion disappears. As indicated before, it seems that most of the effect observed for loss aversion in our study is driven by the difference between gain seekers and loss averters.
References
Agarwal, S., Chomsisengphet, S., Mahoney, N., & Stroebel, J. (2015). Regulating consumer financial products: Evidence from credit cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130, 111–164.
Barberis, N. C. (2013). Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 173–96.
Barberis, N., & Huang, M. (2001). Mental accounting, loss aversion, and individual stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 56, 1247–1292.
Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 73–92.
Booij, A., Van Praag, B., & Van De Kuilen, G. (2010). A parametric analysis of prospect theory’s functionals for the general population. Theory and Decision, 68, 115–148.
Borsboom, C., & Zeisberger, S. (2020). What makes an investment risky? An analysis of price path characteristics. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 169, 92–125.
Bougherara, D., Gassmann, X., Piet, L., & Reynaud, A. (2017). Structural estimation of farmers risk and ambiguity preferences: a field experiment. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 44, 782–808.
Chao, H., Ho, C., & Qin, X. (2017). Risk taking after absolute and relative wealth changes: The role of reference point adaptation. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 54, 157–186.
Cho, H.-C., & Abe, S. (2013). Is two-tailed testing for directional research hypotheses tests legitimate? Journal of Business Research, 66, 1261–1266.
Corgnet, B., Gómez-Miñambres, J., & Hernán-Gonzalez, R. (2015). Goal setting and monetary incentives: When large stakes are not enough. Management Science, 61, 2926–2944.
Corgnet, B., Gómez-Miñambres, J., & Hernán-Gonzalez, R. (2018). Goal setting in the principal-agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance. Games and Economic Behavior, 109, 311–326.
Gneezy, U., & Potters, J. (1997). An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 631–645.
Hirst, D. E., Joyce, E. J., & Schadewald, M. S. (1994). Mental accounting and outcome contiguity in consumer-borrowing decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58, 136–152.
Jarnebrant, P., Toubia, O., & Johnson, E. (2009). The silver lining effect: Formal analysis and experiments. Management Science, 55, 1832–1841.
Jin, C., & Gallimore, P. (2010). The effects of information presentation on real estate market perceptions. Journal of Property Research, 27, 239–246.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–292.
Koop, G., & Johnson, J. (2012). The use of multiple reference points in risky decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25, 49–62.
Kőszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006). A model of reference-dependent preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 1133–1165.
Kőszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2007). Reference-dependent risk attitudes. American Economic Review, 97, 1047–1073.
Kőszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2009). Reference-dependent consumption plans. American Economic Review, 99, 909–36.
Levy, M., & Levy, H. (2002). Prospect theory: Much ado about nothing? Management Science, 48, 1334–1349.
Lin, C.-H., Huang, W.-H., & Zeelenberg, M. (2006). Multiple reference points in investor regret. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27, 781–792.
Luce, D., & Fishburn, P. (1991). Rank-and sign-dependent linear utility models for finite first-order gambles. Journal of risk and Uncertainty, 4, 29–59.
Markle, A., Wu, G., White, R., & Sackett, A. (2018). Goals as reference points in marathon running: A novel test of reference dependence. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 56, 19–50.
Munro, A., & Sugden, R. (2003). On the theory of reference-dependent preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 50, 407–428.
Newall, P. W., & Love, B. C. (2015). Nudging investors big and small toward better decisions. Decision, 2, 319–326.
Nolte, S., & Schneider, J. C. (2018). How price path characteristics shape investment behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 154, 33–59.
Prelec, D., & Loewenstein, G. (1998). The red and the black: Mental accounting of savings and debt. Marketing Science, 17, 4–28.
Sagi, J. S. (2006). Anchored preference relations. Journal of Economic Theory, 130, 283–295.
Schleich, J., Gassmann, X., Meissner, T., & Faure, C. (2019). A large-scale test of the effects of time discounting, risk aversion, loss aversion, and present bias on household adoption of energy-efficient technologies. Energy Economics, 80, 377–393.
Sims, C. (2003). Implications of rational inattention. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 665–690.
Slovic, P. (1972). Psychological study of human judgment: Implications for investment decision making. The Journal of Finance, 27, 779–799.
Soll, J. B., Keeney, R. L., & Larrick, R. P. (2013). Consumer misunderstanding of credit card use, payments, and debt: Causes and solutions. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 32, 66–81.
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C. F., & Nguyen, Q. (2010). Risk and time preferences: Linking experimental and household survey data from Vietnam. American Economic Review, 100, 557–71.
Thaler, R. (1985). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science, 4, 199–214.
Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 183–206.
Thaler, R. H., & Johnson, E. J. (1990). Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice. Management Science, 36, 643–660.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.
Weber, E. U., Siebenmorgen, N., & Weber, M. (2005). Communicating asset risk: How name recognition and the format of historic volatility information affect risk perception and investment decisions. Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 25, 597–609.
Wong, W.-K., & Chan, R. H. (2008). Prospect and Markowitz stochastic dominance. Annals of Finance, 4, 105–129.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof
Following Jarnebrant et al. (2009), for any outcome of portfolio \(r<0\): If the regret-proof policy is optimal for a gain \(r_g\) and a loss \(r_l\) where \(r=r_g+r_l\), it is optimal for smaller gains and losses \((0<r_g<|r|)\) and \((r_l<r<0)\) when the value function is concave in gains and convex in losses and when loss aversion is not extreme.
Similar to Jarnebrant et al. (2009), we define \(x_0\) and \(x_1\) as the gain achieved from using a regret-proof policy and \(y_0\) and \(y_1\) as the loss reduction achieved from not using the regret-proof policy. Under segregated portfolios gains and losses correspond to \(r_{g0}\) and \(r_{l0}\) and \(r_{g1}\) and \(r_{l1}\) respectively, where \(0<r_{g1}<r_{g0}<|r|\), \(r_{l0}<r_{l1}<r<0\) and \(r=r_{g0}+r_{l0}=r_{g1}+r_{l1}\).
Proposition 1(a): The monotonicity and concavity of the value function in the gain domain and convexity in the loss domain (\(v^{''}<0\) for x>0 and \(v^{''}>0\) for x<0 ), imply that
For conditions where the regret-proof policy is optimal, we have
We see that if it is optimal to use the regret-proof policy with \(r_{g0}\) and \(r_{l0}\), it is also optimal for any smaller value of \(r_{g1} < r_{g0}\) and \(r_{l0}< r_{l1}\).
This ensures that there exists a region around r for which the regret proof-policy is optimal if the value function is concave in gains and convex in losses.
Conversely, if the value function is convex in gains and concave in losses, the following inequalities hold:
which implies that the loss reduction resulting by not using the regret policy is greater than the gain resulting from using the regret policy, namely
This shows that, in such a case (convexity in gains and concavity in losses), there exists no \(r_g^*>0\) and \(r_l^*<0\) around r for which the regret proof policy is optimal.
Proposition 1(b):
When \(r_g^*>0\) exists then \(v(r_g^*)+v(r_l^*)=v(r) \Leftrightarrow v(r_g^*)+v(r_l^*) - v(r) = 0\). Following Jarnebrant et al. (2009), we define \(r_g^*\) by \(F(r_g^*, r, \lambda , \alpha ) = 0\) where \(F(r_g, r, \lambda , \alpha ) = r_g^\alpha - \lambda (r_g-r)^\alpha +\lambda (-r)^\alpha \).
Using envelope theorem \(\frac{\partial F}{\partial \lambda } = -(r_g-r)^\alpha + (-r)^\alpha \). For \(\alpha >0\), we always have \(\frac{\partial F}{\partial \lambda }<0\). Thus, lower loss aversion levels leads to preference for segregation of outcomes. \(\square \)
1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof
Proposition 2 (a): For any outcome of portfolio \(r>0\): If the regret-proof policy is optimal for a gain \(r_g\) and a loss \(r_l\) where \(r=r_g+r_l\), it is optimal for smaller gains and losses \((r<r_g)\) and \((-r<r_l<0)\) when the value function is convex in gains and concave in losses and when loss aversion is not extreme.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, let us define \(x_0\) and \(x_1\) as a gain achieved from using a regret-proof policy and \(y_0\) and \(y_1\) as the loss reduction achieved from not using the regret-proof policy. Under segregated portfolios gains and losses correspond to \(r_{g0}\) and \(r_{l0}\) and \(r_{g1}\) and \(r_{l1}\) respectively, where \(r<r_{g1}<r_{g0}\), \(-r<r_{l0}<r_{l1}<r<0\) and \(r=r_{g0}+r_{l0}=r_{g1}+r_{l1}\).
The monotonicity and convexity of the value function in the gain domain and concavity in the loss domain imply that
Under the condition where the regret-proof policy is optimal, we have
We see that if it is optimal to use the regret-proof policy with \(r_{l0}\) and \(r_{l0}\), it is also optimal for any smaller value of \(r_{g1} < r_{g0}\) and \(r_{l0}< r_{l1}\).
This ensures that there exists a region around r for which the regret proof-policy is optimal if the value function is convex in gains and concave in losses.
Proposition 2 (b):
Similar to the proof given by Proposition 1 (b), when \(r_g^*>0\) exists the preference for segregation is equal to preference for integration: \(v(r_g^*)+v(r_l^*)=v(r)\). Then \(r_g^*\) is defined by \(F(r_g^*, r, \lambda , \alpha ) = 0\), where \(F(r_g, r, \lambda , \alpha ) = r_g^\alpha - r^\alpha - \lambda (r_g-r)^\alpha \). Using envelope theorem \(\frac{\partial F}{\partial \lambda } = -(r_g-r)^\alpha < 0\). This shows that the preference for segregation is decreasing in loss aversion \(\lambda \). \(\square \)
1.3 Example of the impact of the shape of the value function on preferences
In this example, we assume that the overall return, r, is negative, the reference point is set at zero and \(\lambda \) is constant (at 3 levels of \(\lambda =4, 2, 1\)). \(r_g\) and \(r_l = r-r_g\) are the outcomes of the two subportfolios. \(r_g>0\) shows that the subportfolios present the mixed outcomes of r, and \(r_g<0\) denotes that both subportfolios are negative. Figure 5 shows how the presentation of two subportfolios (segregation) can create more value for the investor. The overall performance for this example is \(-2.5\). The portfolio is equally divided into two subportfolios with \(r_g\) and \(r-r_g\). As shown in Fig. 5, the preference for segregation over integration depends on the loss aversion and risk aversion coefficient (curvature of the value function). For mixed outcomes (\(r_g>0\)), we can see that the regret-proof policy is more effective for individuals who are less loss averse and who have a more concave value function in gains. When the outcomes are both negative (\(r_g<0\)), the segregation of the portfolio is preferred for the value function that is concave in losses.
1.4 Robustness check
See Appendix Tables 11 and 12.
1.5 Survey question
See Appendix Fig. 6.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Meunier, L., Ohadi, S. When are two portfolios better than one? A prospect theory approach. Theory Decis 94, 503–538 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09901-z
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09901-z